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Opinion of the Court.

cal journals upon various medical subjects. At the trial below he gave evidence tending to show that at the time of the accident he was, and had been since 1864, a resident practicing physician of Washington; that between eight and nine o'clock of the evening of December 6, 1881, while walking with his sister on the south side of G Street, between Fourteenth and Fifteenth Streets northwest, he stepped on a boardcovering a hole in the sidewalk adjoining the Riggs House, and the board breaking or bending, he fell into the hole underneath it, was severely and permanently injured, and his ability to prosecute his studies and to pursue his profession greatly impaired. While under examination-in-chief, his counsel propounded to him this question: "State, Doctor, if you please, whether or not you had at that time or prior to the time of this accident been a contributor to any medical journal of this country or abroad-the old country-of any articles or essays on diseases known to the profession." To this question the plaintiff answered: "I have been for years a regular contributor in the Philadelphia Medical Times; also to the Virginia Journal, a medical monthly published in Richmond, and other journals." The defendant at the time objected to the question and answer, but the objections being overruled, it excepted to the ruling of the court. At a subsequent stage of the trial the plaintiff, being recalled as a witness in his own behalf, offered to prove that he had in his possession certain written articles for medical journals and medical works on obstetrics and gynecology, and that he had been quoted as an authority upon certain subjects; to which the defendant objected, but the court overruled the defendant's objection and permitted said testimony to be given as follows: "Atkinson's Therapeutics of Gynecology and Obstetrics and Wood's Library Minor Surgical Gynecology, by Paul F. Munde, (which books were produced and examined by the witness before the jury,) are text-books in the medical profession, and that, on pages 73 and 140 of said first-named book, were articles written by himself, or reference made to him, and also at page 217 of the last book referred to; also that in the Virginia Medical Monthly for August, 1876, there

Opinion of the Court.

is an article by the plaintiff on the therapeutic use of certain remedies, and also in the American Journal of Obstetrics there is an article by plaintiff on the 'Application of Nitric Acid in Endocervicitis and Endometritis' and also a translation of one of plaintiff's articles in a French journal, entitled 'Annales de Gynécologie,' in April, 1875, and also in a French journal, 'The Review of Medical and Surgical Therapeutics,' of May, 1875." To the action of the court in overruling the defendant's objection and permitting this testimony to be given and to the testimony itself, the defendant excepted.

This evidence was competent upon the issue as to damages. It indicated the nature of the plaintiff's pursuits, and, in connection with other evidence showing the serious and permanent character of the injuries received by him, that his capacity to prosecute his studies, and to follow his ordinary pursuits, was impaired. The defendant insists that the evidence should have been rejected because it did not appear that the plaintiff had derived any income from his contributions to medical journals. This is not a sound view of the question. Even if those contributions were made without compensation, his inability to continue them by reason of the injuries in question was a proper element in the inquiry as to damages. That fact tended to show the extent of both his mental and physical suffering, resulting from the injuries received. All evidence, tending to show the character of his ordinary pursuits, and the extent to which the injury complained of prevented him from following those pursuits, was pertinent to the issue. Wade v. Leroy, 20 How. 34; Nebraska City v. Campbell, 2 Black, 590; Vicksburg &c. Railroad Co. v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 545, 554; City of Ripon v. Bittel, 30 Wisconsin, 614; Ballou v. Farnum, 11 Allen, 73; Caldwell v. Murphy, 1 Duer, 233; S. C. 1 Kernan, (5 N. Y.,) 416. The authorities all agree that in cases of this character much latitude must be given to juries in estimating the damages sustained by the person injured. Physical suffering, resulting from such injuries, is necessarily attended by mental suffering in a greater or less degree. And as said in Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S. 22, 26, 27: "The action is for an injury to the per

Opinion of the Court.

son of an intelligent being; and when the injury, whether caused by wilfulness or negligence, produces mental as well as bodily anguish and suffering, it is impossible to exclude the mental suffering in estimating the extent of the personal injury for which compensation is to be awarded." Railroad Co. v. Barron, 5 Wall. 90, 105; Penn. & Ohio Canal Co. v. Graham, 63 Penn. St. 290; Smith v. Holcomb, 99 Mass. 552; Holyoke v. Grand Trunk Railway, 48 N. H. 541; Stockton v. Frey, 4 Gill, 406; Smith v. Overby, 30 Georgia, 241; Cox v. Vanderkleed, 21 Indiana, 164; Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas. 577.

