one thousand dollars, the officer alleging that he made the seizure for duties due on the goods which he had imported. The officer alleged that other duties than those paid at Santa Fé were due for the payment of which the seizure was made. To support the claim the deposition of John Prewett has been filed. Mr. Prewett states that 'he was in Chihauhua in April 1831, and resided in the same house with Scott, and was present with him in said month, when a Mexican officer, and as this affiant believes, an officer of the custom-house, or a revenue officer of the Government of Mexico, entered the house of said Scott with a file of soldiers in the Mexican service and seized upon and took away from said Scott six bags of money in silver coin, containing, as this affiant believes, one thousand dollars each; the said officer alleging at the time, as well as this affiant now remembers, that said seizure was made for duties due upon the goods of said Scott.'

"This deposition is all the testimony which has been presented to the board. The general statements which it presents are not sufficient to show any responsibility on the part of the Mexican Government for the alleged loss of the claimant's money. Twenty years have elapsed since the loss complained of occurred. During all that time no complaint has been made either to the Government of the United States or to the Mexican Government, and no demand for indemnity has been presented. No claim was presented to the commission organized under the convention of 1839, and it has been presented to this board at a very late period. This long delay in presenting any claim for indemnity, although not conclusive evidence against the validity of the claim, may well excite some suspicion and justify a demand for proof more definite than that which has been presented. *

* **

"If the facts occurred as they are stated by the witness, the most rational inference is that it was a mere robbery perpetrated by a lawless band of soldiers, or by ruffians who, for the occasion, assumed their character, and used the name of a custom-house officer to cover the crime. For such a wrong the government can not be held responsible. Upon no principle of national law can a government be held responsible for every act of lawless violence which may be perpetrated within its dominions. If an illegal exaction of duties had been made by an officer of the government charged with the duty of collecting its revenue, it might be charged that the government should be accountable; but in this case that is neither charged

nor proved. The money, it is alleged, was taken by a customhouse officer. A weigher, gauger, or a clerk in the custom-house might be called a custom-house officer, yet the government could not be held accountable for any act of lawless violence he might have committed. A remedy might have been afforded the claimant by the judicial authorities of the place, but it does not seem that any application was made to them. There is not sufficient proof to show that the wrong, if any was perpetrated, was done by an officer for whose acts the government could be held responsible."

Memorial of William L. Scott: Opinion of Messrs. Evans, Smith, and Paine, commissioners, March 22, 1851, under the act of Congress of March 22, 1851.

Case of the "Express."

"The memorial sets forth that in the month of May 1832 the schooner Express sailed from New Orleans with a cargo on board, belonging in part to the memorialist, bound for Omoa, in the Bay of Honduras, intending to touch at Truxillo for the purpose of landing passengers and a portion of the cargo. Upon arriving at this latter place it was ascertained that the port and castle of Omoa were in a state of rebellion and were then besieged by the troops of Guatemala, and that all commercial intercourse with that port was interdicted. The captain and supercargo of the vessel thereupon resolved to seek another market for the cargo and set sail for Sisal, Yucatan, in the Republic of Mexico,' but upon arriving there found that port blockaded, and thence continued the voyage to Campeachy, where they arrived the 18th of June. The manifest of the cargo was exhibited to the custom-house officer by whom the vessel was boarded, who informed the captain that it should have been certified by the Mexican consul at the port of departure. On the following day the captain and supercargo attended at the custom-house and delivered the manifest, upon inspection of which it was found that there were several prohibited articles on board, which by the Mexican laws were liable to confiscation. Proceedings were therefore instituted before the district judge, before whom the master and supercargo appeared, when, in the language of the memorial, 'the whole matter was fully explained and understood.' The judge however decided that the prohibited articles were liable to confiscation and gave judgment accordingly, and also muleted the vessel with an additional penalty of $202.62. The

memorialist claims indemnity for the articles thus confiscated, and for the penalty imposed.

"No appeal appears to have been taken from this decision. The claim was not presented to the joint commission under the convention of 11th of April 1839, nor does it appear that the interposition of the Government of the United States was ever invoked in the case. These are circumstances indicative of a conviction on the part of the memorialist that the Mexican authorities were justified by the laws of Mexico in the proceedings which took place. The vessel voluntarily entered a Mexican port seeking a market for her cargo, a part of which consisted of merchandise not allowed by the laws of the country to be imported. Those laws imposed a penalty for such importation, and it is not alleged and does not appear that anything more was done than they required. No complaint is made that the trial before the district judge was not fairly conducted, nor that his judgment was unauthorized by the laws of Mexico. In the opinion of the board the memorial does not set forth a valid claim against Mexico, and it is therefore rejected."

Memorial of James F. Desbois: Opinion of Messrs. Evans, Smith, and Paine, commissioners, January 17, 1850, under the act of Congress of March 3, 1849.

Case of the "St.
Croix."

