tralized coordination and the agency performance of information management functions. The original act has been reauthorized only once in its 10 year existence, in 1986, as an amendment to the continuing appropriations resolution. Much has taken place since that time, particularly in the areas of informaton needs and technology. We have responsibility to examine how well we are doing in pursuing the goals of the Act and to identify problems and opportunities for improvement. I feel that the debate which has taken place thus far and which continues is healthy.

S. 1742

S. 1742, the Federal Information Resources Management Act of 1989, would reauthorize the Paperwork Reduction Act with emphasis on its original intent and purposes. It would increase efforts to reduce duplicative Federal information collections and minimize paperwork burden on the public. It would also stengthen the information infrastructure and statistical database of the Federal government, including improving agency capabilities and public access to government information. It would set a national information resources management (IRM) policy, which serves to integrate all information functions within a lifecycle management system in Federal agencies. It would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of OIRA in carrying out all its responsibilities under this law.

STRENGTHENS PAPERWORK REDUCTION EFFORTS

I believe the importance of a strong and ongoing government-wide effort to reduce the burden of unnecessary government paperwork cannot be overstated. A renewed and unified effort by Congress, the Executive Branch, and Federal agencies is required to attack the mountain of paperwork faced by businesses, university researchers, and other individuals. The "Federal Information Resources Management Act" reflects a studied and constructive approach towards addressing this important problem.

S. 1742 reauthorizes existing Federal information collection provisions of law. It continues the overall goal of reducing paperwork by 5 percent each year. It requires OIRA to identify initiatives to reduce paperwork burdens associated with individuals, business, educational institutions, state and local government especially with respect to procurement and Federal grant programs.

IMPROVES INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

Government information must be made a high priority as a valuable and useful resource to government and society. As such, it must be managed in coordination and systematic manner based on established principles of information resources management. OIRA, in conjunction with other government entities with centralized information management responsibilities, must take leadership in developing coherent information policy which gives balanced and needed emphasis to all information functions. Federal agencies must establish parallel, but independent, information resources management programs. The original paperwork act recognizes this need but more needs to be done to strengthen an integrated IRM concept.

OIRA's handling of its statistical policy role must be improved. The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 gave OIRA the responsibility for Federal statistical policy, among other functions. Last year, I asked the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to look into this questions. Their report "Statistical Needs for a Changing U.S. Economy", demonstrates how our statistical system is woefully out of date. As the OTA study points out, the statistical system has suffered in the past from a lack of funding and from a lack of leadership and coordination. The provision of S. 1742 meet these goals.

REAFFIRMS OIRA RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLICY GUIDANCE

OIRA's responsibility for agency information activities is to ensure that they are well run, not to run them. OIRA's relationship to Federal agencies must be structured to provide policy_guidance, not day-to-day approval or disapproval of agency information activities. Federal informaton resources management capabilities must be strengthened, and agencies must take greater responsibility for fulfilling the full range of information functions. S. 1742 provides solutions to this concern.

ESTABLISHES A COMMISSION ON FEDERAL INFORMATION

The Federal information and statistical data system has not kept pace with

vant information for future decisions. An in-depth review is needed to ensure that there are ongoing improvements within the system.

The bill establishes a Commission on Federal Information to look at the broad question of the health of the Federal information and statistical systems. The functions of the Commission are to look at the contribution of information to economic and social welfare and to competitiveness, to identify long term information needs, to identify gaps and other problems in the current system especially with respect to quality, timeliness and relevancy, to set priorities for information in light of changes in the economy and society, and to look at how better to organize the information system for better coordination and to ensure that the system is capable of keeping up with changes in the economy and society, and to look at how better to organize the information system for better coordination and to ensure that the system is capable of keeping up with changes in the economy and society.

INCREASES PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND OIRA ACCOUNTABILITY

There is a need to increase public participation in, and improve the accountability of, OIRA and Federal agency decision making. As I have held other hearings in the Subcommittee, it has become clear that OIRA policies and actions reach far and wide. Whether one is concerned with Census questionnaires, surveys of the educational progress and reading levels of 4th graders, health statistics surveys, food labeling, or warning labels on children's aspirin, this office, OIRA, has left its strong imprint. Sometimes the results have been simple delays, sometimes effective improvements have resulted and sometimes serious policy changes have occurred which can alter the scope and breadth of proposed Federal regulations and who they effect. S. 1742 proposed what I think are modest steps to endure accountability and I believe that such steps need to be established.

