Apocalypse management : Eisenhower and the discourse of national insecurity
For eight years President Dwight Eisenhower claimed to pursue peace and national security. Yet his policies entrenched the United States in a seemingly permanent cold war, a spiraling nuclear arms race, and a deepening state of national insecurity. Ira Chernus uncovers the key to this paradox in Eisenhower's unwavering commitment to a consistent way of talking, in private as well as in public, about the cold war rivalry. Contrary to what most historians have concluded, Eisenhower never aimed at any genuine rapprochement with the Soviet Union. He discourse always assumed that the United States would forever face an enemy bent on destroying it, making national insecurity a permanent way of life. The "peace" he sought was only an endless process of managing apocalyptic threats, a permanent state of "apocalypse management," intended to give the United States unchallenged advantage in every arena of the cold war. The goal and the discourse that supported it were inherently self-defeating. Yet the discourse is Eisenhower's most enduring legacy, for it has shaped U.S. foreign policy ever since, leaving us still a national insecurity state
Print Book, English, 2008
Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 2008
History
xii, 307 pages ; 24 cm.
9780804758079, 0804758077
105454244
Introduction: on Eisenhower and discourse
Part I: The Origins Of Apocalypse Management
Ideological foundations
"The chance for peace"
Candor and Korea
The new look and "atoms for peace"
Part II: The Trials Of Apocalypse Management
The trap
The president and the bomb, 1953-1955
Part III: The Triumph Of Apocalypse Management
The Formosa Straits crisis
"Open skies"
The spirit of Geneva
Part IV: The Ironies Of Apocalypse Management
Beyond Geneva
Mutual security and the military budget
The president and the bomb, 1956-1960
The ironies of disarmament
Conclusion: the national insecurity state