wharf, upon which they had been landed for him, in order to observe the day as a holiday, in consequence of which they were consumed by an accidental fire, it was held that he should bear the loss, and not the carrier. Sec. 693. (§ 363.) Same subject-Fourth of July. So it has been held in New York that the Fourth of July not being by law a legal holiday in that state except for certain specific purposes, there was no legal reason why the carrier might not on that day tender the goods and insist upon their acceptance, or why the consignee should be relieved from his duty to call for and accept them. But it was at the same time held that evidence of usage not to tender nor to receive goods on that day should have been submitted to the jury, and that they should have been instructed that if such a usage or established course of dealing was proven, the consignee was entitled to a reasonable time after that day to remove the goods.22 Sec. 694. ($364.) Consignee must remove goods within reasonable time. The consignee in such cases must be prepared to proceed with ordinary dispatch in the removal of the goods, and cannot, of course, continue the responsibility of the carrier beyond such reasonable time as would be necessary, in the ordinary course of such business, to remove the goods to a safe shelter at a reasonable distance from the wharf or landing.23 He cannot choose an unusual or distant place of storage, and insist that the carrier shall continue the insurer of the 22. Russell Manufg. Co. v. Steamboat Co., 50 N. Y. 121. But see Scheu v. Benedict, 116 N. Y. 510, where it is said that the consignee was not required to proceed with the unloading of a vessel on the Fourth of July. 23. "The general rule," says Benedict, J., "is that when the cargo has been landed at a suitable time, upon a suitable pier, and so placed on the pier that it can be examined by the consignee and removed from the pier, the liability of the ship-owner as a common carrier in respect to such cargo terminates after the expiration of such a period of time after the goods are landed as may be reasonable to enable the consignee to examine and remove it, provided the consignee be informed of the time and place of landing." In Liverpool, etc., S. Co. v. Suitter, 17 Fed. Rep. 695, citing Richardson 2. Goddard, 23 How. 28. See also, De Grau v. Wilson, 17 Fed. Rep. 698. . safety of his goods until he can move them piece by piece to it. He must himself take the consequences of delay beyond what may fairly be considered, according to usage and the course of business, a reasonable time; and if there be an unusual delay, whether by reason of the distance to which the goods must be hauled, or from any other circumstances in the situation of the consignee, and the goods are thereby lost, the carrier cannot be held liable. All that the consignee can claim is, that he shall have the time which would be necessary, under the usual and ordinary circumstances, to provide for the care and removal of the goods. Nor can the carrier land the goods at a wharf or other place unnecessarily and unreasonably distant from the place of business of the consignee, and require of him their removal within such time as would have been considered reasonable had they been brought within the proper distance. In this regard the rights and duties of the carrier and of the consignee are reciprocal. 24. Hedges v. Railroad Co., 49 N. Y. 223. One day is a reasonable time for removing 63 bales of hops to a distance of one mile, and after the expiration of that time, the carrier is liable only as warehouseman. Brand v. Steamboat Co., 30 N. Y. Supp. 903, 10 Misc. Rep. 128. After a consignee had been no tified of the arrival of cotton on Saturday afternoon, and he allowed it to remain on the dock until the following Wednesday, when it was destroyed by fire, the carrier was held not liable for the loss. Nor was the liability of the carrier affected by the fact that part of the cotton had not been unloaded at the time of the fire, it appearing that it was in the hold of the vessel surrounded by other freight and could not be delivered until such freight was re moved. Wynantskill Knitting Co. v. Murray, 90 Hun, 554, 36 N. Y. Supp. 26. Allowing whiskey to remain on the dock three days after notification of arrival is unreasonable, and if the goods are then lost, proof of negligence on the part of the carrier is necessary. King v. Steamboat Co., 73 N. Y. Supp. 999, 36 Misc. 555. If the bill of lading specifically allows the master of the ship several distinct methods of discharg ing the cargo after notice to the consignee, and the consignee fails to take possession of or give directions concerning the goods to the carrier, the carrier, after the lapse of a reasonable time, may adopt any one of the designated methods of discharge, and having chosen to leave the matter to others, the consignee cannot complain of the apparent slowness then Sec. 695. (§ 365.) Diligence required of carrier in giving notice to consignee. The degree of diligence to be exercised by the carrier in his efforts to find the consignee, when the goods are required to be delivered to him personally, and he is unknown, has already been considered.25 As the constructive. delivery by notice, in the case of carriers by water, is allowed as a substitute for a personal delivery, the same care will be required of him in finding, under similar circumstances, the person who is entitled to the notice of the arrival of the goods. It is indeed essential, to constitute a valid constructive delivery by depositing the goods upon the wharf or other place of landing, that the notice should be given to the consignee, if he can be found by reasonable efforts; and if it should appear that he could have been found had such efforts been made, but that they were not made, the carrier would undoubtedly be liable for the loss of the goods whether he had left them exposed or had stored them safely for the consignee; because his liability as carrier would have continued from the fact that he had failed to use the proper diligence to divest himself of that relation to the goods. For when the consignee is unknown to the carrier, a