CHAPTER V.

Philosophy.-Stuart Mill.

I. Philosophy in England-Organisation of positive science-Lack of general ideas.

II. Why metaphysics are wanting-Authority of Religion.

III. Indications and splendour of free thought-New exegesis-Stuart MillHis works His order of mind-To what school of philosophers he belongs —Value of higher speculation in human civilisation.

§ 1.-EXPOSITION OF MILL'S PHILOSOPHY.

I. Object of logic-Wherein it is distinguished from psychology and metaphysics.

--

II. What is a judgment? — What do we know of the external and inner worlds?-The whole object of science is to add or connect facts.

III. The system based on this view of the nature of our knowledge.

IV. Theory of definitions-Its importance-Refutation of the old theory-There are no definitions of things, but of names only.

V. Theory of proof-Ordinary theory-Its refutation- What is the really fundamental part of a syllogism?

VI. Theory of axioms-Ordinary theory-Its refutation-Axioms are only truths of experience of a certain class.

VII. Theory of induction—The cause of a fact is only its invariable antecedent --Experience alone proves the stability of the laws of nature-What is a law?-By what methods are laws discovered?—The methods of agreement, of differences, of residues, of concomitant variations.

VIII. Examples and applications-Theory of dew.

IX. Deduction-Its province and method.

X. Comparison of the methods of induction and deduction-Ancient employment of the first-Modern use of the second-Sciences requiring the first -Sciences requiring the second-Positive character of Mill's work-His predecessors.

XI. Limits of our knowledge-It is not certain that all events happen according to laws-Chance in nature.

I. Agreement of this philosophy with the English mind-Alliance of the positive and religious spirits-By what faculty we arrive at the knowledge of causation.

II. There are no substances or forces, but only facts and laws-AbstractionIts nature-Its part in science.

III. Theory of definitions-They explain the abstract generating elements of

things.

IV. Theory of proof-The basis of proof in syllogism is an abstract law. V. Theory of axioms-Axioms are relations between abstract truths-They may be reduced to the axiom of identity.

VI. Theory of induction-Its methods are of elimination or abstraction. VII. The two great operations of the mind, experience and abstraction-The two great manifestations of things, sensible facts and abstract laws-Why we ought to pass from the first to the second-Meaning and extent of the axiom of causation.

VIII. It is possible to arrive at the knowledge of first elements-Error of German metaphysicians-They have neglected the element of chance, and of local perturbations-What might be known by a philosophising ant — Idea and limits of metaphysics-Its state in the three thinking nations-A morning in Oxford.1

W

I.

HEN at Oxford some years ago, during the meeting of the British Association, I met, amongst the few students still in residence, a young Englishman, a man of intelligence, with whom I became intiHe took me in the evening to the New Museum, well filled with

mate.

66

1 M. Taine has published this 'Study on Mill' separately, and preceded it by the following note, as a preface :- 'When this Study first appeared, Mr. Mill did me the honour to write to me that it would not be possible to give in a few pages a more exact and complete notion of the contents of his work, considered as a body of philosophical teaching. But," he added, "I think you are wrong in regarding the views I adopt as especially English. They were so in the first half of the eighteenth century, from the time of Locke to that of the reaction against Hume. This reaction, beginning in Scotland, assumed long ago the German form, and ended by prevailing universally. When I wrote my book, I stood almost alone in my opinions; and though they have met with a degree of sympathy which I by no means expected, we may still count in England twenty à priori and spiritualist philosophers for every partisan of the doctrine of Experience."

