larged, and he was in a very poor condition and still affected by the distemper. Held, the inquiry being whether the injury was caused by the aggravations of the disease through the neglect and misuse of defendants, instructions predicated upon the theory that the misuse of the horse caused him to have the distemper, were properly refused. Appeal from Milwaukee county court. Thompson & Dorr, for respondent. C. M. Bice, for appellants. ORTON, J. This action was brought in a justice's court for damages to a horse of the plaintiff caused by the defendants while he was in their care and keeping as bailees. The main facts are few. About the sixteenth day of June, the plaintiff hired the defendants to pasture his horse of about four years old. In the mean time, the horse escaped from the pasture of defendants with one of their own horses, and they hunted him up and reclaimed him. In the mean time, also, the horse had a distemper, and while he was sick the defendants worked him with another horse, in a collar harness, drawing loads of earth or sand. The horse had never been worked much, and never in a collar, and the heat was very intense. When the horse was finally returned, about the eighth day of July, to the plaintiff, his neck had been scalded and was very much swollen, and his knees were bunched and enlarged, and he was very much reduced in flesh, and was still affected by the distemper, and was generally in a very poor condition. When taken to pasture he was sound, and in good health and condition, and was of the value of about $250. The claim of the plaintiff was that his horse had been much injured by the defendants by their working him as they did, and by other bad treatment. The jury found that the value of the horse had been lessened by said bad treatment and use $125, and allowed the defendants on their counter-claim $25 for hunting and reclaiming the horse after he had so escaped. The printed case leaves out the most material and strongest evidence of the plaintiff, and argues that there was no proof that the defendants had so injured and damaged the horse. We think by reading the bill of exceptions that there was sufficient evidence of such injury to warrant the jury in finding as they did. The appellants claim, also, that the court ought to have given the instructions asked by them. These consist of eight sections of very long instructions, some of them passing upon the effect of the evidence, and none of them very applicable to the case proved. These special requests appear in the printed case, while the very full instructions given by the court to the jury do not appear there. This might be a sufficient reason for this court to disregard this assignment of error. But we have taken the trouble to read the instructions found in the bill of exceptions, as well as the evidence, and we are satisfied that the instructions covered the whole case, and that they were very fair to the defendants. The jury found that the horse was taken sick while in the care of the defendants, and when he was so taken it was observable by them with proper care, and that it was not proper care for them to use the horse as they did while sick, and that such use and exercise aggravated the disease with which the horse was afflicted, and that he was damaged thereby, including expenses, $125. The learned counsel seems to have mistaken the evidence and finding by predicating instructions upon the theory that the misuse of the horse caused him to have the distemper. There was no such evidenceor special verdict. The main injury was the aggravation of the disease by neglect and misuse. According to the evidence on behalf of the plaintiff, the horse was very badly used and injured, and the jury was justified in so finding, and the amount of such damage stated in the evidence. We can find no possible error in the record, and the learned counsel of the appellants have failed to discover any. The judgment of the county court is affirmed. HAWKINSON v. HARMON. (Supreme Court of Wisconsin. November 1, 1887.) 1. CONTRACTS-WHAT CONSTITUTES-LETTERS. Defendant, having been solicited to purchase some trees of plaintiff, a nurseryman near Minneapolis, wrote the plaintiff's agent, April 29, 1885, inquiring if the trees could be delivered at his farm in Lisbon, Dakota, "as soon as possible." Defendant passed through Minneapolis May 8th, and while there wrote plaintiff's agent on that date to the effect that if he had not shipped the trees to Lisbon, to do so at once. These two letters were handed plaintiff Saturday, May 9th, and the trees were shipped the following Monday. Two days later plaintiff found a telegram in his post-office box, dated May 11th, and purporting to be from the defendant at Lisbon, and ordering him not to send the trees. Held, that the two letters taken together constituted a contract for the purchase of the trees, and that defendant was liable thereon, plaintiff having used due diligence in filling the order. 