STRENGTHENS FEDERAL LEADERSHIP AND OVERSIGHT

Without question Congress and the Executive Branch must provide stronger leadership, management, and guidance, and conduct oversight to ensure that the purposes and objectives of the Act are met. I think S. 1742 addresses these needs as well.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I ask that a more detailed fact sheet, a copy of the bill, the sectionby-section analysis prepared by the Congressional Research Service, and my statement which accompanied introduction, all be made a part of the hearing record.

I believe we have produced a solid piece of legislation and I look forward to the comments of the witnesses and other interested parties. I am confident that with the constructive help of other witnesses and others we can produce a reauthorization that addresses the concerns I have and creates a framework for effective information management throughout the Federal government.

Again, I look forward to the help of all interested parties and I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

Chairman GLENN. Senator Levin?

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, one of the portions of this bill relates to the OMB regulatory review process, which has been the subject of controversy for 9 years. It is that portion I want to focus on very briefly. The controversy began when President Reagan signed an Executive Order in February of 1981. It was Executive Order 12291. OMB review of rules, which is what that order provided, was included in the omnibus regulatory reform bill, S.1080, in the 97th Congress. A tremendous amount of work was put into that bill, but it was never enacted into law. It included a standard for OMB review of rules as well as a time limit.

I proposed legislation in subsequent Congresses that addressed the public disclosure procedures, and though that legislation passed

After hearings in what was then called the Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee, Senator Durenberger and I were able to work out an agreement with the Reagan Administration to implement most of the disclosure procedures contained in the legislation just described. Those procedures were established by memo from the OIRA director to each agency.

Those procedures, while going a long way, have still not satisfied many critics. So, today the bill that we are considering, would not only put those disclosure procedures into statute but would add additional requirements as well, including a time limit on the OMB review period.

I am supportive of the basic elements of this bill, Mr. Chairman, including the proposed time limits. I prefer, however, to have any legislatively mandated procedures be conditional upon the President's decision to have a review process in the OMB in the first place.

By making these procedures conditional, we would not be mandating the OMB review process itself, but only controlling it if in fact one is established.

I commend Senators Bingaman and Lieberman and their staffs for the hard work that they have put into this legislation. It is a difficult, comprehensive piece, an important piece of legislation. And, Mr. Chairman, I would appreciate if the record were kept open, if I have questions for the record.

Chairman GLENN. The record will be kept open.

Senator Lieberman, do you have an opening statement? I know you have worked very closely with Senator Bingaman on this bill. Joe.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for holding these hearings.

And I thank Senator Bingaman for his dedication and effort in drafting what I think is a very difficult but very important piece of legislation. I am proud to be a cosponsor.

Mr. Chairman, I have a statement which I would like to include in the record and then just speak a few words.

Chairman GLENN. Without objection, it will be included.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I regret that I cannot be here for most of the hearing today because I am involved in the negotiations with the Administration on the Clean Air Act.

But I must say that those negotiations convince me again of how important this piece of legislation is, because if-and I believe, when-the Clean Air Act is adopted, it is going to have to be enforced; regulations will be carried out and paperwork will result, and this act goes right to the heart of all of that.

I associate myself with the comments that my colleagues have made on the question of paperwork reduction. Let me just briefly address the question of regulatory review authority.

Over the past decade the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in OMB has reviewed proposed agency regulations pursuant

one requiring an analysis of whether agency activities are consistent with the President's policies and priorities.

Unfortunately, OIRA all too frequently used its authority under these orders to change or delay regulations that the Administration disagreed with on policy grounds, and, in some cases, to actually stifle regulations that were proposed by independent agencies that have been created by Congress.

In particular, OIRA squelched safety and environmental regulations, many of which languished at OMB for months or years awaiting approval.

There are many notorious examples of these, including proposed regulations concerning Tampons and toxic shock syndrome, manufacture and use of asbestos, air emissions from the chemical industry, warnings about aspirin and Reye's syndrome, and the testing of infant formulas, just to name a few.

OIRA's review process was not revealed to the public. There were long delays. There was, ultimately, no accountability. Even the agencies involved were often unaware of communications and meetings between OIRA and industry representatives.

Mr. Chairman, I am hopeful that the Bush Administration will be more sensitive to congressionally mandated action in general and to the need for safety and environmental regulations in particular.

But nonetheless, the historical record provides a basis for reasonable restrictions on the regulatory review process. And that is exactly what S. 1742 does: It recognizes the President's authority to review proposed regulations, but it also imposes reasonable procedural restrictions.

