Eureka Springs, Ark., St. Louis, Mo. 1 Carload rate was 36 cents per 100 pounds. Held, that any rate in excess of that stated would be unreasonable.Cary et al. v. Eureka Springs Ry. Co. et al, (1897) 7 I. C. C. R. 286. Liverpool, Eng., through New Orleans to Es Held, 2 Proportion of through rate received by inland carrier for haul from New Orleans was 70 cents per 100 pounds. tablished inland rate was $1.14. that inland proportion of the through rate could not lawfully be less than corresponding inland rate.-New York Bd. of Trade v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. et al., (1891) 4 I. C. C. R. 447, 3 I. C. R. 417; order of Commission enforced, I. C. C. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 52 Fed. Rep. 187, 57 Fed. Rep. 948; decree of lower courts reversed, Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. I. C. C., 162 C. S. 197, 16 Sup. Ct. R. 666, 40 L. Ed. 910. San Bernardino, Cal., from Chicago, Ill. ALCOHOL. Pacific coast points, from Chicago and 1. Joint commodity rate on alcohol, all kinds, including denatured and wood alcohol, in wooden barrels and iron drums, of 85 cents per 100 pounds in carloads and $1.25 in less than carloads, held not unlawful.-Railroad Commission of Oregon v. Chicago & A. Rd. Co. et al., (1907) 12 I. C. C. R. 541. ALFALFA HAY. Roswell, N. M., to Fort Worth, Tex. 1. Rate of 34 cents held unreasonable; that rate should not exceed 30 cents.Roswell Commercial Club v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. et al., (1907) 12 I. C. C. R. 339. ALLOTTING CARS. In time of car shortage, see "Car distribution.'' I. II. ALLOWANCES. ALLOWANCE TO SHIPPER FOR SERY- ALLOWANCE OF DIVISION OF JOINT Allowances to shippers, see "Rebates or Cartage or drayage allowance, as rebate, see "Rebates or concessions,'' 20-23. Elevator allowances, see Elevation." 66 Oil, allowance for leakage or evaporation, Routing agent, allowance to, as rebate, see Tap-line allowances, as rebates, see "Re 3. Rate on agricultural implements, as forks, hoes, rakes, shovels and spades, in earloads, of $2.21 per 100 pounds, held unlawful under section 4 of Act as compared with rate of $1.95 from same point through San Bernardino to Los Angeles. -San Bernardino Bd. of Trade v. Atchi-Terminal road, allowance to, as rebate, see Son, T. & S. F. Rd. Co. et al., (1890) 4 I. C. C. R. 104, 3 I. C. R. 138; petition to enforce order of Commission denied, I. C. C. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Rd. Co., 50 Fed. Rep. 295. "Rebates or concessions," 25-27. Transit privileges, allowance of, see "Transit privileges,'' 5-11. Yardage allowance, as rebate, see "Rebates or concessions," 16. 2, 3. ALLOWANCE FOR USE OF SPECIAL LIVE- ALLOWANCE TO REPAY COST OF CON STRUCTING SIDE TRACK, 6, 7. ELEVATOR ALLOWANCES, 8-10. In general. 1. Under section 15 of the Act a carrier may make a "just and reasonable" allowance to a shipper for any service or instrumentality furnished by him in connection with the transportation of his property. Held, that this provision must be read in connection with the other provisions of the Act forbidding and making unlawful any arrangement or practice that results in undue preference or unjust discrimination in favor of one shipper as against others, or that results in a rebate or departure from the lawfully published rates; that if the allowance involves a profit over and above the actual cost of the service rendered, it becomes, when made to a shipper, a rebate and an unlawful discrimination to the extent of the profit realized. -Re Allowances to Elevators by U. P. Rd. Co., (1907) 12 I. C. C. R. 85. Allowance for use of tank cars. 2. The carrier may justly make a reasonable allowance to owners of tank cars for the use of such cars.--Rice v. Louisville & N. Rd. Co.. (1888) 1 I. C. C. R. 503, 1 I. C. R. 722. 3. A rate of three-fourths of a cent per mile paid by a carrier for the use of tank cars in which to transport oil, held reason able.-Scofield et al. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., (1888) 2 I. C. C. R. 90, 120, 2 I. C. R. 67. Allowance for use of special live-stock cars. 4. S. & S. were engaged in shipping live stock from Chicago to New York. The L. Express Co. was owned or controlled by S. & S., and was organized for the purpose of furnishing special live-stock cars to defendant. While the use of the cars thus furnished was ostensibly open to all shippers, the number was limited so that substantially all the business done by them was that of S. & S. and shippers in their care. Defendant refused to haul private cars of other companies. The mileage paid by defendant was the usual 4 of a cent per mile, but because the cars were used re exclusively on through trips from Chicago Allowance for compression of cotton. was The 5. Defendant's line