Union Financial and Administrative Practices and Procedures

Jacksonville bus system offered in advance of that strike to submit the dispute to peaceful arbitration and thereby avoid a work stoppage. It was the employer who refused to arbitrate, yet S. 3692 seeks to punish the employees by depriving them of their right to strike. Our experience under the Florida compulsory-arbitration law corroborated the history of the breakdown of collective bargaining which we found in Indiana and New Jersey.

Some of the reasons for the breakdown of collective bargaining under State laws, introducing imposed settlements or the element of seizure, were stated by Senator Taft during the discussion of the Taft-Hartley Act when he said: "If we begin with public utilities, it will be said that coal and steel are just as important as public utilities. I do not know where we could draw the line. So far as the bill is concerned, we have proceeded on the theory that there is a right to strike and the labor peace must be based on free collective bargaining. We have done nothing to outlaw strikes for basic wages, hours, and working conditions after proper opportunity for mediation.

"We did not feel that we should put into the law, as a part of the collectivebargaining machinery, an ultimate resort to compulsory arbitration, or to seizure, or to any other action. We feel that it would interfere with the whole process of collective bargaining. If such a remedy is available as a routine remedy, there will always be pressure to resort to it by whichever party thinks it will receive better treatment through such a process than it would receive in collective bargaining, and it will back out of collective bargaining" (93 Congressional Record 3855 (1947)).

State compulsory arbitration laws tend to create a mental climate in which one party prepares to force, the other expects to have to submit to, governmental fixing of wages and working conditions. Under State compulsory arbitration or seizure laws, there is clearly a tendency to prepare not for negotiation but for compulsory arbitration or for seizure. If the Federal Government were to turn its back on the problem of labor relations in our industry, it certainly would not promote industrial peace. Compulsion by State governmental decree is no more an acceptable answer for labor disputes in public utilities than any other sector of our economy. State compulsory arbitration and seizure laws are incompatible with American traditions and the genius of American institutions. Collective bargaining cannot live alongside either seizure or compulsory arbitration. State compulsion does not settle labor disputes in public utilities. It merely magnifies and embitters those disputes. There is no sound reason for discriminating against public utility employees by denying to them in any fashion the rights of collective bargaining while granting such rights to their fellow employees in American industry. There is no valid reason why public utility employees should be extended by Federal law the rights of organization and collective bargaining on the one hand and be deprived of them with the other by State prohibition of the right to strike. The fact is that an overturning of the doctrine of the Wisconsin case would constitute an invitation to States to enact laws providing for compulsion. The public interest would not be served thereby. Labor disputes in the transit industry are unique because of the character of the employees in the industry, because of a long experience with voluntary arbitration, because of the provisions of the constitution of the union, and in many existing collectivebargaining agreements for settlement of all disputes by arbitration. The wise governmental attitude is one which will encourage and develop these arbitration procedures rather than to relinquish jurisdiction to a diverse patchwork of State legislation incompatible with the objectives of Federal law.

I must add some words of caution to your subcommittee concerning some proposals before your committee which would give State courts or agencies jurisdiction where the National Labor Relations Board declines to exercise its jurisdiction. Such proposals are found, for example, in S. 1772, S. 1723, S. 3098, and S. 3099. At the outset, let me say that we believe those proposals to be wrong in principle. Congress originally decided on a uniform national labor policy. The national labor policy should not now be made a partly national labor policy. The Board should not be permitted to partially abdicate its functions, deprive millions of workers of limited statutory protection, and thus to inspire a patchwork of diverse State legislation, if the States act at all. The remedy for the "no man's land" created by the Board is to require the Board to enforce the national labor policy and perform its duties.

The proposals to permit continued declination of jurisdiction by the Board have, however, other possible implications beyond enabling the States to act

tiators on both sides to assume the responsibility of settlement when there is a possibility that better terms might be secured through compulsory arbitration: (3) the multiplication of the number of demands with which the parties enter negotiations."

