The embargo, it was admitted, was a legal interruption of the voyage, but it was held that it was only a suspension of the contract, and that when that suspension ceased the liability to perform was revived, and that the defendant, having engaged to convey, the dangers of the seas only excepted, he could set up no other excuse.

Sec. 660. (§ 337.) Power of the owner of the goods to change their destination-Liability for freight. So long as the goods remain the property of the bailor, he may countermand any directions he may have given as to their consignment, and may at any time during the transit require of the carrier their redelivery to himself; and if such redelivery can be made without too much inconvenience or expense to the carrier, he will be bound to make it. "A carrier is employed as bailee of a person's goods for the purpose of obeying his directions respecting them, and the owner is entitled to receive them back at any period of the journey when they can be got at. To say that a carrier is bound to deliver goods according to the owner's first directions is a proposition wholly unsupported either by law or common sense. I can well understand the case of goods being placed in such a position that they cannot easily be got at, though it is usually otherwise.''48 But if the goods are demanded by the owner during the transit, when the carrier is willing and able to fulfill the contract on his part, the latter will be entitled to his full freight for the whole distance to the destination to

48. Per Martin, B., in Scothorn v. Railway Co., 8 Exch. 341; Mich. etc. R. R. v. Day, 20 Ill. 375; Steidl v. Railroad, Minn., 102 N. W. Rep. 701, citing Hutch, on Carr.; Sharp v. Clark, 13 Utah, 510, 45 Pac. Rep. 566, citing Hutch. on Carr.

The owner of goods being transported by a common carrier has the right to have his consignment, while in transit, diverted at any intermediate point through which it passes; but such right of diver

sion cannot add to the burdens of the carrier, or require it to do more than comply with a proper and legal demand therefor; and the carrier will not be obliged to heed such a demand unless some evidence of the right of the party making it is furnished before the goods reach the stopping point from which a diversion is sought. Ryan v. Railway Co., 90 Minn. 12, 95 N. W. Rep. 758, citing Hutch. on Carr.

which they were originally directed, and any expense he may be put to in unloading. 49 If this be tendered, and he refuse to restore the goods, it will amount to a conversion. The owner cannot, however, it is said, change the destination and require delivery somewhere else, except upon the basis of a new contract, after the carrier has completed his undertaking and carried the goods to the destination first agreed upon.50

Sec. 661. (§ 337a.) Right of owner to terminate carriage short of destination. So clearly the owner would have the right, while no new interests have intervened and subject to the carrier's claim for full freight,51 to intercept the goods upon their journey and demand their delivery at any reasonable point upon the carrier's line short of the original destination. A fortiori is this so, where, through no fault of the owner, the carriage is delayed by accident or the fault of the carrier.52

49. See post, § 801. Violet v. Stettinius, 5 Cranch C. Ct. 559; Shipton v. Thornton, 9 Ad. & El. 314; Thomson v. Small, 1 Com. B. 328; Carr v. Railroad Co., 92 N. Y. Supp. 799.

Where a carrier delivers goods to the person to whom they were consigned, even though that person was formerly the shipper's agent, after notice from the shipper not to do so except on his written order, the carrier will be guilty of conversion and it will be no defense to an action for such conversion that such person had a lien on the goods for freight paid, where it appears that at that time he owed the shipper a larger sum. Lester v. Railroad Co., 92 Hun, 342, 36 N. Y. Supp. 907.

But the carrier is not guilty of a conversion if he delivers to the consignee, notwithstanding the order of the consignor to redeliver to him, if at the time of delivery there is still in force between the

consignor and consignee a contract by which the consignee agrees to sell the goods and account to the consignor at a certain price, the title to the goods to remain in the consignor until paid for. Lester v. Railroad, supra.

v. Railroad Co.,

50. Melbourne 88 Ala. 443. 51. As to this, see ante, § 660, and post, § 801.

52. In Straus v. The Martha, 35 Fed. Rep. 313, a steamship, disabled on the way, was detained at Halifax for repairs from October to February. The consignee of glycerine on board of her, hearing of her probable detention, demanded delivery of the glycerine at Halifax, offering to pay full freight, together with all incident-. al expenses, and to sign a general average bond. This was refused, and on the arrival of the cargo finally in New York the glycerine was found to be damaged. The vessel was held liable.

But in the absence of a stipulation in the shipping contract expressly providing for the payment of freight for the entire distance, the carrier may be estopped from demanding full freight to the point of original destination by proof of a usage or custom followed by him of making delivery to shippers at intermediate stations upon their paying freight to such points. Such a usage is not contrary to law, and when it has become so general and well settled that the shipper and carrier will be presumed to have contracted with reference to it, the carrier, when the goods are demanded at an intermediate point, will be entitled only to the freight earned in transporting the goods to such point.53

53. Sharp v. Clark, 13 Utah, 510, 45 Pac. Rep. 566.

CHAPTER IX.

OF DELIVERY BY THE CARRIER.

§ 662. Last duty of carrier is de- [§ 678. Same subject-Carrier not

II.

$693. Same subject - Fourth of 710. Mode or place of delivery