Lapas attēli

fixed by law, and extended to a vast variety of contracts; and indeed to all to which its privileges properly apply. And qualified and guarded as it is, it seems to be no more than reasonable. In fact, it may be doubted whether a large portion of the common law of England and of this country rests upon any other basis than that of custom. The theory has been held, that the actual foundation of most ancient usages was statute law, which the lapse of time has hidden out of sight. This is not very probable as a fact. The common law is every day adopting as rules and principles the mere usages of the community, or of those classes of the community who are most conversant with the matters to which these rules relate; and it is certain that a large proportion of the existing law first acquired force in this way.

Other facts must be considered; as how far the meaning sought to be put on the words departs from their common meaning as given by the dictionary, or by general use, and whether other makers of this article used these words in various senses, or used other words to express the alleged meaning. Because the main question is always this: Can it be said that both parties ought to have used these words in this sense, and that each party had good reason to believe that the other party so understood them?

Custom and usage are very often spoken of as if they were the same thing. But this is a mistake. Custom is the thing to be proved, and usage is the evidence of the custom. Whether a custom exists is a question of fact. But in the proof of this fact questions of law of two kinds may arise. One, whether the evidence is admissible, which is to be settled by the common principles of the law of evidence. The other, whether the facts stated are legally sufficient to prove a custom. If one man testified that he had done a certain thing once, and had heard that his neighbor had done it once, this evidence would not be given to the jury for them to draw from it the inference of custom if they saw fit, because it would be legally insufficient. But if many men testified to a uniform usage within their knowledge, and were uncontradicted, the court would say whether this usage was sufficient in quantity and quality to establish a custom, and

if they deemed it to be so, would instruct the jury, that, if they believed the witnesses, the custom was proved. The cases on this subject are numerous. But no definite rule as to the proof

of custom can be drawn from them, other than that derivable from the reason on which the legal operation of custom rests; namely, that the parties must be supposed to have contracted with reference to it.

must be But if it

As a general rule, the knowledge of a custom brought home to a party who is to be affected by it. be shown that the custom is ancient, very general and well known, it will often be a presumption of law that the party had knowledge of it; although, if the custom appeared to be more recent, and less generally known, it might be necessary to establish by independent proof the knowledge of this custom by the party. One of the most common grounds for inferring knowledge in the parties, is the fact of their previous similar dealings with each other. The custom might be so perfectly ascertained and universal, that the party's actual ignorance could not be given in proof, nor assist him in resisting a custom, If one sold goods, and the buyer being sued for the price, de fended on the ground of a custom of three months' credit, the jury might be instructed that the defence was not made out unless they could not only infer from the evidence the existence of the custom, but a knowledge of it by the plaintiff. But if the buyer had given a negotiable note at three months, no ignor ance of the seller would enable him to demand payment with out grace, even where the days of grace were not given by statute. In such a case, the reason of the law of custom—that the parties contracted with reference to it-seems to be lost sight of. But in fact the custom in such a case has the force of law; an ignorance of which cannot be supposed, and, if it be proved, it neither excuses any one, nor enlarges his rights.

No custom can be proved, or permitted to influence the com struction of a contract, or vary the rights of parties, if the custom itself be illegal. For this would be to permit parties to break the law because others had broken it, and then to found the rights upon their own wrong-doing.

Neither would courts sanction a custom by permitting its

operation upon the rights of parties, which was in itself wholly unreasonable. In relation to a law, properly enacted, this inquiry cannot be made in a country where the judicial and legislative powers are properly separated. But in reference to custom, which is a quasi law, and has often the effect of law, but has not its obligatory power over the court, the character of the custom will be considered; and if it be altogether foolish, or mischievous, the court will not regard it; and if a contract exist which only such a custom can give effect to, the contract itself will be declared void.

Lastly, it must be remembered that no custom, however universal, or old, or known, unless it has actually passed into law, has any force over parties against their will. Hence, in the interpretation of contracts, it is an established rule, that no custom can be admitted which the parties have seen fit expressly to exclude. Thus, to refer again to the custom of allowing grace on bills and notes on time, there is no doubt that the parties may agree to waive this; and even the statutes which have made this custom law, permit this waiver. And not only is a custom inadmissible which the parties have expressly excluded, but it is equally so if the parties have excluded it by a necessary implication; as by providing that the thing which the custom affects shall be done in a different way. For a custom can no more be set up against the clear intention of the parties than against their express agreement; and no usage can be incorporated into a contract which is inconsistent with the terms of the contract.