extended northerly from South McAlester, Ind. Terr., through Muskogee, Ind. Terr., to St. Louis. A cotton compress was operated at Muskogee by a professional compressor who neither a buyer nor seller of cotton. Another compress was operated at South MeAlester by a company which bought and sold cotton in large quantities. Defendant's policy was to require compression at compress nearest the point of origin of the cotton, but with respect to cotton originating at or near Muskogee, defendant permitted the same to be shipped to South McAlester for compression, and thence shipped back through Muskogee to destination at through rate from original point of shipment. For this extra hauling to South McAlester and return defendant received no compensation. The privilege of shipping cotton from South McAlester, or from points in that vicinity, for compres sion at Muskogee was not allowed. charge for compression, about 50 cents per bale, was paid by defendant. Out of this sum the compress company made a profit of from 15 to 20 cents per bale. compress company at McAlester, being a large shipper of cotton, thus secured an advantage, by the amount of profit realized from compression, over other shippers not owning compresses. The exception to the rule requiring compression at compress nearest the point of origin was justified by defendant on the ground that the compress company at McAlester had threatened to divert its shipments to another road if the exception were not made. Held, that when defendant declared a policy with respect to compression at the nearest point, it could not vary that rule so as to give the compress company at McAlester the opportunity to avoid it and thereby receive an advantage which was not given to shippers generally; that the threat of the compress company at Mc The Alester to divert its shipments to another road was not the character of competition which would justify defendant in making a discrimination in favor of that com pany-Muskogee Commercial Club v. Mis souri, K. & T. Ry. Co., (1907) 12 I. C. C. R. 312. Allowance to repay cost of constructing side track. 6. An arrangement whereby a carrier undertakes to repay advancements made by a shipper for the construction of a switch track by making an allowance to such shipper of a definite amount on each earload of freight shipped to or from his manufacturing plant, should be evidenced by a written contract, a copy of which should be filed with the Commission.Weleetka Light & W. Co. v. Fort Smith & W. R. Co., (1907) 12 I. C. C. R. 503. 7. The Commission does not approve the practice of some carriers of repaying advancements made by a shipper for the construction of a switch track by making an allowance to such shipper of a definite amount on each carload of freight shipped to or from his manufacturing plant. Such an arrangement presents too much the appearance of a purchase of property by the carrier with transportation, which is contrary to the principles of the Act.Weleetka Light & W. Co. v. Fort Smith & W. R. Co., (1907) 12 I. C. C. R. 503. Elevator allowances. 8. Having the right under the law to provide elevation for its shippers, a railroad company may either construct and operate an elevator of its own, or may furnish elevation facilities to its shippers by making an arrangement with the owner of an elevator for such service. The amount of compensation paid to the owner for rendering the service is not a matter of concern either to shippers or to other carriers, unless in some way it enters into the rates charged, thus making them excessive, or unless by some device a portion of the allowance is returned to shippers, thus effecting a rebate.-Re Allowances to Elevators by U. P. Rd. Co., (1907) 12 I. C. C. R. 85. 9. The eastern terminals of the Union Pacific Railroad are at Council Bluffs, Ia., and Kansas City, Mo. The Union Pacific entered into contracts with P. & Co., under which the latter erected elevators at Couneil Bluffs and Kansas City for transfer of grain at those terminals. The Union Pacific agreed to pay P. & Co. 114 cents per 100 pounds for the service. P. & Co. were large buyers and shippers of grain at points on the Union Pacific system. Com plaint was made that the allowance for transfer was exorbitant and unreasonable and amounted to an unlawful concession. P. & Co. did not pay more for grain than other buyers, and the facts indicated, in view of similar charges elsewhere, that that company was not unduly remunerated. Held, that it was proper and legitimate for the Union Pacific to enter into the arrangement mentioned; that the transfer charge was not unlawful.-Re Allowances to Elevators by the U. P. Rd. Co., (1904) 10 I. C. C. R. 309. 