2. FRAUD, STatute of-ConTRACT FOR SALE OF GOODS-MEMORANDUM SIGNED BY AGENT. A contract for the sale of trees of the value of $94.50 is within the Wisconsin statute of frauds, and is void where no earnest-money is paid, and no partial delivery made, unless a note or memorandum of such contract be made in writing, and be subscribed by the parties to be charged therewith;" but an order by letter is a sufficient "memorandum," and under Rev. St. 2327, such "subscription" may be made by an agent of the buyer.1 Appeal from county court, Winnebago county. This action was brought by Hawkinson, appellant, in justice's court, to recover the purchase price of a quantity of trees alleged to have been sold by the plaintiff to the defendant. The plaintiff recovered before the justice, and the defendant appealed to the county court. A trial in the latter court resulted in a judgment of nonsuit, from which the plaintiff appeals to this court. The material facts as disclosed by the testimony given on the trial in the county court, are as follows: The plaintiff is a nursery-man in the vicinity of Minneapolis, Minnesota; the defendant resides at Oshkosh, in this state, and has a farm in Dakota, but in the transactions out of which this action arose, one Little was the agent of the plaintiff, and one Chase the agent of the defendant. Under the date of Oshkosh, April 29, 1885, Chase, by direction of defendant, wrote to Little as follows: “I received yours of the 22d, and immediately wrote a postal to Horace Harmon, [the defendant] but he did not come to see me until yesterday; but I told him you wrote me that you would commence to deliver last Monday, and I did not know where a letter would reach you, but I would write to Minneapolis. * * * He says he will be there when the trees arrive, and if they look O. K. he has the money to pay for them on the spot. He wants 13,500 box-elders, one year old, at $4 per thousand, and 13,500 soft maple, one year old, at $3 per thousand. This makes in all 27,000 trees-quite a little order. He wants them delivered at Lisbon, Dakota, as soon as possible, and wants you to write to me just as soon as you get this, and tell me if you can do it, and when the trees will be in Lisbon; for he is going there, and does not want to go until about the time the trees will be there. This letter was signed by Chase. It contained other matter, but the above extracts therefrom are all it contained concerning the trees. Under date of Minneapolis, May 8, 1885, the defendant wrote to Little as follows: "I stopped over here on my way out to Lisbon, to see if you had shipped my trees. I presume you have not. Please As to what is a sufficient memorandum of a contract to satisfy the statute of frauds, see Love's Ex'rs v. Welch, (N. C.) 2 S. E. Rep. 242; Doherty v. Hill, (Mass.) 11 N. E. Rep. 581 Elliot v. Barrett, (Mass.) 10 N. E. Rep. 820, and note; Higham v. Harris, (Ind.) 8 N. E. Rep. 255; Hastings v. Weber, (Mass.) 7 N. E. Rep. 848; Falmouth & L. T. Co., v. Shawhan, (Ind.) 5 N. E. Rep. 408, Welch v. Darling, (Vt.) 7 Atl. Rep. 547; Dumn v. Rothermel, (Pa.) 3 Atl. Rep. 800; Banks v. Manufacturing Co., 20 Fed. Rep. 667; Wardell v. Williams. (Mich.) 28 N. W. Rep. 796; Camp v. Moreman, (Ky.) 2 S. W. Rep. 179; Insurance Co. v. Oliver. (Ala.) 2 South. Rep. 445; Webster v. Brown, (Mich.) 34 N. W. Rep. 676; Sheley v. Whitman, (Mich.) 34 N. W. Rep. 879. send them at once, as I do not want to stay out there any longer than I can possibly help, and I can't do anything until they come. Yours, respectfully, H. M. HARMON." The trees here mentioned are those specified in Chase's letter of April 29th. Both the above letters were handed to the plaintiff by Little on Saturday, May 9, 1885, and the plaintiff shipped the trees to Lisbon, Dakota, consigned to the defendant, by the Northern Pacific Railroad, on Monday, May 11, 1885, a little after noon. He also took the usual bill of lading froin the agent of the railway company, and about the same time sent a bill of the trees to Chase at Oshkosh. The testimony tends to show that the trees arrived at Lisbon, and the defendant refused to accept them because, he claimed, they came too late; but the plaintiff was not notified of such refusal until two or three weeks afterwards. The plaintiff guarantied the freight on the trees, and afterwards paid it. On May 13th, two days after the shipment, the plaintiff found in his post-office box a telegram, dated May 11th, signed "H. M. Harmon," which reads: "Do not send the trees. To whom this telegram was addressed, or how it came in the plaintiff's box, does not appear. It was not there, however, on May 11th. On the above testimony the county court nonsuited the plaintiff. Jackson & Thompson, for appellant. Finch & Barber, for respondent. LYON, J. Counsel for the defendant maintain that the testimony fails to show any contract for the sale and purchase of the trees; and if that proposition is not sustained, and it be held that a contract in form was so made, that such contract is void, under the statute of frauds. 