No-fault Divorce: What Went Wrong?Avalon Publishing, 1992. gada 20. jūl. - 167 lappuses |
No grāmatas satura
1.–3. rezultāts no 37.
27. lappuse
... welfare above the level that they could attain if they remained single . Second , the parties compete in markets for the best mates . Gary Becker argued that the economic approach can be used to explain the variety of marriage patterns ...
... welfare above the level that they could attain if they remained single . Second , the parties compete in markets for the best mates . Gary Becker argued that the economic approach can be used to explain the variety of marriage patterns ...
103. lappuse
... welfare rather than that of their family . Increasing their work outside the home from twenty to forty hours per week might impose more costs than benefits on the family -- the net benefits for the family are negative . Conceptually ...
... welfare rather than that of their family . Increasing their work outside the home from twenty to forty hours per week might impose more costs than benefits on the family -- the net benefits for the family are negative . Conceptually ...
138. lappuse
... welfare of the custodial parent . These changes in the welfare of the children and of the custodial parent are a cost . The custodial parent has incentives to take these costs into consideration when considering whether to agree to ...
... welfare of the custodial parent . These changes in the welfare of the children and of the custodial parent are a cost . The custodial parent has incentives to take these costs into consideration when considering whether to agree to ...
Saturs
Introduction | 1 |
The Economics of Marriage and Divorce | 25 |
The Economics of Divorce | 35 |
Autortiesības | |
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Bieži izmantoti vārdi un frāzes
agreements alimony arrangements at divorce assets awards benefits California child support common law community property compensation contract law costs of divorce couples courts decisions definition of property dissolution dissolve the marriage divorce rate Divorce Reform Divorce Revolution divorced spouse divorced women economists effect of marriage effect of no-fault efficient breaches Elizabeth Peters employment expected fault divorce fault grounds financial arrangements financial settlements future earnings gains from marriage grounds for divorce Hayes household commodities household production human capital husband Ibid incentive income income-earning increase incurred individuals introduction of no-fault investments labor force Law Review marital property Marriage and Divorce married women Mary Ann Glendon mutual consent negotiating power no-fault divorce laws no-fault grounds occur parties percent production possibility frontiers professional goodwill property settlements recognize reduced result separate property specialize in household specific performance spouse's substantial tend wages Weitzman welfare wife wives
Atsauces uz šo grāmatu
From Partners to Parents: The Second Revolution in Family Law June Carbone Ierobežota priekšskatīšana - 2000 |
The Postdivorce Family: Children, Parenting, and Society Ross A. Thompson,Paul R. Amato Fragmentu skats - 1999 |