the words "Or property rights," and as amended his clause would then have read:

that an individual who, while in the territory of a nation with which the United States has at any time since December 7, 1941, been at war, was deprived of life or substantially deprived of liberty or property rights, pursuant to any law, decree, or regulation of such nation discriminating against political, racial or religious groups, shall not be deemed to have voluntarily resided in such territory.

Whereupon, Mr. Celler, the chairman of the subcommittee said, and I am reading from page 84 of the House hearings:

The amendment is a good one.

Mr. Spiegelberg says:

The reason we wanted that amended was that it did not appear to us that there was any apparent reason why the test of involuntary residence should depend, merely, on the deprivation of life or liberty.

If a person is substantially deprived of all his property, it is obviously as impossible for him to leave the jurisdiction as if he were deprived of liberty.

Furthermore, the suggested amendment would protect those who are too aged to be confined, and those who succeeded in hiding with the result that they were deprived neither of life nor of liberty, but were stripped of property.

It is my thought that Mr. Cutler's answer to you might be a little too restrictive of the term "liberty" as included in the bill. I should rather prefer to have the record here show that it is the thinking of the Federation which I represent that the deprivation of liberty by way of depriving a person of his property should not be restricted to the single instance where he has been so completely stripped of all of his property to make it possible for him to flee. I should think rather that that is merely one instance which might stand with a number of other instances under the substantial deprivation rule, and if the bill were to be so understood, I think that our Federation would have no objection to it.

Mr. CUTLER. May I comment briefly on that?

Senator HUFFMAN. Yes.

Mr. CUTLER. When I said "deprivation of property substantial enough to make it impossible for him to flee," I did not mean to restrict it to fleeing; I was addressing myself to the language of the House report. Not only to make it impossible for him to get out of the country but to engage in basic pursuits. For the record, it might be useful to say that my answers to questions as to what occurred and how I understand the position of the House committee were based on a final executive session which the committee held and in which we were asked to give certain explanations. The custodian took no position, one way or the other, on this matter of property.

Senator HUFFMAN. It is certain we do not have an exact yardstick. to measure deprivation, so that to say at this point it circumscribes liberty but it is clear it is not just a deprivation of some property which will constitute the deprivation of liberty, it is a substantial deprivation. As to how far the deprivation has to progress to constitute deprivation of liberty is still a question, but it has to be a considerable deprivation, does it not?

Mr. CUTLER. I think so; yes, sir.

Mr. BOSKEY. That is correct, Senator. There is no hard-and-fast rule. It is a matter of practical judgment from case to case. I think

if Mr. Polier watches this statute go into effect, he will find that all people he is worried about have been taken care of, or nearly all of them.

Mr. POLIER. Having been in high administrative positions in the Government twice in my life, I realize the importance of what I am stating here and I would like to point out why the explanation given by representatives of Government is not satisfactory and I think is quite unnecessary, and why I think more adequate clarification of the record is called for.

To begin with, the House imported the term "substantially deprived of liberty." In America, you are victim of discrimination if you are deprived of your liberty. Certainly, this is done under law or a color of law. We are not talking about somebody having had his house robbed; we are dealing with people who suffered as a result of a Government decree or as a result of action of officers of the Government purporting to carry out the governmental authority. That being the case, it seemed to me there was really no justification for importing the term "substantially deprived of liberty" but since we are here trying to get legislation through, what I am urging is that if the term "substantial" or the qualifying phrase, "substantial" is put in to modify liberty, then all we mean is, at most, we should say, that the exclusion of the word "property" there means that there must be more than some minor infringement. It must be more than minor. I would leave it at that. It might well be you could cripple a person by taking away half of his property and he may have lost everything. You might say they take away all of his property and therefore make it impossible for him to do business, but that is unnecessary. I find in Mr. Cutler's statement an extreme administrative position. It would seem to me that the proper interpretation of this phrase, even without the term being written into the statute, could be made more flexible. I do not think it is necessary to go as far as you have gone, and I think that you representatives of Government departments should make that clear and should urge the Senate to make it clear in its report.

