1. Capability Against the "Highest Expected Threat" in the NIE

Even if the Soviet strategic forces by 1972 reach the higher end of the range of estimates projected in the latest NIEs and even if they were to assign their entire available missile force to attacks on our strategic forces (reserving only refire missiles and bomber-delivered weapons for urban targets), about one-half of our forces programed for 1972 would survive and remain effective. If the Soviets expand the Moscow ABM defense and deploy the same or a similar system around other cities at the highest rate projected in the latest NIES, about three-quarters of our surviving weapons would detonate over their targets. The destructive potential of such a U.S. retaliatory attack is illustrated by the following table.

SOVIET POPULATION AND INDUSTRY DESTROYED

[Assumed 1972 total population of 247,000,000; urban population of 116,000,000]

Even if the Soviets deploy a substantial number of ABM interceptors by 1972, our strategic missile forces alone could still destroy more than two-fifths of their total population (more than 100 million people), and over three-quarters of their industrial capacity. As the foregoing table demonstrates, beyond 400 onemegaton equivalents optimally delivered, further increments would not meaningfully change the amount of damage inflicted because we would be bringing smaller and smaller cities under attack.

These results, of course, reflect the decisions we have taken in recent years to enhance the future capabilities of our "Assured Destruction" forces, including: 1. The production and deployment of the POSEIDON missile with MIRVS. 2. The production and deployment of improved missile penetration aids.

3. The increase in the proportion of MINUTEMAN IIIs (with MIRVS and a new improved third stage) in the planned force.

4. The initiation of development of new small reentry vehicles in order to increase substantially the number of warheads (or penetration aids) which can be carried by a single missile.

5. The development and production of SRAMS for our strategic bombers. These and other measures will not only enhance the survivability of our strategic missile forces but will also greatly increase the number of weapons which we could place over the Soviet Union in 1972. As I stated earlier, numbers of weapons will be much more important in the future than gross megatonnage. Our calculations show that, even if the Soviets deploy a substantial number of ABMS by 1972, our offensive forces (after absorbing a surprise attack) would still be able to inflict about the same percent fatalities on the Soviet population in a second strike in 1972 as they could have in 1966.

Indeed, if the Soviet offensive-defensive threat does not increase beyond the highest level now projected through 1972 in the latest National Intelligence Estimates, we will have more "Assured Destruction" capability than we will probably need. However, I have repeatedly cautioned that our "Assured Destruction" capability is of such crucial importance to our security that we must be prepared to cope with Soviet strategic threats which are greater than those projected in the latest intelligence estimates. Accordingly, we must continually reexamine the various actions, beyond those which now seem probable, by which the Soviets might seek to strengthen their strategic forces and take appropriate steps in a timely manner to hedge against them.

COMPARISON: 1972 FUNDS WITH 1973 REQUEST

Senator STENNIS. Do you wish to comment on the comparison made in testimony between the AEC's fiscal year 1972 appropriation and fiscal year 1973 AEC budget request?

General GILLER. The $33 million increase in the weapons operating budget represents an increase of only 3.9 percent over the fiscal year 1972 appropriation which is less than the expected increase in cost of living and therefore does, in fact, represent a reduction in effort.

Second, the requested increase for fiscal year 1973 is not entirely defense-related.

Third, the underground testing budget request has been reduced from the fiscal year 1972 appropriation.

Fourth, the atmospheric test readiness capability and the special test detection program which amounts to approximately 2 percent of the weapons operating program total are maintained at the direction of the Senate as part of the Limited Test Ban Treaty Safeguards.

STRATEGIC WARHEAD FORCE

Senator STENNIS. Is the chart attached to the testimony, prepared by the Center for Defense Information, an accurate picture of the strategic warhead force loading projected for 1976 ?

General GILLER. There are a number of assumptions used in developing the table which are inaccurate. For example, the numbers of warheads per missile for MIRV systems and bombers are overstated; that is, [deleted] not actual force load planning. Some recognition is given this in the case of Poseidon, but other inaccurate assumptions are made leading to a total significantly higher than the actual number of Poseidon warheads to be built. In the case of B-52 bombers, the table implies that all bombers would be fully loaded with SRAM's, many more of which could be loaded than bombs. We do not plan to build that many SRAM's. As a result of the several inaccurate assumptions, the total number of missiles (7,706) and the total number of warheads (14,082) are both overstated [deleted].