10. P. & Co. were owners of grain elevators at Kansas City, Mo., and Council Bluffs, Ia. For the purpose of securing prompt release of its car equipment at Kansas City and Council Bluffs, the Union Pacific Railroad arranged with P. & Co. to transfer grain from its cars at those points into P. & Co's. elevators, an allowance of 14 cents per 100 pounds being paid for the service. P. & Co. were also large dealers in grain, and they therefore performed a service for themselves and for their own grain, although operating the elevators under contract with the railroad company. The allowance paid for elevation yielded P. & Co. an appreciable profit which was used by that company to advantage in the buying and shipping of grain. Held, that as the allowance involved a profit over and above the actual cost of the service rendered, it became a rebate to the extent of the profit realized; that the allowance should not exceed the actual cost of the service rendered, or 34 of a cent per 100 pounds.-Re Allowances to Elevators by U. P. Rd. Co., (1907) 12 I. C. C. R. 85. II. ALLOWANCE OF DIVISION OF JOINT RATE TO ROAD OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY SHIPPER. RIGHT TO BECOME PARTIES TO JOINT TARIFFS, 11. MUST BE COMMON CARRIERS, 12. OWNERSHIP OF ROAD BY SHIPPER AS EXCESSIVE DIVISIONS, 15-17. Right to become parties to joint tariffs. 11. The I. N. Railroad was owned by the I. Harvester Company, and was oper ated as a terminal carrier between the plant of the Harvester Company and the lines of interstate carriers. Held, that no reason existed why the railroad company might not make joint rates, file tariffs, and agree upon joint divisions of charges. Re Divisions of Joint Rates and other Al lowances to Terminal Railroads, (1904) 10 I. C. C. R. 385. Must be common carriers. | compensation for the service performed, 12. Carriers engaged in transporting lumber from Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas to Kansas City and other western 16. The Chicago, L. S. & E. Railroad markets established joint through rates was owned by the U. S. Steel Corporation, with certain logging roads from points tween the works of the I. Steel Company and was operated as a terminal road bewhere the logs were received, via points of connection where the logs were milled, carriers. The I. Steel Company was owned near Chicago and the lines of interstate to destinations mentioned. The logging by the U. S. Steel Corporation. The terroads were owned by the mill owners.minal service to and from the works of While originally built for the purpose only the Steel Company was performed on the of hauling logs from the forest to the basis of divisions of joint rates with conmills, they were engaged to a greater or less extent in handling other traffic. Such necting carriers, such divisions being 10 roads were allowed divisions of the per cent on traffic to the seaboard, 15 per through rate. Held, that the making of the through rates, and the granting divisions thereof to the logging roads, was not in violation of law, provided such roads were common carriers.-Central Yellow Pine Assn. v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Rd. Co. et al., (1904) 10 I. C. C. R. 193. cent on traffic to Buffalo and Pittsburg, and 20 per cent on traffic to Missouri much in excess of a fair charge for the river. Held, that such divisions were service; that so far as they exceeded reasonable compensation for the service performed, they amounted to an unlawful preference in favor of the Corporation.Re Divisions of Joint Rates and other Allowances to Terminal Railroads, (1904) 10 Ownership of road by shipper as affecting legality of division. 13. The mere fact that a terminal car-I. C. C. R. 385. rier is owned entirely by the largest ship- 17. The I. Harvester Company owned per over it, is not controlling on the ques- the entire capital stock of the Illinois N. tion whether a division of joint charges Railroad, and had a controlling interest in between such road and connecting carriers the Chicago, W. P. & S. Railroad. These is illegal.-Re Divisions of Joint Rates companies operated terminal lines in and and other Allowances to Terminal Rail- about Chicago which connected the plants roads, (1904) 10 I. C. C. R. 385, 399. of the Harvester Company and other industries with the lines of interstate car Authority of Commission to condemn divis-riers. While formerly the terminal serv ion. 14. The Commission has no authority to condemn the division of a through rate, unless a part of the through line and the article shipped have a common ownership, and a grossly excessive division is made for the purpose of paying a rebate.-Re Transportation of Salt, (1904) 10 I. C. C. R. 148. Excessive divisions. 