due effort to find him is a condition. precedent to a right even to warehouse the goods; and, as notice to the consignee takes the place of a personal delivery of the goods, and as a due and unsuccessful effort to find him. will alone excuse the want of such notice, it follows that if it be not made, the carrier will continue liable for their safety as carrier.26 Sec. 696. (§ 366.) Necessity of notice may be waived by usage. The necessity of notice may, however, be waived by the previous course of dealing between the parties in which it has not been required; as where the consignee had been in the habit of daily calling for and receiving from the carrier's of the ship's agent in accomplish- 26. Zinn v. The Steamboat Co., 49 N. Y. 442; Sherman v. Railroad, 64 id. 254; Union S. B. Co. v. Knapp, 73 Ill. 506. wharf shipments of goods from a factory, consigned to him for sale as its agent, and from this long continuance must have known that, in the ordinary course of business, goods would be awaiting him each day at the wharf.27 Or the carrier may show that the uniform usage and course of business of carriers in the same trade in which he is employed has been to leave the goods at the wharf or other places of landing, without notice to the consignee; or that, in the manner of delivery adopted by him, even though it might have been without notice to the consignee, he has conformed to the usage and custom of the locality;28 and this, it would seem, whether the usage was known to the shipper or not,29 every person who contracts with another for services in his particular trade being understood to contract with reference to the usage of that trade.30 The carrier may, therefore, show, as has been repeatedly held, the usage as to the manner of delivery of goods by those engaged in the carriage of goods by water, in the particular port or at the particular place of delivery, and that he has acted according to it.31 27. Russell Manufg. Co. V. Steamboat Co., 50 N. Y. 121; Ely v. Steamboat Co., 53 Barb. 207. 28. Gibson v. Culver, 17 Wend. 305; Ostrander v. Brown, 15 Johns. 39; Van Santvoord v. St. John, 6 Hill, 157; Stone v. Rice, 58 Ala. 95. 29. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. The Champlain Trans. Co., 16 Vt. 52; 18 id. 131; 23 id. 186. 30. Loveland v. Burke, 120 Mass. 139; Barnes v. Foley, 5 Burr. 2711. 31. Dixon v. Dunham, 14 Ill. 324; Crawford v. Clark, 15 id. 561; Sleade v. Payne, 14 La. Ann. 453; McKeon v. See, 4 Robt. (N. Y.) 449; Gatliffe v. Bourne, 4 Bing. N. C. 314; Garside v. Trent Nav. Co., 4 T. R., 581; Railroad Co. v. Naive, 112 Tenn. 239, 79 S. W. Rep. 124, 64 L. R. A. 443, citing Hutchinson on Carr; Railroad Co. v. Carter, 165 Ill. 570, 46 N. E. Rep. 374, 36 L. R. A. 527, reversing 62 Ill. App. 618, and citing Hutchinson on Carr. This effect of usage in doing away with the requirement of notice in cases of carriers by water is one of importance, especially in river navigation. Such carriers, especially upon our western rivers, rarely, if ever, give notice to the consignees of freight, which is put off for them at the numer ous places of landing upon these streams, unless the delivery be at some port. It seems to have grown into a universal understanding in such cases, that the mere deposit of freight upon the bank of the river at the usual Sec. 697. (§ 366a.) Necessity of notice may be dispensed with by contract.-The necessity of notice may also be waived by contract, as by a stipulation to that effect in the bill of lading. Under such a provision the consignee is bound to watch for the ship's arrival, and be ready to receive the goods place of landing is all that the carrier is expected to do. Having grown into a universal custom, and being so understood between the parties, there can be no doubt but that the carrier, in so depositing ordinary freight, has done his duty without giving notice to the consignee. Such a course might in most cases be also defensible upon the ground that such had been the course of deal ing between the carrier and consignee. See Stone v. Rice, 58 Ala. 95. The case most directly in point as to the legal effect of such usage, whether of the particular carrier or of the class to which he be longs, is that of the Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. The Champlain Transportation Company, 16 Vt. 52; 18 id. 131; 23 id. 186. A package of money was delivered by the teller of a bank at Burlington to the captain of the defendants' boat, to be carried to Plattsburg, where it was in the habit of touching to put off freight, for another bank in the latter place. When the boat arrived at Plattsburg the captain delivered the package to the wharfinger, there to be carried to the bank. No notice was given to the bank of the arrival of the package, and before its delivery, and whilst in the wharfinger's possession, it was stolen. The owners of the boat were sued by the Burlington bank for the value of the package, and upon the trial the defendants offered to prove that it had always been the constant, uniform and unvaried usage and custom of all the boats belonging to the defendants, when they received packages of money, like the one in question, to carry to any place on the lake, and particularly to the bank at Plattsburg, to deliver them to the wharfinger to be carried to the bank without giving notice to the consignee. This evidence was objected to and excluded by the court, and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The supreme court was, however, of opinion that the inferior court had erred in the exclusion of this evidence, and its judgment was, on this ground, reversed, and the case remanded for another trial. 16 Vt. 52. The case again came before the supreme court (18 Vt. 131), and the question was directly made whether, conceding that the usage of the might justify a departure from the general rule as to delivery, it was necessary that that usage should be known to the plaintiff. Upon this subject the court held that, "in the absence of any special contract between the parties in relation to the subject, the duty and liability of the defendants must be determined by the law applicable to carriers of this carrier |