Opinion of the Court. pressly declared that it was not of the slightest consequence, in principle, by what means the officers of the District were "placed in position, whether they are elected by the people of the municipality, or appointed by the President or a Governor. The people are the recognized source of all authority, state and municipal; and to this authority it must come at last, whether immediately or by a circuitous process." 91 U. S. 545. Has there been any such change in the government established for this District as will take the present case out of the rule announced in the Barnes Case? In the revision of the statutes relating to the District, the clause of the act of 1871, declaring the District of Columbia (Rev. Stat. Dist. Col. 2, § 2) to be a body corporate for municipal purposes with power to contract, etc., was retained. By the act of June 20, 1874, for the government of the District and for other purposes, 18 Stat. 116, c. 337, previous statutes providing for the District a Governor, Secretary, Legislative Assembly, Board of Public Works and a Delegate in Congress were repealed, and all the power and authority then vested in the Governor and Board of Public Works, except as limited by that act, were vested in a commission, composed of three persons, to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate. But by the act of June 11, 1878, 20 Stat. 102, c. 180, a permanent form of government for the District was established. It provided that "the District of Columbia shall remain and continue a municipal corporation, as provided in section two of the Revised Statutes relating to said District," and that the Commissioners therein provided for should "be deemed and taken as officers of such corporation." Those Commissioners, consisting of two persons, to be appointed by the President, with the consent of the Senate, and an officer of the Engineer Corps, detailed for that purpose, were vested with all the powers, rights, duties and privileges, and all the property, estate and effects then lawfully exercised by and vested in the Commissioners of the District, including the power, among others, to apply the taxes or other revenues of the District to the payment of its current expenses, the support of the public schools, the fire 4 Opinion of the Court. department and the police, but making no contract nor incurring any obligation other than such as were provided in that act, and should be approved by Congress; to collect taxes theretofore lawfully assessed and due, or to become due, but without anticipating taxes by selling or hypothecating them; to abolish offices, consolidate two or more offices, reduce the number of employés, remove from office and make appointments to any office under them authorized by law; and to erect, light and maintain lamp-posts, with lamps, beyond the city limits. §§ 1, 2, 3. It was made their duty to submit annually to the Secretary of the Treasury, for his examination and approval, a detailed statement "of the work proposed to be undertaken by them" during the then ensuing fiscal year, and the estimated cost thereof, as well as the cost of constructing, repairing and maintaining all bridges authorized by law across the Potomac and other streams within the District, the cost of maintaining all public institutions of charity, reformatories and prisons, then belonging to or supported in whole or in part by the District, and the expenses of the Washington Aqueduct and its appurtenances, together with an itemized statement and estimate of the amount necessary to defray the expenses of the District for the then ensuing fiscal year. These estimates it became the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to examine and approve or disapprove, or suggest such change in them as the public interest demanded, the result to be certified to the Commissioners, who were required to transmit the same, with the original estimates, to Congress. The act provided that "to the extent to which Congress shall approve of said estimates, Congress shall appropriate the amount of fifty per centum thereof; and the remaining fifty per centum of such approved estimates shall be levied and assessed upon the taxable property and privileges in said District other than the property of the United States and of the District of Columbia." $ 3. It also provides that when any repairs of streets, avenues, alleys or sewers within the District are to be made, or when new pavements are to be substituted in place of those worn Opinion of the Court. out, new ones laid, new streets opened, sewers built, or any work the total cost of which shall exceed $1000, the work shall be given out upon advertisement, the lowest responsible bid to be accepted by the Commissioners, though they have the right, in their discretion, to reject all proposals made. It further provides that the "United States shall pay one-half of the cost of all work done under the provisions of this (5th) section, except that done by railway companies, which payment shall be credited as part of the fifty per centum which the United States shall contribute towards the expenses of the District of Columbia for that year; and all payments shall be made by the Secretary of the Treasury on the warrant or order of the Commissioners of the District of Columbia or a majority thereof, in such amounts and at such times as they may deem safe and proper in view of the progress of the work." The act places the police, schools, Board of Health and sanitary inspectors of the District all under the charge and control of the Commissioners. We have made this extended analysis of the provisions of the act of 1878, because