SALT

Senator STENNIS. In view of the SALT agreement concluded in Moscow, do you agree with the table shown in the testimony comparing deliverable warheads of the United States and the U.S.S.R.?

General GILLER. Not completely. The first part of the table shows launchers and bombers, not warheads. It does not take into account the asymmetry that exists with respect to relative payloads. Regardless of those factors, however, the agreement provides for the following limitations on strategic missile launchers:

Bombers are not included in the agreement.

The number of deliverable warheads is consistent with Secretary Laird's statement. It does not, of course, reflect the fact that [deleted] MIRV warheads are being compared to 25,000 kt. (25 mt.) U.S.S.R. warheads.

Senator STENNIS. What is the relationship of our testing to the SALT talks being conducted by the United States and U.S.S.R. negotiators?

General GILLER. There does not appear to be anything in the SALT agreements just concluded which would preclude per se the necessity for testing those systems not barred by the SALT agreement. Moreover, the SALT agreements explicitly allow for the modernization of certain systems including land-based ICBM's, SLBM's, and ABM's. Depending on the specifics, nuclear testing may represent an important element in the further modernization or development of those systems either explicitly allowed or not covered by the SALT agreements.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Senator STENNIS. Why do we test nuclear explosives?

General GILLER. Our national strategy requires that our nuclear retaliatory force remain invulnerable to any opponent's attack. Because weapons systems change and improve with time and the associated nuclear weapons technology is dynamic, it is mandatory that we have an active research and development program. Testing is absolutely essential to any vigorous research and development program and particularly to advancing our nuclear weapons technology in order to provide appropriate options for both identifying and countering credible advances by an opponent. In addition, nuclear tests of device designs are essential to assure their performance and to preclude the stockpiling of a defective weapon. Other tests are necessary to assure that such weapons can be stored and activated safely without the possibility of an accidental explosion. Tests are also necessary to assure that a warhead will survive specified attempts to destroy it during delivery [deleted]. By taking advantage of technological advances and optimizing the nuclear warhead to the weapons system, total system costs may be significantly reduced as well.

Senator STENNIS. Why do we need so many more tests than the

U.S.S.R.?

General GILLER. It should be pointed out that our detection and identification capabilities with respect to Soviet nuclear tests are limited and we therefore may not be aware of all the tests conducted by the U.S.S.R., particularly low yield tests. Hence, while it seems reasonable to assume that we may have tested more than the U.S.S.R., in view of the different paths our respective countries have followed in developing strategic systems, we cannot be absolutely certain in a quantitative sense how much more we have tested. The path which the United States has followed has involved developing several small and compact warheads which frequently are difficult to design instead of fewer large yield warheads. Moreover, we do not enjoy the large throwweight advantage of certain Soviet missiles such as the SS-9. This throwweight advantage which the Soviets possess results in less stringent warhead design requirements being imposed on Soviet designers.

The requirement for testing is generally higher for more difficult designs which would explain why a larger number of underground tests probably have been carried out by the United States than the U.S.S.R. Senator STENNIS. Money made available for nuclear testing has steadily increased over the past decade. Why can't these allocations be "pared" down and more dollars made available for "non-defense" efforts?

General GILLER. It is a fact that there has been an increase in defense spending during the last decade, although over the past 3 years the budget for nuclear testing has been reduced substantially. During the same period of time, non-defense, Federal, State, and local expenditures have increased at a much greater rate. Spending for nuclear weapons testing as a percentage of the total budget has decreased. Also, on the basis of buying power of constant dollars, spending for nuclear weapons testing has decreased.

ATMOSPHERIC TEST READINESS

Senator STENNIS. Why do we have a readiness program?