1. Did the parties enter into such contract? There is some apparent ground for the argument that the letter of April 29, 1885, was a letter of inquiry, to ascertain whether the trees could be procured of the plaintiff, rather than an absolute order for them. But the two letters, of April 29th and May 8th, must be read together, and, being so read, there can be no doubt but that they constitute an absolute order for the trees, which became a contract of purchase and sale between the parties, when the plaintiff accepted the same and shipped the trees as directed. In the letter of May 8th, the plaintiff, or what is the same thing, his agent, Little, was requested to send the trees at once. It must be held, therefore, that a contract for the sale and purchase of the trees was closed, at least in form. 2. The claim that such contract is void within the statute of frauds cannot be successfully maintained. The point made against the validity of the contract is that no note or memorandum thereof was made in writing, and subscribed by the party to be charged therewith. Rev. St. 655, § 2308. The letter of April 29th was subscribed by Chase, the agent of the defendant, and that of May 8th by the defendant himself. Section 2327, Rev. St., provides that "every instrument required under any of the provisions of this title (title 22) to be subscribed by any party, may be subscribed by the agent of such party lawfully authorized thereto." This section is applicable to the present case. We conclude that the contract between the parties is not void under the statute of frauds. It follows that if the plaintiff has executed the contract on his part he is entitled to recover. No question is made but that the trees shipped by him fulfilled the requirements of the contract, as to description, quality, and quantity. If, therefore, he shipped them within a reasonable time after he received the order therefor, he has fulfilled the contract on his part. The testimony tends to show that the shipment was made within a reasonable time. The plaintiff having established a prima facie case by the testimony which he introduced on the trial, it was error to nonsuit him. The judgment of the county court must be reversed, and the cause will be remanded for a new trial. HANSON v. EICHSTAEDT. (Supreme Court of Wisconsin. November 1, 1887.) PUBLIC RECORDS-REGISTRY OF DEEDS-RIGHT TO MAKE PRIVATE ABSTRACT BOOKS. Under Rev. St. Wis. 700, any person, during the usual hours of business of each day, in a proper manner, and by paying fees, when allowed, and under the reasonable supervision and control of such officer, may enter the office of the register of deeds, and examine the records, and take minutes, notes, and copies of books, records, and instruments therefrom, to make a set of abstract books for his own use. ORTON, J., dissenting. Appeal from circuit court, Green Lake county. 1 The complaint verified February 4, 1887, alleged, in effect, that the plaintiff was elected and qualified as register of deeds of Waushara county; that as such he occupied the office of register of deeds at Wautoma provided by the county; that, December 1, 1886, the defendant, without his consent, took and continued to hold possession of said office, and occupied a table, and books and records therein, and belonging thereto, and threatened to continue to do so, and would unless restrained; that by so doing the defendant seriously interfered with the plaintiff's performance of his official duties; that the defendant uses such books to sit down upon, thereby excluding the plaintiff and the public therefrom; that in doing the things stated, the defendant pretends that he is preparing an abstract of titles to lands in said county from the records thereof, for his own use; that such use of said records is not in the usual way of taking notes, but to the exclusion of the plaintiff and the public; that said office is a rather small room, only large enough for the plaintiff and the public, and that the defendant's occupancy constitutes a nuisance; that the defendant utterly refuses to desist, though often requested; that the plaintiff has offered the defendant the reasonable use of such books, records, and office in the usual way, but he refuses such use, and persists in using as set forth; wherefore, he prays an injunction, etc. Upon that complaint, February 11, 1887, the defendant was temporarily restrained from doing the acts mentioned, during the pendency of the action, or until the further order of the court. The verified answer of the defendant denied each and every allegation, and each and every matter and thing contained in the complaint, except as therein expressly admitted and qualified, and as hereinafter, in effect, stated. Upon that answer, and two affidavits verified March 12 and 14, 1887, the defendant moved the court, March 18, 1887, for a dissolution of said injunction. From said answer and affidavits, and two affidavits verified March 16 and 19, 1887, used in opposition to said motion, it appears, in effect, that the defendant was a lawyer residing at Berlin; that, being desirous of preparing an abstract of the title to lands in the eastern portion of Waushara county for the purpose of opening and keeping an abstract office at Berlin, he