catching salmon of Asian origin and from their own particular streams. Some of this capture for years has been on the high seas. But we do believe that there is a waste of the resource if the immature fish are taken on the high seas.

Mr. HAGEN. It is really the catching of the immature fish that you object to?

Mr. McKERNAN. That is, of course, part of our objection. We also object to the fact that we have no way of knowing at the present time how much fishing effort the Japanese are going to apply in those areas of the North Pacific Ocean west of the provisional abstention line where fish of North American origin intermingle with those of Asian origin. Without this knowledge, we cannot launch a scientific fisheries management program in Bristol Bay. It is impossible. I can say that categorically. It cannot be done.

Yet we are trying to do it, and what we do now is guess what the Japanese are going to do on the high seas. It is completely unsatisfactory. One cannot conceive of us, with our sophisticated conservation tools today, carrying out successful conservation of these resources under these conditions.

Mr. HAGEN. Do you have any real evidence that their activities are injuring the fishing?

Mr. McKERNAN. Only to the extent that they are capturing fish out there in considerable quantities, and we have estimates as to the numbers they are taking. To this extent, of course, they reduce the amount available for our own fishing and have it within their power, of course, with their tremendously efficient gear, to capture all of the available fish out there. They have shown restraint. Incidentally, I do not mean to imply that the Japanese have not lived within the terms of the North Pacific Convention. I simply maintain that this convention has not been totally successful and that there are likely to be further negotiations on this convention. Everything we know leads to that conclusion. Also that we need a stronger U.S. position with which to bargain with the Japanese. We believe that legislation of this kind would be an effective tool for the U.S. Government.

Mr. HAGEN. Assuming the Japanese are good fishermen, I would think they would see no value in catching immature fish. They may not even be able to show a profit on it. I would think their own self-interest would dictate the elimination of catching immature fish. Mr. McKERNAN. The problem is complicated because there are several species of salmon in this area and some of these mature at a smaller size than others. When you fish these, these species that are intermingled as well as races that are intermingled, you then have a problem. If you do not take a small size mesh, for example, the smaller ones would go through the nets, would not be caught, and you would only take a fewer number of the larger ones.

When you arrange your gear so that it will take the smaller speciesfor example, pink salmon is a smaller species of salmon-then automatically you get immatures of the sockeye salmon, which is a larger species at maturity, and some of the immatures or many of the immatures will be taken in the nets which are designed to catch the smaller species of salmon.

Mr. HAGEN. In your comments on the comparison between the two bills you state in the case of the draft bill the Japanese could avoid an embargo by cooperation in an international program of

conservation. Would that be cooperation merely to ascertain the facts or would it be cooperation in the sense of changing the size of their nets?

Mr. McKERNAN. Both.

Mr. HAGEN. So the end result would be the same as the Pelly bill, except the method would differ.

Mr. McKERNAN. Yes.

Mr. HAGEN. Thank you.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Thompson.

Mr. THOMPSON. I have only one question. I have enjoyed the part of the testimony I heard.

How far has the State Department gone in attempting to accomplish a measure of coordination of effort with the Japanese, through conference between the State Department and its counterpart in Japan? Have you asked them to go into conference on this matter? Mr. MCKERNAN. Yes, and the State Department has actively engaged in contacts and conferences with the Japanese and, in my opinion, the people working on this particular problem in the State Department are not only dedicated but very competent people and that they have done everything within their power, with the present force and power that this Government is using in this area, to accomplish the purpose.

This is one of the reasons why we believe that some additional legislation is necessary to put this Government in a stronger negotiating position.

Mr. THOMPSON. In other words, you say the results of these conferences have not been satisfactory?

Mr. McKERNAN. Not wholly satisfactory, not satisfactory to the extent they must be satisfactory.

Mr. THOMPSON. Have the Japanese shown a willingness through their Government to cooperate or an unwillingness?