15. The I. Harvester Company owned the entire capital stock of the I. N. Railroad. The latter company operated a ter minal line in and about Chicago which connected the plants of the Harvester Company and other industries with the ice to and from the plants of the Harvester Company had been done on the basis of switching charges, such service was later performed on the basis of divisions of the rates with connecting carriers, which divisions were far in excess of the switching charges previously in force. On traffic intended for Missouri river or beyond, the division was 20 per cent of the rate, or $12 per car, as against a former maximum switching charge of $3.50 per car. Held, that such divisions, in so far as they exceeded reasonable compensation for the service, amounted to rebates and to undue preference and advantage in favor Joint Rates and other Allowances to Terof the Harvester Co.-Re Divisions of minal Railroads (1904) 10 I. C. C. R. 385. Division of joint rate with boat line controlled by shipper. lines of interstate carriers. The terminal service with reference to shipments to or from such other industries was performed on the basis of divisions of joint rates with connecting carriers, which divisions 18. Members of the I. Salt Co., doing were far in excess of what the service was business at Manistee and Ludington, reasonably worth. Held, that such divis- Mich., organized a boat line between those ions, in so far as they exceeded reasonable|points and Chicago. The boat line joined on right to maintain complaint, see "Parties, 28, 29. Commission without authority to administer anti-trust act. 1. The Commission has no authority to administer the anti-trust law, or even to determine whether that law has been violated.-Sprigg et al. v. Baltimore & O. Rd. Co. et al., (1900) 8 I. C. C. R. 443, 456. Suits to enforce, properly cognizable by Courts. in a through rate on salt fram Manistee | Violation of act by complainant, effect and Ludington via Chicago to Missouri river of 53 eents per barrel, and was granted a division by the rail carriers of from 30 to 3314 per cent of that rate, according to destination, such division amounting to from 16 to 18 cents per barrel Prior to the organization of the boat line, vessels carried salt from Manistee and Ludington to Chicago at a rate of from 8 to 11 eents per barrel. Salt in terests at Detroit insisted that the divis ion of the through rate allowed the boat line was excessive and amounted to a 2. Proceedings for the enforcement of rebate in favor of the Salt Co. Because the Anti-Trust Act are properly cognizable of natural advantages enjoyed by Manis- by the Courts and not by the Commistee and Ludington, salt cost less to manu- sion.-Tift et al. v. Southern Ry. Co. et al., facture at those points than at Detroit,, (1905) 10 I. C. C. R. 543. Central Yellow the difference averaging 75 cents per ton. Pine Assn. v Illinois Central Rd. Co. et The boat line assumed additional services al. (1905) 10 I. C. C. R. 505. not previously borne by the vessels, inelading stowage, docking, cooperage, in saraace and handling of ears at Chicago, the value of such services being about 81 eerts per barrel. Held, that it was no part of the duty of the Commission to equalize natural advantages between localities through the adjustment of tariff rates; that the division allowed the boat, line was not so grossly excessive as to amount to a rebate.-Re Transportation of Salt, (1904) 10 L. C. C. R. 148. AMENDMENTS. To complaint, see "Procedure,” 26-28. See "Free transportation." ANSWER. See "Pleadings;” “Procedure.' See "Prior transportation." ANTHRACITE COAL. See "Coal." ANTI-TRUST ACT. Agreements between carriers to suppress competition, as bearing on question of reasonableness of rates, see "Rates," 147-152. Traffic association in violation of act, see "Associations." Cannot be resorted to, to restrain giving of rebates. 3. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the Interstate Commerce Act are separate and independent statutes, and the former cannot be resorted to to sustain a proceeding in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States to restrain a common carrier from giving rebates in violation of the commerce Act.-United States v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., (1905) 142 Fed. Rep. 176, 183. APPEAL. ORDERS OF COMMISSION NOT APPEAL- APPEAL FROM COURTS DECISION DOES CONTROL OF COURT OVER DECREE PEND- POWER OF COURT TO SUSPEND APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF CIRCUIT Practice on appeal in suits to enforce Commission's order, see "Procedure,' 127, 128. Orders of Commission not appealable. 1. The law allows no appeal from a decision of the Commission denying or awarding reparation, nor does a writ of error lie in such case.-Western New York & P. R. Co. v. Penn Refining Co., (1905) 137 Fed. Rep. 343, 354, 70 C. C. A. 23. 2. In doubtful cases the Commission will not overlook the fact that if it errs |