went to the register's office in the custody of the plaintiff, about December 1, 1886, and took notes, minutes, and copies from the books and records therein, with the consent or acquiescence of the plaintiff, from day to day, until December 11, 1886, when the plaintiff informed him that he had no right to use such books and records for the purpose of making such abstract, and then forbade him the further use of the same; that, December 20, 1886, the defendant made a formal demand for the use of such books and records for the purposes aforesaid; that the plaintiff then gave him access to said books and records until December 25, 1886; that, about February 3, 1887, the plaintiff renewed his work of taking such notes, minutes, and copies, and the plaintiff furnished the same, but in 1 As to the right to examine the public records and take copies thereof for the purpose of making a set of abstract books, see State v. Rachac, (Minn.) ante, 7. and note. sisted that the defendant had no right thereto, and that he should stop him whenever he got ready to do so; that he did not want the defendant there for that purpose, as he was in the way; that the defendant claimed the right to be there for the purpose named; that the plaintiff acquiesced in his being there, and his continuing such work, until February 11, 1887, when the summons, complaint, and injunctional order were served upon him; that the defendant never at any time interfered with, or in any way obstructed, the plaintiff in the performance of his duties as such register, nor with the current business of the office, nor the business of the public with said office; that defendant at all times surrendered and gave up any books whenever requested by the plaintiff, and obeyed every request and direction of the plaintiff. Upon the hearing of the motion, and upon March 23, 1887, the court ordered that said injunctional order be, and the same was thereby dissolved, vacated, and set aside. From that order the plaintiff brings this appeal. Cate, Jones & Sanborn, for appellant. Geo. D. Waring and R. L. D. Porter, for respondent. CASSODAY, J. It is urged by counsel for the plaintiff that it was an abuse of discretion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. He contends that the right to inspect and copy public records is confined to those having some interest in the particular record sought to be inspected or copied, and does not extend to one seeking to do so from mere curiosity, or for his own private gain. Such seems to be substantially the rule at common law. 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 473-475. It is claimed that the same rule should be applied under our statutes. In support of such contention counsel rely upon Buck v. Collins, 51 Ga. 391; Bean v. People, 7 Colo. 200, 2 Pac. Rep. 909; Brewer v. Watson, 71 Ala. 299; Randolph v. State, 2 South. Rep. 714; Webber v. Townley, 43 Mich. 534, 5 N. W. Rep. 971. To fully appreciate the significance of these decisions, as authority here, it becomes necessary to carefully note the statutes, and circumstances under which they were respectively made, as compared with those here involved. In the Georgia case, the complainant insisted upon the right to make abstracts from books of records "without the payment of any fees" under statutes, which, as construed by the court, entitled the officer in charge of such records to exact fees. The court merely held that the complainant could not exercise such right without the payment of fees. The Colorado case was under a statute requiring the recorder to keep his office "open during the usual business hours, * * * and that all books and papers required to be kept in his office shall be open for the examination of any person." But the statute of that state also made it the duty of the several clerks and recorders "to make and furnish, upon application therefor, abstracts of deeds," etc., "to any person who shall make application therefor, and shall pay or tender the fees provided by law." Sub. 584, Gen. St. Colo. 268. That case was based upon statutes making such fees appurtenant to the office of the custodian of such records. Under such circumstances it was held that the recorder was "not compellable, by mandamus, to allow abstract makers to use his office and the county records for the purpose of abstracting the entire records of the land titles of the county for sale." To hold otherwise would have been, in effect, to hold that such recorder was compellable, by mandamus, to aid in building up a rival establishment which would necessarily reduce the emoluments of his office, and without any statute in terms requiring him to do so. By section 762, Rev. St. c. 353, Laws 1864, and chapter 39, Laws 1867, a register in this state was required to keep a tract index in such counties as had already kept one, and in such other counties as the board of supervisors thereof should thereafter order one to be kept. That section was subsequently amended so as to authorize the discontinuance of such index, and to keep and maintain, in place thereof, "a complete abstract |