Mr. MCKERNAN. This is not a question that one can answer categorically yes or no. In certain areas the Japanese have shown a great willingness to deal with us in the convention as a whole, but we have been unable yet to either, through the force of scientific evidence or through the force of persuasion, to get them to resolve this problem of the capture of Bristol Bay fish west of the line.

Mr. THOMPSON. My thought was that if they do show an unwillingness to cooperate, there is hardly any legislation we could pass that would change their attitude. I wonder if any legislation would change their attitude.

Mr. McKERNAN. Do you not suspect, though, that they, of course, like us, have to weigh the consequences of various actions? When the consequences pay, the Japanese then, like ourselves

Mr. THOMPSON. A matter of economic compulsion for them to cooperate. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Gross.

Mr. GROSS. Is it not true that some of the understanding-there has been all too little understanding and meeting of minds-has been as a result of the industry in this country and the industry in Japan getting together rather than the State Department? Has it not been industry working with industry that has accomplished what has been accomplished? This is not to say the Interior Department has not played its part. I could hope that the State Department would some

day come alive and give you the support that is necessary to stabilize this industry.

Mr. MCKERNAN. Mr. Gross, may I answer that by saying that the industry has worked on this problem also.

Mr. GROSS. I think this ought to have had some consideration in the settlement of that huge loan of $1,800 million to the Japanese where we find all too few dollars coming back, less than 25 cents on the dollar coming back to the U.S. Treasury out of the loan. I think this industry should have had some consideration in the settlement of that loan. Thank you.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Pelly.

Mr. PELLY. Mr. McKernan, as I understand, the Special Committee on Triparty Fishery Problems, organized by the various Japanese fishery societies, had a meeting on August 9 in which they decided to formally file a petition with the Japanese Government urging that the abstention principle of the present Japanese-Canadian-United States North Pacific Convention be abolished.

Mr. McKERNAN. Yes; that is one of the reports I referred to earlier. Mr. PELLY. If that were followed out by the Japanese Government, it is the end of all conservation and the only answer would be maybe for the California and Oregon and Washington and Canadian and Alaska Fishery Commissions to go ahead and allow their fishermen to go outside and everybody go out and destroy the whole fishery. We will get our share and that will be the only way.

Mr. McKERNAN. We would certainly hope that some other convention which would continue the conservation of these resources could result from negotiations, as mentioned by Governor Harriman yesterday. In this regard we believe this legislation might be a very important factor in providing the very best terms of a new convention to this Government.

Mr. PELLY. In other words, that is a tremendous threat to all conservation, if the Japanese Government acceded to the fishing interests in Japan, conservation has gone overboard. On the other hand, if we have an inducement to encourage conservation, such as would be provided by this legislation, do you not think it would go a long way toward getting all the nations in the North Pacific Ocean that have an interest in salmon fishing to get together?

Mr. McKERNAN. I at least think it would help our present problem. Mr. PELLY. Thank you.

Mr. GROSS. One further comment, if I may. I do not want to keep the gentleman here, but I want to say it makes it awfully difficult for me to support such bills as we have here to spend money to further propagate research on salmon until this sort of thing is settled and we arrive at some understanding with the Japanese. Why do we spend our money to propagate salmon only to see some other country reap the benefit from it? This is going to be hard for me to support. Mr. MCKERNAN. Perhaps this committee can accomplish two very worthwhile objectives here in considering both these bills together, Mr. Gross.

Mr. DINGELL. The Chair and counsel have questions to ask. I know your time is limited. We will expect you to advise us when you have run out of time. The Chair would like to recognize counsel for questions.

Mr. ZINCKE. Mr. McKernan, I believe you said that 22 percent of the potential catch of Bristol Bay salmon was taken by the Japanese. Is that correct?

Mr. McKERNAN. I said 22 percent of the total run in 1961 we estimate were taken by the Japanese on the high seas.

Mr. ZINCKE. What percentage of the total run in 1961 was taken by the Americans and the Canadians?

Mr. McKERNAN. 70 percent; 30 percent were taken by the Japanese, 70 percent by the United States.

Mr. ZINCKE. Now you say 30 percent. How does that relate to the 22 percent that you previously mentioned?