"This remark is very true. I myself could have made it, having been brought up in the doctrines of Scotch philosophy and the writings of Reid. I simply answer, that there are philosophers whom we do not count, and that all such, whether English or not, spiritualist or not, may be neglected without much harm. Once in a half century, or perhaps in a century, or two centuries, some thinker appears; Bacon and Hume in England, Descartes and Condillac in France, Kant and Hegel in Germany. At other times the stage is unoccupied, or ordinary men come forward, and offer the public that which the public likes-Sensualists or Idealists, according to the tendency of the day, with sufficient instruction and skill to play leading parts, and enough capacity to re-set old airs, well drilled in the works of their predecessors, but destitute of real invention-simple executant musicians, who stand in the place of composers. In Europe, at present, the stage is a blank. The Germans adapt and alter effete French materialism. The French listen from habit, but somewhat wearily and distractedly, to the scraps of melody and eloquent commonplace which their instructors have repeated to them for the last thirty years. In this deep silence, and from among these dull mediocrities, a master comes forward to speak. Nothing of the sort has been seen since Hegel.'

specimens. Here short lectures were delivered, new models of machinery were set to work; ladies were present and took an interest in the experiments; on the last day, full of enthusiasm, God save the Queen was sung. I admired this zeal, this solidity of mind, this organisation of science, these voluntary subscriptions, this aptitude for association and for labour, this great machine pushed on by so many arms, and so well fitted to accumulate, criticise, and classify facts. But yet, in this abundance, there was a void; when I read the Transactions, I thought I was present at a congress of heads of manufactories. All these learned men verified details and exchanged recipes. It was as though I listened to foremen, busy in communicating their processes for tanning leather or dyeing cotton: general ideas were wanting. I used to regret this to my friend; and in the evening, by his lamp, amidst that great silence in which the university town lay wrapped, we both tried to discover its reasons.

II.

One day I said to him: You lack philosophy-I mean, what the Germans call metaphysics. You have learned men, but you have no thinkers. Your God impedes you. He is the Supreme Cause, and you dare not reason on causes, out of respect for him. He is the most important personage in England, and I see clearly that he merits his position; for he forms part of your constitution, he is the guardian of your morality, he judges in final appeal on all questions whatsoever, he replaces with advantage the prefects and gendarmes with whom the nations on the Continent are still encumbered. Yet, this high rank has the inconvenience of all official positions; it produces a cant, prejudices, intolerance, and courtiers. Here, close by us, is poor Mr. Max Müller, who, in order to acclimatise the study of Sanscrit, was compelled to discover in the Vedas the worship of a moral God, that is to say, the religion of Paley and Addison. Some time ago, in London, I read a proclamation of the Queen, forbidding people to play cards, even in their own houses, on Sundays. It seems that, if I were robbed, I could not bring my thief to justice without taking a preliminary religious oath; for the judge has been known to send a complainant away who refused to take the oath, deny him justice, and insult him into the bargain. Every year, when we read the Queen's speech in your papers, we find there the compulsory mention of Divine Providence, which comes in mechanically, like the apostrophe to the immortal gods on the fourth page of a rhetorical declamation; and you remember that once, the pious phrase having been omitted, a second communication was made to Parliament for the express purpose of supplying it. All these cavillings and pedantry indicate to my mind a celestial monarchy; naturally it resembles all others; I mean that it relies more willingly on tradition and custom than on examination and reason. monarchy never invited men to verify its credentials. As yours is, however, useful, well adapted to you, and moral, you are not revolted

A

by it; you submit to it without difficulty, you are, at heart, attached to it; you would fear, in touching it, to disturb the constitution and morality. You leave it in the clouds, amidst public homage. You fall back upon yourselves, confine yourselves to matters of fact, to minute dissections, to experiments in the laboratory. You go culling plants and collecting shells. Science is deprived of its head; but all is for the best, for practical life is improved, and dogma remains intact.

III.

