Lapas attēli

was affected by a rash caused by contact with damp goods it was held that he was not injured by accident. So, where, as the result of years of labor, a man finally breaks down and has to give up work. But in an English case it was held that where a man died from a disease called "anthrax ” as the result of a specific poison absorbed in the course of his employment as a wool sorter, his death was accidental. And under the terms of an accident policy it has been held that death due to glanders contracted by a man in the course of his employment was accidental. The acceleration or aggravation of a pre-existing disease or infirmity is an “injury caused by accident."

Sun-stroke, except under peculiar circumstances is generally considered as a disease. Frost-bites, too, have generally been held to be one of the natural incidents of a cold climate, not "arising out of the employment," and not" accidental” injuries. But when the nature of the employment is such as to expose the workman in a peculiar degree to the effects of heat or cold he may be entitled to compensation; as where a sailor, painting on the outside of a ship under a tropical sun, suffered from the effects of the sun's rays increased by reflection from the side of the vessel. So heat-stroke caused by working in front of a furnace is held to be an accidental injury.

If the original injury is one for which the employer is liable he will be liable also for the incidental results of the injury; as for example where death results from the use of an anæsthetic in an operation rendered necessary by the accident. . So, where a workman lost the sight of one eye by the spattering of hot metal, and at the hospital, in a fit of insanity caused by his injuries, jumped out of a window and was killed, it was held that his widow was entitled to compensation for his death.

Where a workman unreasonably refuses to submit to a safe and reasonable operation which will relieve or remove his incapacity to work at his trade, his incapacity thereafter is held to be the result of his refusal, and not of the original accident. In such case, however, the burden of proof is on the employer to show that the operation would have effected the result claimed, and that the refusal was unreasonable. The workman may justify by showing that he acted under the advice of an honest and competent physician. The same principle has been applied

where the workman persistently neglects or refuses to conform to habits of life essential to his recovery.

Again, the employee's injury must “arise out of his employment.” It must be due to the character of the work in which he is engaged, or to the conditions by which he is surrounded, or the dangers to which he is peculiarly exposed while performing it. In the language of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts: “The injury arises out of the employment when then is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all the circumstances, a casual connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury.”. It need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence."

Thus, while the employer would clearly be liable for injury caused by an accidental explosion in the quarry in which his employee was working, he would not be responsible if the employee was injured by a stray bullet fired from oụtside. So, it has been held that where a man engaged in working high up in the air upon the steel frame of a building was struck by lightning the accident was attributable in part to the exposed character of the place where he was working, and therefore due to his employment, but that when a factory operative was so struck he was not entitled to compensation as the conditions under which he was working exposed him to no special danger. An employer has been held liable for injury caused by the explosion of a steam boiler operated by a third party on the floor below that on which his business was conducted, on the ground that his workmen were necessarily exposed to this hazard while doing their work. So too, where the injury.was caused by the bite of a cat habitually kept in the place of employment. And where the statute covers disease, the employer would be liable for the effects of an “occupational disease" such as lead or phosphorous poisoning, or a disease caused by bad drainage or other unhealthful conditions of the place where the employee was required to work, but not where the employee contracted an infectious disease, such as small-pox, from a fellow workman. Thus, where a boy in doing his work was required to use a

leaky boat and contracted pneumonia as the result of wetting his feet, he was held to be entitled to compensation. On the other hand, when a teamster became temporarily deranged while on the road and after driving about aimlessly a long distance from his usual route was found dead from exposure, it was held that there was nothing in the nature of his employment that exposed him to danger of temporary derangement, and that the injury did not arise "out of his employment."

Injuries suffered by an employee at the hands of third persons while in the performance of his duty are generally considered as arising out of his employment. For instance, where a paymaster was robbed of his employer's funds and killed while engaged in his regular duties; where a game-keeper was attacked and injured by a poacher; and where an engineer was killed by a stone thrown by a boy from a bridge under which the train was passing. So, where a checker employed by a merchant was assaulted and killed by a drunken fellow-servant who was known by his employer to be quarrelsome and dangerous when intoxicated; and where a foreman whose duty it was to keep order was injured while attempting to stop a fight between workmen. On the other hand injuries resulting from practical jokes played by one workman on another, or from rough play, or from a private quarrel between workmen are generally held not to arise out of the employment. So too, where the assault has no relation to the fact of employment, as when it is committed by a drunken stranger.