Where the terms of a contract are plain, usage, even under that very contract, cannot be permitted to affect materially the construction to be placed upon it; but when it is ambiguous, a long-continued usage may influence the judgment of the court, by showing how the contract was understood by the parties to it.



It is very common for parties to offer evidence external to the contract in aid of the interpretation of its language. The


general rule is, that such evidence cannot be admitted to con tradict or vary the terms of a valid written contract; or, as the rule is expressed by writers on the Scotch law, "writing cannot be cut down or taken away by the testimony of witnesses." The rule is often expressed with sufficient exactness for ordi nary purposes, in this way: "Evidence may be admitted to ex plain a written contract, but not to contradict it." There are many reasons for this rule. One is, the general preference of the law for written evidence over unwritten; or, in other words, for the more definite and certain evidence over that which is less so; a preference which not only makes written evidence better than unwritten, but classifies that which is written. if a negotiation be conducted in writing, and even if there be a distinct proposition in a letter, and a distinct assent, making a contract, and then the parties reduce this contract to writing, and both execute the instrument, this instrument controls the letters, and they are not permitted to vary the force and effect of the instrument, although they may sometimes be of use in explaining its terms. Another is, the same desire to prevent fraud which gave rise to the statute of frauds; for as that statute requires that certain contracts shall be in writing, so this rule refuses to permit contracts which are in writing to be controlled by merely oral evidence. But the principal cause alleged in the books and cases is, that when parties, after whatever conversation or preparation, at last reduce their agreement to writing, this may be looked upon as the final consummation of their negotiation, and the exact expression of their purpose. And all of their earlier agreements, though apparently made while it all lay in conversation, which is not now incorporated into their written contract, may be considered as intentionally rejected. The parties write the contract when they are ready to do so, for the very purpose of including all that they have finally agreed upon, and excluding everything else, and making this certain and permanent. And if every written contract were held subject to enlargement, or other alteration, according to the testimony which might be offered on one side or the other as to previous intention, or collateral facts, it would obviously be of no use to reduce a contract to writing, or to attempt to give it certainty and fixedness in any way.

It is nevertheless certain, that some evidence from without must be admissible in the explanation or interpretation of every contract. If the agreement be, that one party shall convey to the other, for a certain price, a certain parcel of land, it is only by extrinsic evidence that the persons can be identified who claim or are alleged to be parties, and that the parcel of land can be ascertained. It may be described by bounds, but the question then comes, where are the streets, or roads, or neighbors, or monuments referred to in the description; and it may sometimes happen that much evidence is necessary to identify these persons or things. Hence, we may say, as the general rule, that as to the parties or the subject-matter of a contract, extrinsic evidence may and must be received and used to make them certain, if necessary for that purpose. But as to the terms, conditions, and limitations of the agreement, the written contract must speak exclusively for itself. Hence, too, a false description of person or thing has no effect in defeating a contract, if the error can be distinctly shown and perfectly corrected, by other mat ter in the instrument.

A written contract, of which the memorandum satisfies the statute of frauds, is open to evidence to show that certain essentials of the actual contract are not in the memorandum, if the effect of the evidence is, not to vary the written contract, but to show that no such contract was ever made.

Recitals in an instrument may sometimes be qualified or contradicted by extrinsic evidence; by "recitals" are meant the narrative of the circumstances or purposes which have induced the parties to make the contract. So the date of an instrument, or if there be no date, the time when it was to take effect, which may be other than the day of delivery; or the amount of the consideration paid, may be varied by testimony; but if a note given for land is sued, the promisor cannot show in defence that the deed described a less quantity of land than had been stipu lated. And an instrument may be shown to be void and with. out legal existence or efficacy, as for want of consideration, or for fraud, or duress, or any incapacity of the parties, or any illegality in the agreement. In the same way, extrinsic evi dence may show a total discharge of the obligations of the con

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