You are truly French, he answered; you leap over facts, and all at once find yourself settled in a theory. I assure you that there are thinkers amongst us, and not far from hence, at Christ Church, for instance. One of them, the professor of Greek, has spoken so deeply on inspiration, the creation and final causes, that he is out of favour. Look at this little collection which has recently appeared, Essays and Reviews ; your philosophic freedom of the last century, the latest conclusions of geology and cosmogony, the boldness of German exegesis, are here in abstract. Some things are wanting, amongst others the waggeries of Voltaire, the misty jargon of Germany, and the prosaic coarseness of Comte; to my mind, the loss is small. Wait twenty years, and you will find in London the ideas of Paris and Berlin.—But they will still be the ideas of Paris and Berlin. Whom have you that is original ?— Stuart Mill. Who is he?-A political writer. His little book On Liberty is as admirable as Rousseau's Contrat Social is bad.-That is a bold assertion.-No, for Mill decides as strongly for the independence of the individual as Rousseau for the despotism of the State.-Very well, but that is not enough to make a philosopher. What besides is he? An economist who goes beyond his science, and subordinates production to man, instead of man to production.-Well, but this is not enough to make a philosopher. Is he anything else?-A logician. Very good; but of what school? Of his own. I told you he was original.—Is he Hegelian?-By no means; he is too fond of facts and proofs. Does he follow Port-Royal?-Still less; he is too well acquainted with modern sciences.-Does he imitate Condillac ?—Certainly not; Condillac has only taught him to write well.—Who, then, are his friends?-Locke and Comte in the first rank; then Hume and Newton. -Is he a system-monger, a speculative reformer ?-He has too much sense for that; he only arranges the best theories, and explains the best methods. He does not attitudinise majestically in the character of a restorer of science; he does not declare, like your Germans, that his book will open up a new era for humanity. He proceeds gradually, somewhat slowly, often creepingly, through a multitude of particular facts. He excels in giving precision to an idea, in disentangling a principle, in discovering it amongst a number of different facts; in refuting, distinguishing, arguing. He has the astuteness, patience, method, and sagacity of a lawyer.-Very well, you admit that I was

right. A lawyer, an ally of Locke, Newton, Comte, and Hume; we have here only English philosophy; but no matter. Has he reached a grand conception of the universe?—Yes.-Has he an individual and complete idea of nature and the mind?—Yes.-Has he combined the operations and discoveries of the intellect under a single principle which puts them all in a new light?—Yes; but we have to discover this principle. That is your business, and I hope you will undertake it. But I shall fall into abstract generalities.-There is no harm in that? -But this close reasoning will be like a quick-set hedge.-We will prick our fingers with it. But three men out of four would cast aside such speculations as idle.-So much the worse for them. For in what does the life of a nation or a century consist, except in the formation of such theories? We are not thoroughly men unless so engaged. If some dweller in another planet were to come down here to ask us the nature of our race, we should have to show him the five or six great ideas which we have formed of the mind and the world. That alone would give him the measure of our intelligence. Expound to me your theory, and I shall go away better instructed than after having seen the masses of brick, which you call London and Manchester.

§ 1.-EXPERIENCE.
I.

Let us begin, then, at the beginning, like logicians. Mill has written on logic. What is logic? It is a science. What is its object? The sciences; for, suppose that you have traversed the universe, and that you know it thoroughly, stars, earth, sun, heat, gravity, chemical affinities, the species of minerals, geological revolutions, plants, animals, human events, all that classifications and theories explain and embrace, there still remain these classifications and theories to be learnt. Not only is there an order of beings, but also an order of the thoughts which represent them; not only plants and animals, but also botany and zoology; not only lines, surfaces, volumes, and numbers, but also geometry and arithmetic. Sciences, then, are as real things as facts themselves, and therefore, as well as facts, become the subject of study. We can analyse them as we analyse facts, investigate their elements, composition, order, relations, and object. There is, therefore, a science of sciences; this science is called logic, and is the subject of Mill's work. It is no part of logic to analyse the operations of the mind, memory, the association of ideas, external perception, etc.; that is the business of psychology. We do not discuss the value of such operations, the veracity of our consciousness, the absolute certainty of our elementary knowledge; this belongs to metaphysics. We suppose our faculties to be at work, and we admit their primary discoveries. We take the instrument as nature has provided it, and we trust to its accuracy. We leave to others the task of taking its mechanism to pieces, and the VOL. II. 2 H