The next objection to the admission of evidence relates to a certain entry in the books of the Adams Express Company in reference to the dead-light placed at the hole into which plaintiff fell. It should be stated in this connection that there was evidence before the jury, on behalf of the plaintiff, tending to show that the sidewalk, where the accident happened, was torn up for the purpose of putting in a new boiler for the Riggs House; that after the boiler had been set, and the wall around it bricked up, a hole was left for the purpose of putting in a dead-light; that before the dead-light (in the procuring of which there was some delay) was put in place, the hole was covered by a board, that was kept there for fifteen or eighteen days before the dead-light was put in, which was not done until after the accident in question; that on the top of the boiler was a safety valve that required the attention of the engineer; that before the hole was covered, or the boiler set, the engineer, in order to reach the safety valve, would take off the board cover and go down; and that there was no attachment to the boards from below to prevent them from sliding, but they were nailed together by two cleats. There was also evidence tending to show that the boards constituted a reasonably sufficient covering for the hole. C. E. Luckett, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that he was a clerk in the Adams Express Company in Washington, and its agent at Georgetown in November and December, 1881; that he had the company's book of delivery for those months; that the entries in it under date of November 29, 1881, are in his

Opinion of the Court.

handwriting, were made by him in the regular course of business for which the book was kept, and that on that date there is an entry in the book of a delivery to Beckham & Middleton; that he did not in person deliver the article mentioned to that firm; his duty being to write up the driver's book, check off the way-bills that came in, and do all the clerical work of the office; and that the company's driver delivered the article referred to, taking the book with him, the book produced by witness being the one that the driver had. At this point of the witness' testimony-in-chief he was asked: "Whether the book shows that this thing was received on the 29th of November." The question was objected to, and the objection overruled. The witness answered: "It was." To this ruling of the court as to the question and answer the defendant excepted. It was also in proof, in behalf of the plaintiff, by Middleton, of the firm of Beckham & Middleton, that on the book of the Adams Express Company, referred to by Lucket, (and shown to the witness,) appeared his signature under this entry, of date November 29, 1881: "1 casting, Beckham & Middleton; amount of charges, $1.60; Beckham & Middleton;" that the casting referred to was ordered from New York for Hutchins, who put in the boiler, and that no other casting was delivered to him by witness or his firm during November or December, 1881. To this evidence when offered the defendant objected, but the objection was overruled, and it excepted.

The principal object of this evidence in reference to the dead-light was to show when it was placed at the hole. We will not stop to consider whether a proper foundation was laid for the use of the above entry as evidence in itself; for it was otherwise in proof and not questioned, that the dead-light was not placed in position until after the plaintiff had fallen into the hole, and that the hole was unguarded by such a light for some time prior to the accident. The point which concerned the District was the length of time during which the hole was left unguarded by a dead-light, or other sufficient signal, and not whether Beckham & Middleton, as between themselves and Hutchins, were negligent in not procuring the

Opinion of the Court.

dead-light sooner, or in not delivering it more promptly than was done after it reached their hands. If the entry in the books of the Express Company was incompetent as evidence, in itself, of the facts stated in it, its use before the jury could not possibly have prejudiced the defendant.

We will add, that the objections made by the District to the evidence in relation to the plaintiff's contributions to medical journals, as well as to the entry upon the books of the Express Company, lose much of their force because they did not indicate with distinctness the precise grounds upon which they were intended to rest. Such general objections were well calculated to embarrass the court, and put it at disadvantage in its conduct of the trial. It was entitled to know the grounds of the objection, so that the jury could be put in possession of the real case to be tried. In Camden v. Doremus, 3 How. 515, 530, this court declined to consider objections made to the admission of evidence which did not state the grounds upon which they were made, and did not obviously cover the competency of such evidence nor point to some definite and specific defect in its character. "We must," the court said, "consider objections of this character as vague and nugatory, and, if entitled to weight anywhere, certainly as without weight before an appellate court." To the same effect are Burton v. Driggs, 20 Wall. 125, 133; Patrick v. Graham, 132 U. S. 627, 629. This rule is especially applicable in actions like the present one, in which no fixed rule can be prescribed for measuring the amount of damages, and in which the result must, of necessity, depend upon the good sense and sound discretion of the jury, as controlled by the special circumstances of the case.

At the close of the testimony on behalf of the plaintiff the defendant asked the court to instruct the jury that the evidence did not show a case entitling the plaintiff to recover. The court refused to so instruct the jury. The defendant having closed its evidence made numerous requests for instructions, each one of which was refused, and it excepted.

The charge of Mr. Justice Cox to the jury covered every possible view of the case as made by the evidence. While it is too lengthy to be here inserted, it will be proper to state

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