It is well to note that the words "sheriff or coroner were introduced together. The general duties of coroners in this State are defined in sections 2608, 2609, 1 Comp. Laws. They relate to executing the office of sheriff in case of the disqualification or death of that officer. As such, they would have charge of the jail or lockup, and might have in their possession or control the dead body of a person to be disposed of by dissection under this statute. This condition would differ materially from that of a justice who was holding an inquest on the dead body of a stranger found dead in a railroad yard. We think that it would surprise the people of this State if it were held that the dead body of a stranger should be a subject for dissection if not promptly claimed by friends or relatives, who might not know of the death. Section 11828, above quoted, was amended in 1885 by adding the proviso. It is a provision applying specially to "proceedings for the discovery of crime," and to the disposition of the dead bodies of strangers, not belonging to this State. Since 1846, notwithstanding the statute relating to dissection, it has been repeatedly enforced and administered by the courts of this State, and recognized by this court in a number of cases above cited. It seems to us that this is a proper case for the application of the familiar rule for the construction of statutes-that where there are two acts or provisions, one of which is special and particular, and certainly includes the matter in question, and the other general, which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act or provision, the special must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general act or provision. Crane v. Reeder, 22 Mich. 322; Regents of University v. Auditor General, 109 Mich. 137 (66 N. W. 956); City of Lansing v. Board of State Auditors, 111 Mich. 335 (69 N. W. 723).

Repeals by implication are not favored. A statute can be repealed only by an express provision of a subsequent law, or by necessary implication through a positive repugnancy between provisions of the latter and former

enactment, to such an extent that they cannot stand together, or be consistently reconciled. Connors v. Iron Co., 54 Mich. 168 (19 N. W. 938); People v. Wenzel, 105 Mich. 70 (62 N. W. 1038); Musselman v. Wright, 107 Mich. 639 (65 N. W. 569); Nolan v. Garrison, 151 Mich. 138 (115 N. W. 58). In our opinion there is no such repugnancy here. The items in the so-called supplemental bill indorsed upon the claim, together with the $9 item, must be eliminated.

As this matter should be disposed of without further expense or delay, the respondent should issue a warrant to relator for $121.19. There will probably be no necessity for issuing the writ. No costs will be allowed. OSTRANDER, HOOKER, MOORE, and MCALVAY, JJ., concurred.

PEOPLE v. ALEXANDER.

1. EVIDENCE-DYING DECLARATIONS-RES GESTA-HOMICIDE. Declarations of respondent's wife during the five days she survived after being shot, that her husband killed her, were competent so far as they related to the act of killing and the res gestœ.

2. SAME-THREATS-INTENT.

Threats previously made by respondent to kill his wife, shown by declarations of the deceased made to her father, were inadmissible where the threats were general and did not relate to the actual killing or to any purposed act of the deceased.

3. SAME-HUSBAND AND WIFE-PREVIOUS ASSAULT.

Dying declarations are not admissible to show matters not intimately connected with the homicide or mere conclusions or opinions not otherwise admissible.

4. SAME.

Evidence that the wife while dying disclosed previous trouble with or assaults by her husband is not competent as a part of the dying declaration.

5. SAME-HEARSAY-DYING DECLARATIONS.

Nor were the statements admissible to explain the wife's endearing language, claimed to have been addressed to the husband after the shooting and properly received in evidence on cross-examination of witnesses for the prosecution, for the purpose of showing the degree of culpability which she attached to his act.1

Error to Wayne; Mandell, J. Submitted April 22, 1910. (Docket No. 139.) Decided June 6, 1910.

John Alexander was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than seven nor more than fifteen years in the Detroit house of correction. Reversed.

Edward H. Kennedy and Thomas J. Mahon, for appellant.

