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whole Treaty, the failure of the Geneva arbitration need not be fatal to the Treaty of Washington. But it occurs to reply, that the Treaty of Vienna was a general European settlement, agreed to at a congress of Sovereign States, and not restricted to a settlement of claims between one and another; whilst the Treaty of Washington is purely an agreement between two states for the settlement of certain matters in dispute between them, and until the carrying into execution of which, a right of some kind, on one side or the other, must remain in abeyance. Moreover, the conditions of the Treaty of Vienna were all duly carried out, the several arrangements agreed upon by the contracting parties fulfilled, and the Treaty completely executed, so far as it could be at the time. It was no violation of the Treaty that, in the course of subsequent events, many of its provisions should be rudely upset; nor even that, upon such occurrences taking place, the contracting parties, under altered views of policy, and in the altered circumstances of the case, should not have strictly enforced the guarantees entered into for the maintenance of its provisions.

But in the case of this Treaty with the United States, and the negociations which led to it, dating back to the time of Mr. Reverdy Johnson's mission, there are special grounds upon which we have a right to insist upon the operative unity of the Treaty in its several parts. And here, it is impossible to advance a step without impugning the American Government of bad faith, if not deliberate deception. It will be recollected, that four or five years ago, as

a consequence of the misunderstandings arising out of the Fenian raids, the United States Government demanded of us a treaty, and enactment, by which British subjects in the United States should be allowed, under certain conditions, to renounce their natural allegiance to their Sovereign. A greater infraction of the very fundamental principles of natural law was never heard of, and our Government at first displayed a creditable horror at the proposal; but eventually, as usual with them, they yielded to the demand. Upon reference to the American correspondence and protocols of 1868-9, we find that on the 19th September in the former year, Mr. Reverdy Johnson informed Lord Stanley "that he was not authorized to discuss officially the Alabama question, till the Naturalization question had been disposed of;" and a fortnight afterwards, the discussion of the St. Juan and Water Boundary question was also made dependent on carrying out the Naturalization Treaty; and, again, ten days after that, it was intimated that the signing of the St. Juan Boundary Convention should be made conditional on the previous execution of the Alabama Claims Convention. Well, the Naturalization Treaty was signed and ratified; and, in a communication announcing the fact, Lord Clarendon instructed Mr. Thornton to ask the United States Government, in consideration thereof, to cause to be signed and ratified the Claims Convention, and the St. Juan Boundary Convention. As we all know, they were not ratified, the Senate refusing its sanction; and in consequence of, or rather,

notwithstanding this scandalous juggle, and breach of faith, we rashly ventured to concur in the appointment of the Joint High Commission of Washington, in 1871, the mischievous blundering work of which is now before us.

LORD REDESDALE'S PUZZLE. ITS OMINOUS SOLUTION. ONE of the most curious out-growths of the present disputes, is the proposition put forward by Lord Redesdale, early last year, and repeated again by him in the course of the recent discussions. In the abstract, his lordship suggests that, as the wrongful acts of which the United States complain were committed by the Southern States, which are now restored to amity, and form a common corporation with them, it would be unfair to mulct a neutral state for these acts, in damages, of which the Southern States, as part of the United States, would partake; thus profiting by their own wrong.

Lord Granville, when the suggestion was first made, declined to offer any opinion on the subject, and as late as the 14th June in the present year, he repeated that "he had no opinion for, or against, the argument." It is strange that upon so important a suggestion, he should not, in the course of a whole twelvemonth, have thought it worth his while to consult the law-officers of the crown, or even Sir Roundel Palmer, who is the counsel specially retained by the Government in this matter. It is, also, no less strange, that without any opinion as to the merits or bearings of the theory propounded, his lordship should have instructed the authors of

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the British Counter-case to include an argument based upon it in the summary of general principles with which that document concludes. It must be obvious that if Lord Redesdale's theory is well founded, it would amount to a plea against all payments on account of the Alabama Claims; but as that would be repugnant to the conditions of the Treaty, why adduce it in the pleadings which are based upon that treaty? The fact is, Lord Granville was unable to form any opinion upon the subject, from the simple fact that there are no authorities, nor precedents, possibly to be brought to bear upon it. Under the established principles of international law, as they stood at the time these acts took place, no wrong was committed by any one, and consequently no claim for damages was possible against any one, as between State and State. The "new rules" have created the wrong and the remedy,. which did not exist before; and hence the confusion and doubt as to where they should apply,. involved in Lord Redesdale's argument, and in the plea based upon it, included in the British Countercase. It is a mistake, however, to impute that by these acts the Confederate States "violated" our neutrality, and that "wrong was done by them to Great Britain, in the very infraction of her laws, which constitutes the foundation of the present claims." The "neutrality" of Great Britain as a state was not violated or even imperilled, by any of these acts; and the people of the Confederate States not being amenable to our municipal laws, could not be guilty of any "infraction" of them.

British subjects may have offended against our municipal law, and if they did, were open to punishment for so doing; but there is no penalty enforcecible against a belligerent state for having received from the subjects of a neutral, contraband of war, nor indeed has a belligerent any remedy against the latter for having supplied them; his only remedy being the right to seize and confiscate them, on the way for the purpose of delivery.

The corollary to all this is to suggest a very grave reflection as to what may possibly-nay, will almost certainly-arise out of these unfortunate 66 new rules," on any future occasion of war. It will be observed that they only impose obligations and penalties upon neutrals,-none upon belligerents. Well! suppose a case: Great Britain, France, and the United States, in common with other powers, have accepted the "new rules." France and the United States are at war, Great Britain is neutral; either or both belligerents may in spite of "due diligence" on the part of the United Kingdom, succeed in obtaining from her subjects the material aids prohibited by the "new rules" and by the Foreign Enlistment Act, and either or both may afterwards make claims, and enforce compensation against us, who will have no remedy against the offending belligerent or belligerents.


Ir was a great mistake in principle, in the first instance, to consent to refer to arbitration matters

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