of the earnest contention of the counsel for the defendant, that while the District of Columbia is still a municipal corporation, under its present form of government it has not, "as a municipal corporation, the features involving it in the liability under consideration." The reasons assigned by counsel for this contention have been carefully considered, with the result that, in our judgment, the municipal corporation created by the act of 1878 is subject to precisely the same liability for injuries to individuals, arising from the negligence of the Commissioners or of the officers under them in maintaining in safe condition, for the use of the public, the streets, avenues, alleys and sidewalks of the city of Washington, as was the District under the laws in force when the cause of action in the Barnes Case arose. It is said that the present corporation, as a corporation, has nothing to do with the streets. That could have been said with equal propriety in reference to the old corporation, when the streets were under the control and supervision of the Board of Public Works. Yet, that board was held to be a part of the munic Opinion of the Court. ipal corporation. Its acts, within the scope of its powers, were deemed the acts of the corporation. Its negligence, in the care of streets, was held to be the negligence of the municipal corporation of which it was a part. So, in this case, the Commissioners, having full control of the streets, are under a duty to keep the public ways of the city in such condition that they can be used with reasonable safety. Their neglect in that matter is the neglect of the municipal corporation of which they are the responsible representatives, although subject to the paramount authority of Congress. It is suggested that the District is without the means to perform the supposed neglected duty; that none of its officers can pay a judgment against it, and that no process against it could enforce payment; that even a mandamus against it to levy a tax would be futile because neither the District nor the Commissioners can levy a tax for any purpose; and that no judg ment against it can be paid except by warrant upon the Treasury, pursuant to an appropriation by Congress. We do not perceive that these considerations materially affect the principle upon which the decision in the Barnes Case rests. That streets, avenues, pavements, sidewalks and sewers in Washington are established, repaired and maintained, in part, by appropriations made by Congress, and, in part, by taxation upon private property, does not change the fact that, by an express declaration of Congress, the District is created a body corporate for municipal purposes. Because it was a municipal corporation proper, as distinguished from a corporation established as an agency of the government creating it, this court held in the Barnes Case that it was responsible for such negligence of its officers having the care of streets, avenues and sidewalks, as resulted in personal injuries to individuals. The source from which the District obtains the means for maintaining public highways in the city is of no consequence, so long as Congress has made it, and permits it to remain, a mere municipal corporation, with such functions as pertain to municipal corporations proper. This municipal feature was emphasized in Metropolitan Railroad v. District of Columbia, 132 U. S. 1, 7, where it was said that the corporate capacity Opinion of the Court. and the corporate liabilities of the District remained as they were before the act of 1878, and that its character as a mere municipal corporation had not been changed. Having that character, we held, in that case, that the District was subject to the ordinary rules governing the law of procedure between private persons, and was, therefore, embraced by the Maryland statute of limitations of 1715. It is further said that the fee-simple of the streets in the city of Washington is in the United States, and that that fact is entitled to great weight. This point was made in the Barnes Case and distinctly overruled. The court there said: "We do not perceive that the circumstance that the fee of the streets is in the United States, and not in the municipal corporation, is material to the case. In most of the cities of this country, the fee of the land belongs to the adjacent owner; and upon the discontinuance of the street, the possession would revert to him. The streets and avenues in Washington have been laid out by competent authority. The power and the duty to repair them are undoubted and would not be dif ferent were the streets the absolute property of the corporation. The only questions can be as to the particular person or body by which the power shall be exercised, and how far the liability of the city extends." Without further discussion, we adjudge, upon the authority of Barnes v. District of Columbia, that the District is liable for such negligence upon the part of its officers as is charged in the plaintiff's declaration. That case was determined in 1875, and has never been questioned by any subsequent decision in this court. On the contrary, its authority was recognized in Metropolitan Railroad v. District of Columbia, and in Brown v. District of Columbia, 127 U. S. 579, 586, and the principles announced in it were applied in District of Columbia v. McElligott, 117 U. S. 621. If the rule announced in the Barnes Case is not satisfactory to Congress, it can be abrogated by statute. We proceed to examine the objections urged by the District to the admission of evidence. The first one relates to the plaintiff's testimony in reference to his contributions to medi |