 | United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services - 1968 - 1226 lapas
...strategic forces by 1972 reach the higher end of the range of estimates projected in the latest NIEs and even if they were to assign their entire available...bomber-delivered weapons for urban targets), about oue-hnlf JThe "highest expected threat" Is actually composed of the upper range of N1E projection*... | |
 | United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services - 1966 - 1088 lapas
...that threat can be acitted from this particular analysis.) Zven if the Soviets in the 1970 period vere to assign their entire available missile force to...(reserving only refire missiles and bomber-delivered vcapons for urban targets), our analysis shows that a very large proportion of our alert forces vould... | |
 | United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services - 1967 - 1000 lapas
...we actually expect. 1. Capability Against the Expected Threat Even if the Soviets in the 1972 period were to assign their entire available missile force to attacks on our strategic forces (reserving inly refire missile and bomber-delivered weapons for urban targets), acre than one-half of the total... | |
 | 1966 - 1272 lapas
...period, that threat can be omitted from this particular analysis.) Even if the Soviets in the 1970 period were to assign their entire available missile force...missiles and bomber-delivered weapons for urban targets), our analysis shows that a very large proportion of our alert forces would still survive. And, for these... | |
 | United States. Congress. Senate. Armed Services - 1966 - 1100 lapas
...period, that threat can be omitted from this particular analysis.) Sven if the Soviets in the 1970 period were to assign their entire available missile force...missiles and bomber-delivered weapons for urban targets), our analysis shows that a very large proportion of our alert forces would still survive. And, of £hese... | |
 | United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services - 1966 - 1474 lapas
...period, that threat can be omitted from this particular analysis.) Even if the Soviets in the 1970 period were to assign their entire available missile force...missiles and bomber-delivered weapons for urban targets) , our analysis shows that a very large proportions of our alert forces would still survive. And, of... | |
 | United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services - 1966 - 1566 lapas
...period, that threat can be omitted from this particular analysis.) Even if the Soviets in the 1970 period were to assign their entire available missile force...missiles and bomber-delivered weapons for urban targets), our analysis shows that, a very large proportion of our alert forces would still survive. And, of these... | |
 | United States. Congress. Senate. Appropriations Committee - 1966 - 1138 lapas
...strike first in a well-coordinated surprise attack. [Deleted] even if the Soviets in the 1970 period were to assign their entire available missile force...missiles and bomber-delivered weapons for urban targets) our analyses show a very large proportion would survive, and of those, a large proportion would be... | |
 | United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services - 1966 - 1384 lapas
...period, that threat can be omitted from this particular analysis.) Even if the Soviets in the 1970 period were to assign their entire available missile force...missiles and bomber-delivered weapons for urban targets), our analysis shows that a very large proportions of our alert forces would still survive. And, of these... | |
 | United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services - 1966 - 1088 lapas
...that threat can be emitted from this particular analysis.) Even if the Soviets in the 1970 period vere to assign their entire available missile force to...(reserving only refire missiles and bomber-delivered vcapons for urban targets), our analysis shows that a very larce proportion of our alert forces would... | |
| |
Even if the Soviets in the 1970 period were to assign their entire available missile force to attacks on our strategic forces (reserving only refire missiles and bomber-delivered weapons for urban targets), our analysis shows that, a very large proportion... 
