suggested above that broadcasting by a station other than that of origin is the same as repetition in slander and libel. But that is not true. Radio stations may be connected by wire, in the sense that one wire, or pair of wires, reaches each, but there is no relation between them. Each is an independent broadcaster, though all take identical matter from the same source. One may cease without affecting the others. It is as though an independent wire ran from the voice of the speaker to each station separately. It is not a case of repetition by any, but of original transmission by all. Their liability is therefore several, not joint, and no one is liable for defamation voluntarily spread by the other. Liability would be determined under the principles already discussed. A like situation arises if matter is broadcast from one station, and without its knowledge or consent a second station takes the transmission and broadcasts it to its own audience. Strictly speaking, this, of course, is not a case of repetition because there is no second voicing. Both operations are instantaneous and proceeding at the same time. This practice is prohibited by the Radio Act of 1927,1 and the action of the second station is therefore unlawful. It is difficult to see on what principle the first station could be held liable for the additional publicity given to the defamatory matter by the broadcasting of the second. Some cases have already been cited, holding that in the ordinary repetition of libel or slander, the original speaker is not liable for the second publicity since he is not responsible for the independent and illegal act of another. If there is a contractual or permissive relation between the two stations, liability would be determined under the ordinary rules of agency. Venue of Action. The gist of an action or prosecution for either libel or slander being the publication of the defamatory statements, a single radio broadcast may create liability in more than one jurisdiction. A statement broadcast in New York may reach listeners in Illinois and be libelous of a citizen of that state. It is easy to conceive possible instances of this sort. So far as civil liability is concerned, the necessity for personal service of process would in most cases preclude action elsewhere than in the state of residence of the libeller, and in the Federal courts venue is fixed in the district where the defendant resides, under the general provision governing actions dependent upon diversity of citizenship. 1 Section 28. Liability to criminal prosecution in a state other than that in which the transmitting station is located presents a more difficult question, involving the possibility of prosecution by a state for acts committed beyond its borders, application of particular statutes, extradition, and removals. Analogy may be found in the cases determining the liability of the owner of a newspaper printed in one state and circulated in another. In a case involving newspaper publication in Indianapolis with the circulation of a few copies in the District of Columbia, the Federal Court held that there was only a single publication in Indianapolis, and in refusing to order the removal of the defendant to the District of Columbia to answer a charge of libel there, said:1 When a newspaper owner or proprietor does what the evidence in this case shows these defendants did-composed, printed, and deposited in the mails for circulation these papers containing, for the purpose of this statement, libelous articles either they are guilty here, and in every county and district and jurisdiction into which those papers go, or they are only guilty here. When these defendants put newspapers containing the alleged libelous articles into the post office here in Indianapolis, which went through the mails throughout the country, to various states, counties, and districts of the United States, either they committed a separate crime every time one of those papers went into another county, another state, or another district, or there was but one crime, and that crime was committed here. A later case in Washington, distinguishing United States v. Smith, held that the proprietor of a paper published in California but circulated also in Washington was subject 1 United States v. Smith, 173 Fed. 227, 231. to prosecution in the latter state for any libelous matter so published. The court said:1 If a person residing without the state publishes a libel against a citizen of the state and circulates such libel within the state, he is as much subject to punishment within the state as any citizen of the state. The mere fact that he resides outside of the state and publishes the libel outside of the state is no excuse for a violation of the law of the state. There can be no doubt of the power of the state to prosecute a non-resident of the state who commits a crime against the law of the state by shooting across the line, or by causing a nuisance in a stream running from one state into another which results in injury to this state. The publishing of a libel stands on exactly the same footing. A text writer states the general rule as follows:2 A prosecution for libel, in the absence of statute, is sustainable in any county where a periodical containing it circulates or to which it is mailed for publication. A transmission of a newspaper published in one state to one of the counties of another state for circulation renders the publisher liable to prosecution in such county. Conclusion. It is apparent that no dogmatic conclusion can be reached on any phase of this subject. The very bases of liability are in doubt. No one can say with certainty whether radio defamation in many instances will be classed as libel or as slander, nor safely predict whether absolute liability will be imposed or only reasonable care required. With these fundamental principles in doubt, the entire situation is permeated with uncertainty. 1 State v. Piver, 132 Pac. (Wash.) 858. For case note see Ann. Cas. 1915A 697. * NEWELL, On "Slander and Libel," 4th ed., p. 917. CHAPTER XI INTERNATIONAL LAW International law has been defined to be a system of rules of reason, morality, and custom established among civilized nations as their public law and consists of rules of conduct which reason deduces as consonant with justice, from the nature of society existing among independent nations, with such definitions and modifications as may be established by general consent.1 It is much more succinctly stated to be the principles and rules adopted by civilized states as binding upon them in their dealings with each other.2 Apart from a few special agreements, treaties, or conventions, there is no specific international law governing radio communication, except as its general principles may be applicable. International Law in Time of War. The status of radio stations and the rights and duties of persons operating them in time of war have not been fully defined, but a few articles of existing conventions to which the United States is a party deal directly or indirectly with the subject. The Land War Neutrality Convention. 4 Article 3 of this convention prohibits the erecting of radio stations by belligerents on neutral territory and also the use by belligerents of any radio station established on such territory before the war for purely military purposes and not previously opened for the service of public messages. Article 5 obliges the neutral power not to allow any such proceeding by a belligerent. 1 Heirn v. Bridault, 37 Miss. 209, 230; Wheat. Int. Law, 36. 2 Charles Evans Hughes, before American Society of International Law, Nineteenth Annual Meeting. 3 The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 (James B. Scott), pp. 139, 180, 217. 4 MALLOY, "Treaties, Conventions, etc.," vol. II, pp. 2297, 2298. Under Article 8, a neutral power is not bound to forbid or restrict the employment on behalf of belligerents of radio stations belonging to it or to companies or private individuals. Under Article 9, the neutral power must apply to the belligerents impartially the measures taken by it under Article 8 and must enforce them on private owners of radio stations. Convention for the Adaptation to Naval War of the Principles of the Geneva Convention.1 By Article 8 of this convention, it is provided that the presence of a radio installation on board a hospital ship does not of itself justify the withdrawal of the protection to which a hospital ship is entitled so long as she does not commit acts harmful to the enemy. Convention Concerning Neutral Rights and Duties in Maritime Warfare.2 Under this convention, belligerents are forbidden, as part of the general prohibition of the use of neutral ports and waters as a base of naval operations, to erect radio stations therein, and, under Article 25, a neutral power is bound to exercise such supervision as the means at its disposal permit to prevent any violation of this provision. The Unratified Declaration of London of 1909. This declaration was signed by the powers represented in the Naval Conference. It embodied rules which corresponded in substance with the generally recognized principles of international law, and specified in Articles 45 and 46 certain acts in which the use of radio telegraphy 1 MALLOY, "Treaties, Conventions, etc.," vol. II, p. 2334. 2 MALLOY, "Treaties, Conventions, etc.," vol. II, pp. 2359, 2362. |