General GILLER. The AEC supports this program in conjunction with the DOD as guaranteed to the Congress by President Kennedy when the Limited Test Ban Treaty was ratified. The rationale for the program might best be explained by quoting from Senator Jackson's January 21, 1972, report to the Congress on the implementation of safeguards in connection with the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

The third safeguard—

That of maintaining readiness to resume testing in the atmosphere-is contingent since the need to exercise that option might never arise. Nevertheless, it is in this area that some of our most severe limitations of knowledge exist. This arises in part because of the incompleteness of the information obtained on the subject of weapons effects at high altitude during the 1962 test series. Since that time, a large, costly, and continuing program has been carried out by the DOD and the AEC to answer some of these questions by less satisfactory means. Some of this work is supported by, and complements, the readiness program.

This important safeguard is essential to help deter a Soviet resumption of atmospheric testing. Our own ability to quickly resume such testing can discourage the Soviet Union from hoping to gain a major advantage by violating the test ban and carrying out a quick series of atmospheric tests and then calling for a renewal of the test ban agreement.

Senator STENNIS. Why is so much money required just to maintain a test readiness capability?

General GILLER. Retaining such a capability requires a highly qualified cadre of people and an inventory of current and complex facilities. Our program does not involve only staying ready. It involves the application of these people and resources to the present day problems and questions that confront us in many of the areas that might be associated with nuclear testing in the now prohibited environments.

LMFBR

Senator STENNIS. What experience is there on the liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) and what steps have been taken by the AEC to inform the public of the issues and enviromental considerations pertinent to the LMFBR's?

Mr. SHAW. The AEC and others have been working continuously since 1945 on the sodium cooled breeder reactor concept. One of the

earliest activities in this area was the construction of an experimental reactor called Clementine at Los Alamos National Laboratory which was used from 1946 to 1953 to explore the possibility of operating a reactor with fast neutrons, plutonium fuel and a liquid metal coolant-in this case, mercury. The experimental breeder reactor I (EBR-I) which produced the world's first nuclear-generated electric power was built and operated by Argonne National Laboratory from August 1951 through December 1963 to prove the breeding principle in a fast flux reactor, and to establish further the engineering feasibility of using liquid metal coolant. This experience and the experience obtained from constructing and opearting thermal and intermediate spectrum liquid metal cooled experimental reactors contributed important information toward improved reactor design and safety technology which was of significant benefit to the design, construction, operation and maintenance of subsequent plants. These reactors included the sodium reactor experiment, the Hallam nuclear power facility, and the submarine intermediate reactors mark A and mark B. Development efforts related to reactor operation in a fast flux and high temperature liquid metal environment were subsequently initiated. The technological developments led to construction of a number of test facilities, to demonstration of the physics and safety of a fast flux neutron spectrum reactor, and to construction in the United States of two fast reactors in the mid-1950's, the 62.5 megawatt thermal (MWt) experimental breeder reactor II (EBR-II), and the 200 MWt Fermi reactor. In the mid-1960's, construction was initiated on the 20 MWt southwest experimental fast order oxide reactor (SEFOR) with the purpose of conducting research of the safety of the LMFBR. Other projects in the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and France added to the overall liquid metal fast breeder reactor experience.

In 1962, the AEC issued the Report to the President on Civilian Nuclear Power. This report pointed out that the use of breeders could solve the problem of an adequate and economic energy supply for the future. The report concluded that nuclear energy can and should make an important and, eventually, a vital contribution toward meeting the Nation's long-term energy requirements, and that economic breeders were essential to the long-range major use of nuclear energy. The report included a detailed discussion of the role of breeders in the overall program and established the development of breeder reactors as a specific objective.

In early 1967, the AEC issued the 1967 supplement to the 1962 Report to the President on Civilian Nuclear Power. The supplement set forth the changes that had occurred since 1962, and considered the ongoing AEC reactor programs in relation to the recommendations of the 1962 report. The supplement reaffirmed the promise of the breeder for meeting our long-term energy needs and established the liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) program as the AEC's highest priority civilian reactor development effort.

In addition to the extensive amount of information previously published on the LMFBR program, such as that provided in the LMFBR program plan (WASH-1101-1110), in congressional hearing records and in the many published prints of hearings and reports of the