applicable to property devoted to religious and charitable uses; the
real estate, however, being also subject to a certain condition of for-
feiture and escheat contained in the act of 1862;
(5) The general system of common law and equity, except as modified by
legislation, prevails in the Territory or Utah, including therein the
law of charitable uses;
(6) By the law of charitable uses, when the particular use designated is
unlawful and contrary to public policy, the charity property is subject
to be applied and directed to lawful objects most nearly corresponding
to its original destination, and will not be returned to the donors, or
their heirs or representatives, especially where it is impossible to
identify them;
(7) The court of chancery, in the exercise of its ordinary powers over
trusts and charities, may appoint new trustees on the failure or dis-
charge of former trustees; and may compel the application of charity
funds to their appointed uses, if lawful; and, by authority, of the
sovereign power of the State, if not by its own inherent power, may
reform the uses when illegal or against public policy by directing the
property to be applied to legal uses, conformable, as near as practica-
ble, to those originally declared;
(8) In this country the legislature has the power of parens patriæ in refer-
ence to infants, idiots, lunatics, charities, etc., which in England is
exercised by the crown; and may invest the court of chancery with all
the powers necessary to the proper superintendence and direction of
any gift to charitable uses;
(9) Congress, as the supreme legislature of Utah, had full power and
authority to direct the winding up of the affairs of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints as a defunct corporation, with a
view to the due appropriation of its property to legitimate religious
and charitable uses conformable, as near as practicable, to those to
which it was originally dedicated. This power is distinct from that
which may arise from the forfeiture and escheat of the property under
the act of 1862;
(10) The pretence of religious belief cannot deprive Congress of the power
to prohibit polygamy and all other open offences against the enlight-
ened sentiment of mankind. Mormon Church v. United States, 1.
See LOCAL Law, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6;
PARTY, 1, 2.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 1.
ORPHANS' COURT.
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 3, 4, 6;
STATUTE, A.
PARENS PATRIÆ.
See MORMON CHURCH.
1. A party bidding at a foreclosure sale of a railroad makes himself there-
by a party to the proceedings, and subject to the jurisdiction of the
court for all orders necessary to compel the perfecting of his purchase;
and with a right to be heard on all questions thereafter arising, affect-
ing his bid, which are not foreclosed by the terms of the decree of
sale, or are expressly reserved to him by such decree. Kneeland v.
American Loan & Trust Co., 89.
2. Where not concluded by the terms of a decree of foreclosure of a rail-
road, any subsequent rulings which determine in what securities, of
diverse value, the purchaser's bid shall be made good, are matters
affecting his interests, and in which he has a right to be heard in the
trial court, and by appeal in the appellate court. Ib.
POLYGAMY.
See MORMON CHURCH.
POSTAGE STAMPS.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 1.
The maker executed in the State of Illinois and delivered to the promisee
a series of notes, one of which was acquired by a bona fide endorsee,
and was as follows: "$5000. Chicago, Ill., January 30, A.D. 1884.
For value received, four months after date, the Chicago Railway
Equipment Company promise to pay to the order of the Northwestern
Manufacturing and Car Company of Stillwater, Minnesota, five thou-
sand dollars, at First Nat. Bank of Chicago, Illinois, with interest
thereon, at the rate of - per cent per annum, from date until paid.
This note is one of a series of twenty-five notes, of even date herewith,
of the sum of five thousand dollars each, and shall become due and
payable to the holder on the failure of the maker to pay the principal
and interest of any one of the notes of said series, and all of said notes
are given for the purchase price of two hundred and fifty railway
freight cars manufactured by the payee hereof and sold by said payee
to the maker hereof, which cars are numbered from 13,000 to 13,249,
inclusive, and marked on the side thereof with the words and letters
Blue Line C. & E. I. R. R. Co.; and it is agreed by the maker hereof
that the title to said cars shall remain in the said payee until all the
notes of said series, both principal and interest, are fully paid, all of
said notes being equally and ratably secured on said cars. No. 1.
George B. Burrows, Vice-President. Countersigned by E. D. Buffing-
ton, Treas.," Held, (1) That this was a negotiable promissory note
according to the statute of Illinois, where it was made, as well as by
the general mercantile law; (2) That its negotiability was not affected
by the fact that the title of the cars for which it was given remained
in the vendor until all the notes of the same series were fully paid, the
title being so retained only by way of security for the payment of the
notes, and the agreement for the retention for that purpose being a
short form of chattel-mortgage; (3) That its negotiability was not
affected by the fact that it might, at the option of the holder, and by
reason of the default of the maker, become due at a date earlier than
that fixed. Chicago Railway Equipment Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 269.
1. While, as a general rule, the directors of a railroad company cannot,
without the previous approval of their stockholders, authorize the
construction of a passenger station in a city situated in a State foreign
to that in which the company was created, and to which its own road
does not extend, and cannot make the company responsible for any
portion of the cost of such construction; yet, the fact that such in-
creased facilities at Boston were necessary to enable the joint man-
agement under the contract between the Boston and Lowell and the
Nashua and Lowell Companies to retain the extended business,
common to both, justified the directors of the Nashua Company in
incurring obligations on account of such expenditures, and brought
them within the general scope of director's powers. Nashua and Lowell
Railroad v. Boston and Lowell Railroad, 356.