In the Wisconsin Bus case Chief Justice Vinson pointed out that compulsory arbitration laws furnished incentives to the employer not to engage in collective bargaining. In that case, as the Chief Justice noted, the transit employees agreed to continue collective bargaining after a strike became imminent, but the company insisted on invoking the arbitration features of the Wisconsin act. Indeed, in that case, the company repudiated their agreement previously made for voluntary arbitration under accepted and tested procedures. The Chief Justice further noted that under the statute the transit company was able to avoid entirely any determination of certain union demands, and the arbitrators ruled that under the Wisconsin statute the matter of assigning workers to certain schedules was an employer's management right, and, in effect, not a subject for collective bargaining, despite the fact that similar problems of work assignment are appropriate subjects for collective bargaining under the Taft-Hartley Act. This example illustrates the attitude of many employers when the employees are deprived of their right to strike and the employer is permitted to seek refuge under the shelter of a State law which enables him to escape the collective-bargaining process provided for in the Federal law The Court held the Wisconsin compulsory-arbitration law invalid because of conflict with the Taft-Hartley Act.

The New Jersey experience, prior to the Wisconsin bus decision, teaches the same lesson as to the undesirability of State compulsion. A study of the operation of the New Jersey law between 1947 and the end of 1949 was made by an impartial observer, Thomas Kennedy, who was then a professor at the University of Pennsylvania (The Handling of Emergency Disputes, 1949 proceedings, Industrial Relations Research Association, pp. 13–47). The conclusions contained in that study confirms many of our own observations. One of the Nation's large transit systems which operates largely within the State of New Jersey is Public Service Coordinated Transport. That company has been bargaining with a group of local divisions affiliated with our international union for over 30 years. From 1924 to 1947 there were no strikes or slowdowns. During that 23-year period, with the exception of some cases before the War Labor Board, the parties always reached agreement upon new con tract terms without resort to strikes or lockouts and across the bargaining table and without the use of arbitration. In 1947, the first year in which the New Jersey compulsory arbitration law was on the books, negotiations failed to result in agreement. In 1948 and 1949, the major terms of the contracts between the parties were the result of compulsory arbitration. The 1949 agreement expired at the end of January 1951. In 1951, the State seized the property and initiated a wage adjustment while operating that property, as of February 1, 1951, just a few weeks prior to the handing down of the Wisconsin decision. In summary, during the entire period from the effective date of the New Jersey law in 1947 to the date of the Wisconsin Bus case, no agreement was the result of free collective bargaining without governmental imposition or intervention.

Moreover, there were strikes under the New Jersey law despite the provision of severe penalties in the law. Professor Kennedy pointed out that both management and labor in New Jersey complained that the bargaining process was hampered by the existence of compulsory arbitration.

The Indiana experience corroborates the experience in Wisconsin and New Jersey. On the Indianapolis transit system, there had been a prewar history of voluntary agreement. The compulsory arbitration law in Indiana was enacted in 1947. Beginning in 1948, there were 2 successive compulsory arbitrations, and then 1 voluntary agreement, prior to the Wisconsin Bus decision And there were public utility strikes in Indiana in spite of the attempt to outlaw them.

When Senator Holland appeared before the subcommittee in support of his bill, S. 3692, he referred to the Jacksonville bus strike, urging a return to the compulsory procedures of the Florida compulsory-arbitration law which was ruled invalid because of the Wisconsin Bus decision. Your committee should be informed that the union which represents the employees on the

8 Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway, and Mode America, Division 998 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bor