Mr. McKERNAN. The 30 percent is the percent of the catch that the Japanese took. You asked me how much of the catch the United States took, and I told you 70 percent. The 22 percent is the 22 percent of the total run, escapement plus catch.

Mr. ZINCKE. That hundred percent represents what percentage of the total run, the 70 plus 30?

Mr. McKERNAN. That represents about two-thirds of the total run. I am approximating this. It is 17% over 23. The total run is 23 million. The Japanese take we estimate at 5.2 million, the U.S. take was 12.3 million.

Mr. ZINCKE. The 70 percent includes both the United States and Canada; is that right?

Mr. McKERNAN. Canada does not take any of the Bristol Bay run. We are talking about the red salmon run into Bristol Bay which migrates out beyond the abstention line. Is that clear?

Mr. DINGELL. Is there any indication that the Japanese are taking other than the red salmon in the areas they fish?

Mr. McKERNAN. Yes; they are taking some chum salmon of North American origin and they are taking great quantities of pink salmon and other species primarily of Asian origin in this area and some other miscellaneous species such as king salmon and silvers.

Mr. DINGELL. I know your time is very short, but can you indicate to this committee statistics on the taking of salmon in these areas by the United States as contrasted to taking of the Japanese of salmon of North American origin?

Mr. McKERNAN. May I submit that for the record?

Mr. DINGELL. Yes.

(The information follows:)

Mr. DINGELL. You indicate the Japanese have been taking these fish back to 1952.

Mr. McKERNAN. Yes.

Mr. DINGELL. I think in order to have a useful comparison perhaps you can go back to 1942 because that would give us some yardstick as to the rise and fall in the catch. You might also indicate if you have figures on population of salmon so we can have an intelligent comparison of how population of these salmon has gone during the period of time.

Mr. McKERNAN. There are some artificial problems involved with the war, so 1952 is a pretty good starting point if the chairman wants to get a comparison.

Mr. DINGELL. How about going back to 1946, which would be 16 years?

Mr. McKERNAN. Yes; let us see what we can do.

Mr. DINGELL. 1946 or 1948, something like that.

Mr. McKERNAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. DINGELL. You might also indicate to us, if you can, the general area in which the different species of salmon run. Mr. Pelly and Mr. Hagen are expert on this subject, but I am not. Mr. McKERNAN. We will do that.

Mr. DINGELL. You indicate a difference of 15°, that salmon actually run 15° west of the abstention line of 170.

miles

How many

Mr. McKERNAN. This came out in testimony yesterday. The salmon of North American origin probably migrate even farther west than the 15° mentioned in testimony yesterday.

In fact, we are finding they migrate very widely in the North Pacific and probably migrate even some specimens quite close to the Asian coast, at least the Kamchatka Peninsula, but significant quantities migrate west to about 170° east longitude, which is 15° west of the present abstention line. This is in the neighborhood of six to nine hundred miles.

Mr. DINGELL. Six to nine hundred miles?

Mr. McKERNAN. Yes.

Mr. DINGELL. This would also be what percentage of the fishing area that the Japanese traditionally fish?

Mr. McKERNAN. This would be a significant amount of the area that the Japanese fish. That is, now. It is not, in my opinion, a significant amount of the area that the Japanese fished before the war when they had land-based plants in Kamchatka, Sakhalin Island, and the Kuriles.

Mr. DINGELL. You indicate a preference for the draft you sent up, which the Department of the Interior sent up, for the committee to consider as a substitute to the bill of our colleague, Mr. Pelly.

You also submitted to the committee an analysis of the two bills. What is the position of the Department of the Interior with regard to the substitute you submitted? Does this have administration approval?

Mr. MCKERNAN. I would refer you, Mr. Chairman, to the final paragraph of the Department's report wherein the Bureau of the Budget has advised that subject to considerations of the views of the Department of State on the implications of the bill for U.S. foreign policy, there is no objection to the submission of this report. Essentially, the two Departments disagree.