Front cover image for Truth in virtue of meaning

Truth in virtue of meaning

The distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences (the idea that some sentences are true or false just in virtue of what they mean) is a famous focus of philosophical controversy. Gillian Russell reinvigorates the debate with a new defence of the distinction, showing that it is compatible with semantic externalism
eBook, English, 2008
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008
1 online resource (xv, 232 pages)
9780191528330, 9780191715907, 9780199694730, 9781281150431, 9786611150433, 0191528331, 0191715905, 0199694737, 1281150436, 6611150439
609342337
The 'in virtue of' relation
Meaning
Beyond modality
The spectre of "two dogmas"
Definitions
More arguments against analyticity
Analytic justification
Electronic reproduction, [Place of publication not identified], HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010
English
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