2. A contract between two railroad companies, situated in different States,
for the management of the business common to both by one of them,
with an agreed division of receipts and expenses does not warrant the
managing company in purchasing at the common expense, the control
of a rival line, without the assent of the stockholders of the other
company. Ib.
3. Railroad corporations, created by two or more States, though joined in
their interests, in the operation of their roads, in the issue of their stock
and in the division of their profits, so as practically to be a single cor-
poration, do not lose their identity; but each has its existence and its
standing in the courts of the country only by virtue of the legislation
of the State by which it was created, and the union of name, of offi-
cers, of business and of property does not change their distinctive
character as separate corporations. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 1, 2; B;
CONTRACT, 3;
CORPORATION, 1;
JURISDICTION, B, 1;
PARTY, 1, 2;
RECEIVER, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
1. The appointment of a receiver of a railroad vests in the court no
absolute control of the property, and no general authority to displace
vested contract liens, and when a court makes such an appointment it
has no right to make the receivership conditional on the payment of
any unsecured claims except the few which by the rulings of this court
have been declared to have an equitable priority; it being the excep
tion and not the rule that the contract priority of liens can be dis-
placed. Kneeland v. American Loan and Trust Co., 89.
2. A court which appoints a receiver acquires, by virtue of that appoint-
ment, certain rights and assumes certain obligations, and the expenses
which the court creates in discharge of those obligations are neces-
sarily burdens on the property taken possession of, and this, irrespec-
tive of the question who may be the ultimate owner, or who may
have the preferred lien, or who may invoke the receivership. Ib.
3. When a court appoints a receiver of railroad property it may, in the
administration, contract debts necessary for operating the road, or
for labor, supplies or rentals, and make them a prior lien on the prop-
erty. Ib.
4. When, at the instance of a general creditor, a receiver of a railroad
and its rolling stock is appointed, and among the latter there is rolling
stock leased to the company with a right of purchase, and, there being
a deficit in the running of the road by the receiver, the rental is not
paid, and the lessor takes possession of his rolling stock, his claim for
rent is not entitled to priority over mortgage creditors on the fore-
closure and sale of the road under the mortgage. Ib.
5. Where the holder of a first lien upon the realty alone of a railroad
company asks a court of chancery to take possession not only of the
realty but also of personal property used for the benefit of the realty,
that personalty thus taken possession of and operated for the benefit
of the realty should be first paid in preference to the claim secured by
the realty. Ib.
6. Where, on the application of the trustee of a railroad mortgage, a
receiver is appointed and takes possession of the road and of its roll-
ing stock, and among the latter is rolling stock which the company
was operating under lease, and the receiver continues to operate it, its
rental at the contract price, (and not according to its actual use,) if
not paid from earnings will be a charge upon the proceeds of the sale
under the foreclosure of the mortgage prior to the mortgage debt. 1b.
7. A receiver derives his authority from the act of the court, and not from
the act of the parties; and the effect of his appointment is to put the
property from that time into his custody as an officer of the court, for
the benefit of the party ultimately proved to be entitled, but not to
change the title, or even the right of possession. Union Bank v. Kan-
sas City Bank, 223.
8. Under some circumstances a receiver would be derelict in duty if he
did not cause to be insured the property committed to his custody, to
be kept safely for those entitled to it. Thompson v. Phenix Ins. Co.,
287.
9. If a receiver, without the previous sanction of the court, applies funds
in his hands to pay insurance premiums, the policy is not, for that
reason, void as between him and the company; but the question
whether he has rightly applied such funds is a matter that concerns
only himself, the court whose officer he is, and the parties interested
in the property. Ib.
10. Where a receiver uses moneys in his hands without the previous order
of the court, the amount so expended may be allowed to him if he
has acted in good faith and for the benefit of the parties. Ib.
See INSURANCE, 3.
It appearing that the subject of the controversy in this case is identical
with that which was before the court in an action at law at October term,
1883, in Cragin v. Lovell, 109 U. S. 194, and that the parties are the
same, and that the court then held that "the petition shows no privity
between the plaintiff and Cragin," and "alleges no promise or con-
tract by Cragin to or with the plaintiff;" Held, that while the plea of
res judicata is not strictly applicable, the court should make the same
disposition of the controversy which was made then. Lovell v. Cragin,
130.
In the absence of the Secretary of War the authority with which he was
invested by that act could be exercised by the officer who, under the
law, became for the time Acting Secretary of War. Ryan v. United
States, 68.
See TABLE OF STATUTES CITED IN OPINIONS.
A. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
The statute of Maryland of 1798, c. 101, sub-ch. 12, § 10, is not repealed
by the act of Congress of March 3, 1883, c. 87. Thaw v. Ritchie, 519.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 6;
EXTRADITION, 3;
JURISDICTION, A, 5;
B. STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.
CORNELL UNIVERSITY, 2;
CRIMINAL LAW, 1, 2;
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 1;
EXTRADITION, 3;
JURISDICTION, A, 3;
MORMON CHURCH.
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