State compulsory arbitration laws tend to create a mental climate in which one party prepares to force, the other expects to have to submit to, governmental fixing of wages and working conditions. Under State compulsory arbitration or seizure laws, there is clearly a tendency to prepare not for negotiation but for compulsory arbitration or for seizure. If the Federal Government were to turn its back on the problem of labor relations in our industry, it certainly would not promote industrial peace. Compulsion by State govern mental decree is no more an acceptable answer for labor disputes in public utilities than any other sector of our economy. State compulsory arbitration and seizure laws are incompatible with American traditions and the genius of American institutions. Collective bargaining cannot live alongside either seizure or compulsory arbitration. State compulsion does not settle labor disputes in public utilities. It merely magnifies and embitters those disputes. There is no sound reason for discriminating against public utility employees by denying to them in any fashion the rights of collective bargaining whi granting such rights to their fellow employees in American industry. Ther is no valid reason why public utility employees should be extended by Federa law the rights of organization and collective bargaining on the one hand a be deprived of them with the other by State prohibition of the right u strin The fact is that an overturning of the doctrine of the Wiscons constitute an invitation to States to enact laws providing for campus. Te public interest would not be served thereby. Labor disputes in the trans industry are unique because of the character of the employees in the because of a long experience with voluntary arbitration, lean visions of the constitution of the union, and in many existir e bargaining agreements for settlement of all disputes by arbitrati governmental attitude is one which will encourage and deveg he tion procedures rather than to relinquish jurisdiction of State legislation incompatible with the objectives of Federa I must add some words of caution to your subcommitte proposals before your committee which would give State a jurisdiction where the National Labor Relations Border jurisdiction. Such proposals are found, for example and S. 3099. At the outset, let me say that we bein wrong in principle. Congress originally decided policy. The national labor policy should not labor policy. The Board should not be emitte tions, deprive millions of workers of inspire a patchwork of diverse State remedy for the "no man's land" creste to enforce the national labor policy and The proposals to permit eatin have, however, other Me att

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where the Board refuses to act. If such legislation is construed as a general relinquishment of Federal jurisdiction to the extent the Board declines to exercise it, the courts may hold that State compulsory arbitration and seizure laws may be applied to utilities concerning which the Board declines to assert jurisdiction though unfair labor practices and representation questions are the primary problems sought to be treated.

If the Board were to continue its present arbitrary practice of setting a minimum gross dollar revenue of $3 million or over for utilities operating intrastate but whose activities affect commerce, we would have the curious spectacle of compulsory arbitration or seizure for some utilities but not as to others within the same State. Moreover, it may well be that such a result raises questions of constitutionality of the proposed legislation. We object to such proposals.

STATEMENT OF JAMES C. PETRILLO, PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF MUSICIANS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

My name is James C. Petrillo. I am president of the American Federation of Musicians of the United States and Canada, consisting of some 260,000 professional musicians. I have been privileged to serve in that capacity for the past 18 years as a result of free elections conducted at our annual conventions.

Senator Kennedy has kindly offered me this opportunity to reply in writing to the unsworn testimony of Mr. Cecil F. Read, presented to the committee on May 9, 1958. I note from the transcript that Mr. Read was "reluctantly" heard by the committee because he is not "out of the main current of people who have a direct interest and represent a great many people." He was heard because "Senator Knowland expressed a particular interest" in his appearance. In these circumstances, I respectfully request that this written reply be inserted in the printed record immediately following Mr. Read's testimony.

It seems to me most unfortunate that a man who is the self-appointed "chairman" of an organization with only "four official members" who was granted the privilege to appear before a committee of the Senate of the United States considering legislation affecting the welfare of millions of organized workers and their families, should have abused that high privilege by testimony which, at best, is unfair and, at worst, is deliberately false and misleading.

Mr. Read's testimony opens with the bald untruth that he "was expelled from the A. F. of M. for opposing the policies and actions of James C. Petrillo." The truth is, as he subsequently admitted upon examination by Senator Kennedy, that he was expelled "on charges of advocating dual unionism and placing obstacles in the way of the successful maintenance of the local." Criticism and debate have always been open, vigorous, and encouraged in the American Federation of Musicians. No single member of the federation has ever been disciplined in the mildest degree for voicing criticism or opposition to the policies adopted by the federation or to any action taken by any of its leaders.

The time has, I think, arrived for the total destruction of carefully nurtured. ugly myths that have unfairly victimized the American Federation of Musicians. It is a recorded but sadly neglected—fact that some 15 years ago the owners of the music industry, in an effort to thwart the legitimate aspirations and rights of sorely exploited musicians, established a $1 million fund dedicated exclusively to an unbridled assault by cartoons and editorials on the person and personality of the federation's president. The menacing public image thus falsely created has too frequently been seized upon, in the Halls of Congress and elsewhere, as an easy means of furthering petty ambitions hungrily seeking a temporary limelight.