Mr. CUTLER. I was trying to limit my comments to the word 'property." The gentleman is quite right, that we interpret the phrase "substantial deprivation of liberty" as meaning something more than a 9 o'clock curfew, something more than a trivial interference with liberty or freedom of action. But it does not mean total deprivation, in the sense of being totally incapacitated or actually shut up or anything like that. As far as the phrase "substantial deprivation of liberty" is concerned, I think I am entirely in accord with the gentleman. I was addressing myself only to the additional point that would be raised by "property" and apparently did not make myself clear.

Mr. POLIER. I would suggest that language making it clear, that you are not dealing with trivial or minor aberrations, but that where there is any substantial-after all, to take away a quarter of your property may, under the circumstances, be substantial. I want to leave it leave the flexibility and the discretion in the Department at least. I do not want them to give away or give up their ability to administer the law by saying, "Well, the rule is, you were deprived of your property or you were deprived of your liberty" do not be self-denying here, and let us make it clear in the Senate report if we can, sir, that there is no self-denying of that sort.

Mr. CUTLER. I feel that can be worked out, sir.

Senator HUFFMAN. Of course, a report will be made from the record which we are here compiling, and discussions of the definitions in doubt will be included in that report.

Mr. POLIER. May we file with this a suggested formulation of what our idea is, much more precisely than we can in the oral discussion? Senator HUFFMAN. You may make your complete file, and suggest anything you have of that nature.

Mr. KANE. I should personally like to see the word "property" in the wording of the statute because I look at the statute from the point of view of the attorney who is going to have to practice and advise clients with reference and respect to the statute. Now when he gets his form of statute, either from the books or from the looseleaf report or something, he may not find that the word "liberty" as is written in this statute here has a particular sense, a particular connotation which includes the deprivation of property. The great majority of lawyers that have to advise clients with respect to this bill may not be so easily apprised of the meaning of the legislation with which they are dealing and they may not be in such a good position to advise their clients as if the word "property" appeared on the face of the bill. Then, of course, if the word property appears on the face of the bill, we also avoid the pitfalls of judicial interpretation of the statute.

We might even have a question here, if this case came before a court, as to whether we could go behind the meaning of the word "liberty" to determine what the Congress meant when it used it. The court has a rule that says, if the language of the statute is clear on its face, you cannot go into its legislative history.

Senator HUFFMAN. Did you sit through the House hearings?
Mr. KANE. I sat through but a part of them, sir.

Mr. POLIER. May I comment on that. First of all, the bulk of the people are going to get relief from the Alien Property Custodian. The amount of money concerned in most of these cases will not justify the filing of a suit. We must rely on the proper administration of the law. The second thing is, a lawyer practicing administrative law, the first thing he does is write in for the rules and regulations and the procedures prescribed by the Department. If the does not, he will certainly be lost. When he does that, the Department always-this department I am sure, as any other department-I now rise to the defense of the administrative agencies-carefully explains to you, and that is what makes it possible for us to administer the enormous amount of business-they carefully explain the procedures. I would like to insure the report will say that the term "liberty" means, as administered by the Custodian, substantial deprivation of property. I would like to agree with you, and I would like to strike the word "substantially" but as I said before you came in, if this report does not have a proper explanation, we are not going to get legislation at this session.

Mr. KANE. I am in favor of the legislation.

Mr. POLIER. I am in favor of getting it this year.

Senator HUFFMAN. My reason for asking if you sat through the House hearings or not, was to determine what attitude they had taken toward the terms which have been suggested.

Mr. KANE. I think the House report fairly mirrors the tenor of the hearings; namely, that the word "liberty" as used, will include persons substantially deprived of property.

Mr. POLIER. I think our discussion here has made it clear that we are going to reach agreement upon language among ourselves here and suggest a clarification which would meet most of the objections, but not all.

I would like to turn to what I call the second thing. The deprivations that the statute refers to, in so many words, if you will look at the appendix C, lines 14, and following:

was deprived of life or substantially deprived of liberty pursuant to any law, decree, or regulation of such nation discriminating against political, racial, or religious groups, shall not be deemed to have voluntarily resided in such territory. I think it is clear in those words, that it pertains not only to literal deprivation, but to deprivation under color of a law or a regulation or a decree.

Mr. BOSKEY. Mr. Polier, I think that was in our minds at the time we worked on the provisions. It would be perfectly agreeable to us to make it more explicit in the committee report, if you think that is desirable and if the Senate committee wishes to do so.