"The St. Croix sailed from New York to Aransas Bay, in Texas, in 1834, with a party of colonists and their effects. After the passengers and cargo had been discharged by the permission of the collector of the port, a demand was made by the captain [of the port] for tonnage duties alleged to be due, amounting to $210. Captain Ward, alleging that he had understood that vessels arriving with colonists were not liable to any charge for tonnage duties, and had not therefore provided himself with funds to meet such a charge, offered to pay $100, which was all the money he had at the time, and offered to draw upon the owners of the vessel for the residue, or to procure the inoney there, if a short time should be allowed him for the purpose. While he was endeavoring to make arrangements to raise the money he was finally seized by order of the collector and imprisoned twenty-nine days, when he was discharged. In the mean time the vessel had been dismantled, her sails carried off, her stores destroyed or taken away by the order of the collector, and the captain deprived of all control over her. He then protested and abandoned her and returned to the United States.

"The forcible seizure of the vessel under the circumstances, the carrying off her sails, and the waste and destruction of her stores for the nonpayment of tonnage duties alleged to be due, without any judicial proceedings either to ascertain the amount of the duties, or to direct the means of enforcing their payment, appears to the board as an act of illegal violence, justified by no law of Mexico of which they have any knowledge, and constituting a valid claim."

Memorial of William D. McCarty, assignee of John Woolsey: Opinion of Messrs. Evans, Smith, and Jones, commissioners, November 28, 1849, under the act of Congress of March 3, 1849.

Case of the "Patrick
B. Hayes."

"The schooner Patrick B. Hayes, an American vessel registered at Philadelphia, sailed from that port to Vera Cruz on the 20th of September 1827 with a cargo of brandy, sperm candles, and cigars. The vessel and cargo were owned by Patrick Hayes, the claimant, who was a citizen of the United States. Two of the crew being disabled by sickness when the vessel reached the Gulf of Mexico, Commodore Porter, who was in command of a Mexican vessel of war, having met the schooner and finding her crew insufficient to navigate her, took the sick sailors on board of his vessel and sent two of his own crew to fill their place. On the night of the 12th of October, one of the Mexican sailors furnished by Commodore Porter being at the helm, through his carelessness or treachery the vessel was grounded on the coast of Yucatan, opposite Telhuac. The captain, having thrown overboard a part of the cargo with out getting the vessel off, on the morning of the 13th inst. went on shore for assistance. The inspector of the port sent out a boat, which took off a part of the cargo and also picked up a portion of what had been thrown overboard to lighten the vessel. The inspector then took possession of the vessel and detained the captain on shore several days, refusing to allow him to return on board. The captain applied to the judge of the district, Juan José Seal, exhibited to him his papers, and requested the restoration of the vessel and cargo. This the judge refused to do, but after some days' delay ordered the cargo to be reshipped, and sent the vessel to Sisal for the purpose of instituting proceedings to procure their forfeiture. When the schooner arrived at Sisal the cargo was landed and deposited in the custom-house. Seal then instituted proceedings before the circuit court at Merida upon the allegation that the brandy which constituted the larger portion of the cargo

was of Spanish manufacture and therefore prohibited. Captain Hunston made every effort in his power to procure a decision of the court, but without success, and finally, about the latter part of December, abandoned the vessel and cargo and returned to the United States.

"In the mean time the claimant, who happened to be at Havana, hearing that his vessel had been seized, proceeded to Sisal and arrived there in January 1828. The court at length, in February, decided that the brandy was not of Spanish manufacture and was therefore an article of legitimate commerce, and that the vessel was not liable to seizure; but in consequence of the resemblance of the brandy to Spanish brandy, and the suspicions attaching to the vessel from her grounding at Telhuac, the owner was subjected to the payment of all the costs and expenses which had been incurred. An appeal was allowed from this decision to the claimant, upon his giving bond with security conditioned to comply with the final decision. Several securities were offered who were refused, upon grounds strongly indicating an intention to compel the claimant to abandon the appeal. The claimant was finally compelled to consent to a sale of the vessel and cargo for the payment of the costs and charges imposed on him by the court, which amounted to over $1,500, in addition to the duties on the cargo, which were about $1,200. The vessel and cargo were sold at public sale, and out of the entire proceeds the claimant, after paying the duties, costs, and charges, realized but about $1,700.

"The proceedings against the property of the claimant were vexations and oppressive in the highest degree. The papers produced in evidence satisfactorily prove that the voyage was a legal one, honestly undertaken, and without any intention of fraud. The brandy had been imported from Marseilles by the claimant but a few days before it was shipped for Vera Cruz. The seizure of the vessel was wanton and without excuse. The proceedings were unnecessarily delayed, occasioning great expense and trouble to the owner and captain. And when at length the tardy proceedings of the court were brought to a close, although that tribunal was forced to decide that the charges upon which the proceedings were instituted were false and unfounded, the sentence of acquittal was accompanied by an order for the payment of enormous costs and charges upon the ground that an intention of fraud had been suspected.