OMB itself must consider the kinds of restrictions that are in S. 1742 as reasonable, because OMB accepted nearly identical limits in an administrative agreement with the leaders of the House Government Operations Committee last November.

But I feel very strongly that it is necessary to put those procedural guidelines into the law. An agreement between one or two Members of Congress and OMB simply does not have the force of law. If it does not have the approval of either House of Congress or of the President, it is ultimately binding on no one.

And while I respect the current director of OMB and certainly believe that he will honor this agreement that he has reached with Members of the House, there is no guarantee that his successor will do that. It seems to me that on a more general policy level that, when significant problems arise in Government, we ought to address them through the legislative process which is mandated by the Constitution, not through side agreements that are of uncertain authority. Retreating to an unbinding agreement between one or two Members of Congress and an agency really does not set a good precedent for resolving significant issues of public policy.

That is why I think that dealing with these issues legislatively is the way to go, although it is by no means an incursion into Executive authority. On the contrary, this legislation clearly recognizes the Executive's authority to enforce the law, but accepts the reality that Congress can set up structures and procedures for guiding the

We have routinely and repeatedly set procedural limitations and deadlines on agency rulemaking powers in a host of areas. We designate agencies that are, after all, to be members of the President's Cabinet, and we fund the entire Executive Branch, including, incidentally, OMB. So it seems to me that creating guidelines for OIRA's regulatory reviews is very much within Congress' purview and makes sense as a matter of public policy.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for giving me the opportunity to make that statement.

[The prepared statement of Senator Lieberman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding these hearings and Senator Bingaman for dedication in drafting this difficult and important piece of legislation. Paperwork reduction and information policy may be dry issues, but they are crucial to the successful operation of the federal government. The government relies on the cooperation of businesses, state and local governments, and individuals in providing needed information, and if they are overwhelmed by needless paperwork, their cooperation will be difficult to obtain. And we are plainly in need of a coherent policy within the federal government on acquisition, storage, retrieval and dissemination of all kinds of information and data. S. 1742 goes a long way toward establishing an intelligent national information policy, and I am proud to be a co-sponsor.

The bill also contains reasonable, and in my view, critically important, guidelines concerning OMB's regulatory review authority. Over the past decade, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in OMB has reviewed proposed agency regulations pursuant to two Executive Orders-one requiring a cost-benefit analysis and one requiring an analysis of whether agency activities are consistent with the President's policies and priorities.

Unfortunatley, OIRA all too frequently used its authority under these orders to change or delay regulations that the Administration disagreed with on policy grounds, in some cases, to stifle regulations proposed by independent agencies mandated by the Congress. In particular, OIRA squelched safety and environmental regulations, many of which languished at OMB for months or years awaiting approval. There are many notorious examples, including proposed regulations concerning tampons and toxic shock syndrome, the manufacture and use of asbestos, air emissions from the chemicals industry, warning about aspirin and Reyes syndrome, and testing of infant formulas, to name a few. OIRA's review process was not revealed to the public; even the agency involved was often unaware of communications and meetings between OIRA and industry representatives.

Past abuses are not a reason for eliminating a centralized review of agency action by OMB, and I am confident that the Bush Administration will be more sensitive to congressionally mandated action in general and to the need for safety and environmental regulations in particular. Nonetheless, the historical record does provide a basis for reasonable restrictions on the regulatory review process.

S. 1742 does just that-recognizes the Executive's authority to conduct a review of proposed regulations, while imposing reasonable procedural restrictions. These include moderate time limits on the length of OIRA's review, public record-keeping requirements, and some limitations on ex parte contacts. OMB itself must consider these restrictions reasonable, since it accepted nearly identical limits in an “administrative agreement" with the leaders of the House Government Operations Committee last November.

It is necessary, however, to put these procedural guidelines into the law. An agreement between one or two members of Congress and OMB does not have the force of law. It does not have the approval of either the Congress or the President, and it is binding on no one. The current Director of OMB will undoubtedly honor the agreement reached with the House members; his successor may not, and need not, honor it. It seems to me that when significant problems in government arise, the government ought to address them through the legislative process mandated by the Constitution. This seems particularly true where, as in this case, the problem entails some conflict between the executive and legislative branches. Retreating to an unbinding agreement between one or two members of Congress and an agency does not set a good precedent for resolving significant issues of public policy.

Dealing with these issues legislatively is by no means an incursion into Executive