The fact that the injury would not have been suffered had the workman been stronger or in better health is immaterial. “An accident arises out of the employment," said the Lord Chancellor of England," when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or the condition of health.” Accordingly, it was held that the rupture of an aneurism while the workman was tightening a screw — a work not involving excessive strain — was an accident arising out of the employment; and so in a case of apoplexy brought on by over exertion.

Finally. The injury to the employee must have been sustained " in the course of his employment.” The liability in this

respect does not depend on whether the general relation of employer and employee subsists between the parties, but whether at the time of the accident the employee was actually in the performance of the employer's business or under his control and subject to his direction; and it is held that an employee is deemed to be in the employer's service whenever he is present to perform his duties as a servant, and subject to orders, although at a given time he may not be in the actual performance of a duty. The law on this point is thus stated by an eminent judge: “An accident arises in the course of employment when the employee is doing what a man so employed may reasonably do, within a time during which he is employed, and at a place where he may reasonably be during that time.”

Generally speaking, in a manufacturing or other similar business, the workman begins his employment upon entering the employer's premises and continues in it until he has left them. It has been held, however, that when the employee enters the premises by a forbidden route or one different from that provided by the employer, a resulting injury is not incurred in the course of his employment. Nor is the employer responsible when the employee temporarily leaves his work and for purposes of his own goes to a part of the establishment where he has no duty to perform and there meets with an accident; nor where, being employed to work on a certain machine, or to do a certain kind of work, he voluntarily and without orders undertakes the operation of a different machine or the performance of a different kind of work. But if the work is done with the assent of the employer, express or implied, or by the direction of his authorized agent the fact that it is outside of the scope of his regular employment is immaterial. In the case of a sudden emergency the employee may, in the interests of his employer, do acts not within the scope of his usual employment, as when a servant was injured while endeavoring to stop his master's runaway horse.

Where the accident does not take place on the employer's premises his liability depends upon the same general principles. Thus if the employer sends his coachman on an errand with his carriage and the coachman goes on a pleasure ride or on business of his own, the employer is not responsible, and so when he takes

his employer's horse, or automobile without leave. But where a servant was injured while watering his employer's horse, which was one of his duties, it was held to be immaterial that he was intending after the watering to take the horse out for his own purposes.

Where a workman was employed in unloading a gondola car and after it was unloaded jumped on the car and rode to a switch where he had no duty, merely to pass the time, it was held that the employer was not liable for an injury which he sustained while so riding. On the other hand, where a factory employee deviated from his usual route in going from his home to his work in order to procure an article which his employer had directed him to procure it was held that this was in the course of his employment. And so where it is a part of the contract of service, express or implied, that the employee shall be carried to and from the place where the work is actually performed an accident happening on the way is in the course of employment.

The relation of employer and employee exists for a reasonable time before and after the actual performance of work provided the employee is upon the employer's premises. Thus, injuries sustained while coming to work or leaving it are within the scope of the employment.

So, where a workman after finishing his work for the day was injured while changing his clothes. And where a woman, after she had quit work at her machine, had her hair caught in machinery while combing it preparatory to going home at noon, it was held that the accident arose out of and in course of her employment. Where a workman is taking his lunch during the lunch hour upon the employer's premises at a place provided for that purpose, or at an apparently safe place which he has not been forbidden to use, he is still in the exercise of his employment. So, where a woman, after leaving her work room at the noon hour to go to lunch was injured by falling on stairs which formed the only means of access to the room, although not in the control of the employer, it was held that her going out for that purpose was incident to her employment, and that she was entitled to compensation. And a workman is still acting in the course of his employment where after his work is finished he returns to his employer's premises for his pay.

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