please us at the very first. The union of great strength with delicacy is rare, but not unexampled.

One more distinction deserves to be noticed. Though we are certainly much indebted to nature for refinement, as well as for delicacy and strength of feeling, yet the former depends far more upon education than the two latter. To raise the mind above the pleasures of sense, and fix it on those of the intellect, imagination, and affections, is, as before observed, one grand object of mental culture. This is true refinement, or mental civilization.

I may conclude this head by remarking that dif ferent orders of mind require very different treatment in order to keep them in a healthy state. Persons naturally of high spirits and of delicate sensibilities, if they have fit objects at home, are supported by their buoyancy of humour, and can do without outward amusements, though they relish them much when these fall in their way. Others, of great equanimity of spirits, and of rather dull sensibility, get on in an uniform manner, without at all thinking of such amusements, which they are little capable of enjoying. The former can do without, but the latter cannot relish them.

There is a third class, however, naturally rather of low spirits, but of lively sensibilities. To them, pleasures, commonly so called, are not only agreeable, but useful; for, by varying the train of ideas, they prevent melancholy, and improve the whole tone of mind. While these can relish amusements, they cannot well do without them.

79

9

CHAPTER II.

ON SOME PARTICULAR DESIRES.

SECTION I.--The Principal Desires enumerated.

AVING treated of desire in general, `we come

HA

now to consider some of the particular desires. It has already been remarked that it does not belong to a work of this nature to give a general analysis and classification of the emotions, or to trace the sources from which they spring. This is the province of pure mental philosophy, otherwise called metaphysics. Moral science views the emotions chiefly in their effects upon human conduct and human happiness, and as desires and fears are the most important in this respect, it naturally pays the greatest attention to these. Even when thus limited the subject is still sufficiently vast, probably quite enough of itself to fill a volume, and therefore we shall be excused from entering into a minute detail, that would draw us too far away from the main track which we wish to pursue. Having already made sundry observations on desire in general, we shall now content ourselves with remarks on the more important species.

We must begin by calling to mind the grand distinction, which was formerly laid down between the self-regarding and the social desires. Now, almost every good which we are capable of desiring for

ourselves may be classed under one or other of the eight following heads: 1. Sensual gratifications. 2. Amusement. 3. The Affections of others. 4. Wealth. 5. Power. 6. Reputation. 7. Knowledge; and lastly, what is necessary to them all, Continued Existence.

It will be remarked that we have not put pleasure as a separate object of desire, and for this reason, that pleasure is intimately associated with each, so much so, indeed, as to have induced many to suppose that we never really long for any thing else, however varied the forms in which it may present itself:

"Whate'er the motive, pleasure is the mark,"

says Young, and many are of his opinion. To settle this disputed point, belongs not to a work like the present, but to purely mental philosophy. Whether pleasure be or be not our sole aim, one thing is certain, that we cannot wish for any thing without connecting with it ideas, either of positive pleasure or of the absence of pain. These ideas are, at least, inseparably united with every thing that we long for. It may sometimes remain in doubt, whether the pleasure in prospect first give rise to the desire, or whether certain objects directly rousing desire, pleasure follow after and react upon the previous passion; but whichever view we may adopt, desire and pleasure are indissolubly associated. In either case, our moral conclusions must remain the same. It is because the question is a purely speculative one, or has at least no perceptible application to practice, that it appertains to metaphysical and not to moral philosophy. It would require but a very slight dif

ference in language to suit either theory; for instead of saying desire of wealth, of power, of knowledge, &c. we should have merely to insert a word, and talk of desire of the pleasures of wealth, power, &c. Nay, even this difference could only be maintained at first, for having made the statement in the outset, it would become too tedious to repeat so many words on every occasion, and therefore an ellipse would be indispensable. Those readers, therefore, who think that pleasure is our only aim, may supply the ellipse for themselves.

This being understood, we now proceed to observe, that every good is valued by us on two distinct accounts; first, as it is in itself; secondly, as it leads to some other good. But there is one good in particular, for which all the eight above mentioned, or others, if there be such, may be highly prized, independently of the gratification which they offer from their own peculiar nature. They may all flatter our love of Superiority. This is the most general desire of human nature, for it is found in every walk of life, and mixes with every pursuit, gay as well as grave, trifling as well as important.' There is, perhaps, not a good we are capable of possessing which may not feed this universal passion. Taking in order the eight above stated, sense seems to afford the least grounds

1 In Madame de Sevigné's Letters, there is a story told of Louis the XIVth's head cook, which is a very curious instance of the force which this passion may acquire even in the most trivial pursuits. He prided himself so much on his skill in arranging a dinner, that he is said to have killed himself from vexation, because one day an expected dish of fish did not arrive in time!

G

for distinction; but yet there are persons who pride themselves on their superior powers of hearing and seeing, and above all, on a delicacy of taste, which can perceive sundry flavours in one dish, and accurately determine the quality of various wines, and the merits of different vintages. Among some savage nations, where the senses of hearing and seeing are greatly cultivated, I have no doubt that those who peculiarly excel in these faculties, look upon themselves with no slight complacency. Amusements are valued not only as such, but also because they can confer distinction; particularly those where skill may be shown, as chess, whist, tennis, rackets,' cricket, shooting, coursing, and horse racing. People dislike very much to lose at chess, and even at certain games of cards, not merely because they lose their money, but because they feel humiliated. They have shown a want of skill, or at the least of good fortune, for even this may be made a ground of superiority. Not a few feel pride in being called lucky fellows. We delight in knowing that we possess the affections of others, but we glory in the thought that we can easily command them. Wealth is sought after as the source of numberless comforts, and also as conferring a well-marked distinction. Up to a certain point, desire of power is the same as the desire of absence of restraint, or of liberty, so dear to the human breast; but it may swell into an insatiable thirst of dominion over others, and dominion is superiority. While reputation is a passport to general favour, and is necessary for success in every pursuit, it also leads us to fame or glory, which raises us high in the world.