John E. Bird, Attorney General, Philip T. Van Zile, Prosecuting Attorney, and Fred H. Aldrich, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

BLAIR, J. Respondent was convicted of manslaughter, upon an information charging him with murdering his wife by shooting her with a revolver. Respondent testified that while he was endeavoring to remove the cartridges from his revolver, when he was intoxicated, it was accidentally discharged. For proof of the charge in the information the people relied largely upon the dying declarations of the wife, made from time to time during the five days that she survived her wound. Portions of these statements were objected to by respondent's counsel, and the assignments of error covering the rulings of the court upon such objections present the principal questions for

'As to admissibility in evidence of dying declarations, see note to Worthington v. State (Md.), 56 L. R. A. 353.

our consideration. We have no doubt that a sufficient foundation was laid for receiving the dying declarations so far as they concerned the shooting itself or embraced the res gestæ thereof. But it is contended that certain declarations covered by the assignments of error were received which did not relate to the act of killing and were not confined to the circumstances attending the act as part of the res gestæ, but related to former and distinct transactions in no legal sense a part of the res gestæ, and which were, therefore, erroneously received in evidence.

The statement by Mrs. Alexander of the shooting, as narrated by her father, was as follows:

"Eva said that is my daughter-John come home drunk and abused me and my baby, and I asked John, where have you been, and he asked me, where have you been?' Eva told him she had been over to the grocery store, and bought a dozen heads of cabbage and a crock, and telephoned to him for a sauerkraut cutter, and he said he would make one-he could make one better than they could buy, and she said he brought the sauerkraut cutter home, but she didn't see it, but he still abused her, and says, "Who's been here ?' and she says, 'No one has been here,' and he says, 'Yes, there has been some one here,' and she said, 'If you say so-if you say there has been some one here-it must have been so,' and she said she was afraid of him; that she dassn't contradict him; did not want to contradict him, and he said, "There was some one here, and I will shoot you,' and she said, 'Don't shoot me, for my sake or my baby's sake,' or 'my sake or God's sake, don't shoot, John,' and he said, 'I will shoot you,' and she says, 'If you are going to shoot I will have to call in the neighbors; I will have to call for help,' and he said, 'If you call for help, I will shoot you,' and reached for the revolver that was under the pillow, and said, 'Look out, I will shoot,' and 'he shot and I got it,' and she says, she said, 'If I had stepped one step further to the left I would have been safe; if I had been one step further to the right baby would have got it.'

The father was further permitted, against objection, to give the following testimony:

"Q. What, if anything, did she state to you about other troubles preceding this?

"A. She never mentioned her troubles to us whatever, until after the shooting. Of course I spoke to her about the troubles once or twice through her sickness, but on account of her severe pain, etc., I did not bother her a great deal about it; but in her statement to us there, the day before she died, she placed her finger to her lip there, and lifted it up there and said, 'There is a mark he left me, and we had to take some stitches in that.""

Other witnesses testified:

"Q. What, if anything, did she say during that time, after having made these remarks, as to the manner in which she was injured? (Objected to.)

"The Court: You may answer that.

"A. She said, 'My husband deliberately shot me.'

"Mr. Kennedy: I move that that be stricken out as an improper conclusion in any witness, and therefore not proper in this declaration.

"The Court: Is that what you say Mrs. Alexander said?

"A. Mrs. Alexander said, 'My husband deliberately shot me.'

* *

*

"Q. What further was said with reference to her relations with her husband?

"A. She said, 'Many times he has wronged me,'and many bullets she had dodged. * Well, she was suffering great pain, and she said, 'Just to think that my husband deliberately shot me.'

"Q. What further?

* *

"A. She said she had always been a good, true wife to him.

*

* *

"Q. Did she say anything about their relations prior to the shooting? (Objected to as incompetent and immaterial.)

"A. Not at that time.

"Q. Did she subsequent to that time?

"A. Yes, sir; she said he had abused her.

"Mr. Kennedy: I make the same objection.

"The Court: That was at a different conversation. "Mr. Aldrich: Yes, but later. * *

*

"A. When she was suffering intense pain, she said, 'And just think, he shot me. It is not the first time; many times he has threatened me, and many bullets I have dodged.""”