Mr. POLIER. That avoids many pitfalls. I am sure it will be exactly what any administrative body would want to have. That is, the color of the law is in effect the law. That is, our constitutional protection under the fourteenth amendment applies to the action of a State, whether it is under the letter of a law or the color of a law. Now I want exactly that meaning here.

Now turn to the third one. We now come to the second group of people covered by subsection (D). That is, an individual who was a citizen or a subject of a nation, that is, an Italian, whether he was in Italy at the time in question, or whether he was in France-that is, he was in occupied territory. Now the House bill purports to relieve him of these disabilities only if he has been deprived of his full rights of citizenship. Now citizenship as a matter of fact, it is quite possible to execute a person without depriving him of his rights as a citizen, of his citizenship. That is proper under the American law. Rights to citizenship and civil liberties and economic liberties may be considered as two different things. I am sure here again that they were not saying in section (C) that a person in Germany, whether a German or a non-German, is to be given relief if he is deprived of life or substantially deprived of his liberty, or an Italian in France, we will say Italian, because there was no decree of denaturalization against them as there was with Germans, I am sure it was not the intention to require the Custodian to go into a fine search of Italian law to find out whether his rights of citizenship, which are peculiar national concepts, and of histories in each country, were impaired. I take it in speaking of a person not enjoying the full rights of citizenship, a person would not be regarded as enjoying full rights of citizenship if he was deprived of his life or substantially deprived of his liberty.

Now, if that arises, that his full rights of citizenship were denied as not being enjoyed if a person were deprived of his life or deprived substantially of his liberty, if that explanation should be given there, I think we would have taken care of the defect, and I could not imagine that you are putting a harsher understanding on in the case of an Italian in France and an Italian in Italy.

Mr. CUTLER. I do not know whether it is harsher one way or the other, or whether the specific criterion you mentioned would apply; I have no feeling against it. I think the point you raised is covered generally in the language of the House report which says that is intended to include laws, decrees or regulations substantially reducing the rights normally enjoyed. In other words, it was the intenton of those who drafted this provision that it would not be necessary to show that you were denationalized.

Senator HUFFMAN. It would not be necessary to show that you have lost your full citizenship.

Mr. POLIER. If it is agreeable to the Senate, the report might say, 'enjoyment of full rights of citizenship would not exist in other cases. One case it would include would be any case where the person was substantially deprived of his liberty or of his life. I think that much should be included.

Mr. CUTLER. I see no objection to that.

Mr. POLIER. That leads me to my fourth point and here I am afraid nothing can be done without a change in the legislation, and I would prefer to have the bill with the three defects remedied.

Through a curious piece of draftsmanship, the relief that was to be given by the amendment of subsection (D) does not apply to a citizen let me use an example of Italy, an Italian who was in France, and there suffered deprivations by virtue of the laws promulgated as part of the German occupation because that would not be the Italian law, and subsection (D) refers to deprivations by the law of the country in which he is a citizen. That is a technical defect and could be remedied if there were an opportunity to remedy without prejudicing this whole legislation.

The manner we have suggested in an application of appendix E, sir, which is the last two pages of this document, there we say

other than an individual who, while a resident in territory under the control of such nation was deprived of life, liberty, or of property rights, as a consequence of or under color of any law, decree, or regulation of such nation or the territory under its control.

Now if again we could attempt some amendment or clarification, it would be desirable because you have an enormous group of people who fled from their own countries and who suffered, not as a result of the law of the country, from which they fled, but the law imposed on the country to which they fled and in which they were caught.

Now if I may have a moment, I wonder if we could not have a clarification of that. That would involve, as I understand, a change in the bill.

Mr. CUTLER. I think it would, sir. To be quite frank, that point was not called to our attention. We tried to cover every contingency we could think of.

Mr. POLIER. You would have considered it had you thought of it? Mr. CUTLER. I have no reason to doubt that. If there is any chance of getting something like this put through, without a conference, I would not be adverse, but I should fear, as I think you do, the undertaking of it.

Senator HUFFMAN. That almost surely would have to go to conference.

Mr. CUTLER. I hope and believe that it is something that will not deprive many claimants and it may be that it can be amended in the