Now that I have publicly annuonced my firm intention to decline the nomination as president of the American Federation of Musicians at its convention next week in Philadelphia, I think it altogether appropriate that I make this last effort to set the record straight. This I do, not by way of personal defenseI am more than content to rest upon the actual record of my deeds and efforts but, rather, by way of defense of an organization, of a cause, and of men and women who deserve and need the help and understanding of the public and Congress of the United States.

I say bluntly and unequivocally that no trade union is more democratically conceived and managed than is and has been the American Federation of Musicians. Yes, scores of persons have been quick to attack and criticize. But not a one of them has ever accepted the open, specific invitation to witness our con

ventions in actual operation or to examine the actual procedures and conduct of our officials.

Not a single delegate to our annual conventions is in any sense controlled or dominated by the federation officers. Every delegate is selected by the democratic vote of his fellow local members. Not once in my administration has a local been placed in trusteeship. No staff employee of the federation has a voice or vote at the convention. Every proposition is the subject of committee study Debate is unlimited. And election of officers

and report and convention action. is by secret ballot.

No breath of scandal has ever touched the management of our finances. Our financial reports, regularly published and widely distributed, are a model of completeness and clarity. Not one nickel has been misspent or unaccounted for. The ethical codes recently enacted by the AFL-CIO require no change in our constitution and bylaws. Each and every requirement of these codes was part of our laws 30 years prior to their adoption by the AFL-CIO.

Mr. Read would make light of these solid achievements by referring to them as merely going "through all the motions of democracy." I must observe the irony of testimony that mouths cliche's about democracy and support for legislation seeking to democratize unions by a witness who is, himself, insensitive to either the "motions" or the substance of democracy.

A basic reason for the federation's expulsion of Mr. Read was the sordid manner in which he engineered the suspension of the duly elected president of local No. 47. I enclose herewith, and ask that it be made a part of the record, a copy of a report of Mr. Arthur J. Goldberg as impartial referee appointed by the federation to hear the charges against Mr. Read. I respectfully commend it to the committee's attention as a classic document on internal union procedures. That report demonstrates how Mr. Read, in the most brutal and insensitive manner, assaulted a man's reputation, career, and position without any prior notice and without any charges, without any justification in the laws of the union, and by means of a "kangaroo court" he cynically contrived to carry out his secret plot.

The same Mr. Read established a so-called musicians defense fund for the purpose of instituting multiple suits against the American Federation of Musicians. This fund has been in existence for almost 2 years and has collected and expended many, many thousands of dollars without a single report having yet been made to any of its contributors.

Through his confusing and divisive tactics, Mr. Read seriously weakened the bargaining power of the federation in its recent negotiations with the major motion-picture producers in Hollywood, thus generating the first strike of the federation in that industry. Upon the announcement of the strike he gratuitously proclaimed his approval and support. And then, when the strike was but a few weeks old, he announced the formation of a dual union and petitioned the National Labor Relations Board for certification, thereby effectively preventing any negotiated settlement of the strike he originally applauded. It is his "democratic" view, formally urged to the NLRB, that if his new union obtains a vote of 251 persons in Hollywood, Calif., it should be the exclusive bargaining representative of all musicians throughout the United States who might be employed by the major producers.

In this connection, I digress momentarily to protest the Board's actions in this case which, in my judgment, seriously violate the declared public policy to stabilize bargaining relationships. It is axiomatic, of course, that the statute seeks the diminution of strikes. It is equally obvious that strikes can honorably be settled only if there are persons with effective capacity to negotiate. Once Mr. Read filed his phony petition, which the Board chose to entertain, the companies understandably rejected our invitation to sit down and discuss a settlement of the strike.

I use the word "phony" advisedly. In his petition, Mr. Read claimed that only 500 musicians would be eligible to vote. The Board rules require a showing of 30 percent interest to support a valid petition. By any standard previously established in the motion-picture industry some 2,000 musicians would have been eligible to vote. However, the simple device of making the selfserving statement that only 500 were eligible made it possible to support that petition with a mere 150 authorizations.

Because of its length, this report is not printed here but has been retained in the subcommittee files.

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Union Financial and Administrative Practices and Procedures: Hearings Before ...