be fixed before the court can interfere, and allegations as to the unconstitutionality of the law under which a commission acts and threatened consequences of the exercise of the power to fix rates in multiplicity of suits and irreparable injury cannot be set up as a basis of equity interposition before the rates have first been fixed.21

Sec. 576. A state has no control over interstate rates.-A state undoubtedly has the right to regulate rates and prevent unjust discrimination on domestic commerce wholly within its own borders, but as soon as traffic takes on the character of interstate commerce its power of regulation ceases. The question consequently often arises whether a particular transaction is domestic or interstate commerce. In general it may be said that a railroad company whose line is wholly in one state, and which, although it carries freight destined to points. beyond such state, never issues through bills of lading to points beyond its own line, receives no freight on through bills of lading, and which has no arrangement with other roads for a conventional division of charges or for a common control is not within the purview of the Interstate Commerce Act and is subject to state regulation alone.22 And this power of the state extends to the regulation of the joint tariffs of connecting roads operating wholly within its boundaries.23 It

A 623; Railroad Co. v. Middlesex & S. Traction Co., 70 N. J. L. 732, 58 Atl. Rep. 332.

Although third parties should not be permitted, as a matter of right, to intervene and be made formal parties to the suit, and thus, in a measure control the case, the commission, and, on appeal, the court should be liberal in receiving evidence upon the question of what is a reasonable rate or charge to be made by the carrier proceeded against, and in their discretion may receive evidence and hear arguments in behalf of any person or corporation

specially, although indirectly, interested in the result. Steenerson v. Railway Co., 60 Minn. 461, 62 N. W. Rep. 826.

21. McChord v. Railroad Co., 183 U. S. 483, 22 Sup. Ct. R. 165, reversing Railroad Co. v. McChord, 103 Fed. 216.

22. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 457; United States v. Chicago, etc. Railroad, 81 Fed. 783; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Bellaire, etc. Railway Co., 77 Fed. 942; Ex parte Koehler, 30 Fed. 869.

23. Railroad Co. v. State of Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257, 22 Sup. Ct.

would, however, be beyond the scope of this work to go over the whole field of what is and what is not interstate commerce, so only the best illustrative cases are gathered in the footnote.24

24. The instant property is delivered and a sale completed in a state after an interstate shipment, it becomes a part of the common mass of property subject to the laws of that state, and its further transportation by the vendee, although without breaking bulk, is a matter for state regulation. Railway Co. v. State, 97 Tex. 274, 78 S. W. Rep. 495, affirming 32 Tex. Civ. App. 1, 73 S. W. Rep. 429.

Sec. 577. The reasonableness of a state rate must be determined without reference to carrier's interstate business.The reasonableness or unreasonableness of rates prescribed by R. 900, 46 L. Ed. 1151, affirming 80 in transporting the commodity, Minn. 191, 83 N. W. Rep. 60. some acting entirely in one state and some through two or more states, does in no respect affect the character of the transaction. Thus, where orange growers in Florida shipped their fruit from one point in that state to another point in the same state, consigned to their agent at the latter point for reshipment, who immediately forwarded them to their destination in another state, it was held that the shipment from the growers to the forwarding agent was interstate commerce not subject to the control of the Florida Railway Commission. Cutting v. R. & Nav. Co., 46 Fed. 641. See also along the same lines, Railway Co. v Barry, (Tex. Civ. App.) 45 S. W. Rep. 814; Houston, etc. Navigation Co. v. Insurance Co., 83 Tex. 1, 32 S. W. Rep. 889, 59 Am. St. Rep. 17, 30 L. R. A. 713, reversing Id., 31 S. W. Rep. 685; State v. Southern Kan. Ry. Co. of Texas, (Tex. Civ. App.) 49 S. W. Rep. 252 and Railway Co. v. Fort Grain Co., 7 Tex. Ct. Rep. 207, 72 S. W. Rep. 419, 73 S. W. Rep. 845.

A consignment of cattle was made to Kansas City, Mo. The stock yards where the cattle were unloaded extended over the Missouri state line into Kansas. The office of the consignee and the actual unloading were in the latter state, but those facts were held not to change the transaction into interstate commerce, the obligation of the carrier only extending to Kansas City, Mo., any other place of delivery being merely used for the convenience of the parties. Scammon v. Railroad Co., 41 Mo. App. 194.

Whenever a commodity has begun to move as an article of trade from one state to another, commerce in that commodity between the states has commenced. The fact that several different and independent agencies are employed

A railroad corporation while engaged in interstate commerce is not rendered subject to state control by a provision in the char ter granted it by the state that it shall be subject to the laws applicable to common carriers.

a state for the transportation of persons and property wholly within its limits must be determined without reference to the interstate business done by the carrier, or to the profits derived from it. The state cannot justify unreasonably low rates for domestic transportation, considered alone, upon the ground that the carrier is earning large profits on its interstate business, over which, so far as the rates are concerned, the state has no control. Nor can the carrier justify unreasonably high rates on domestic business upon the ground that it will be able only in that way to meet losses on its interstate business. So far as the rates of transportation are concerned, domestic business should not be made to bear the losses on interstate business, nor the latter the losses on domestic business. It is only rates for the transportation of persons and property between points within the state that the state can prescribe; and when it undertakes to prcscribe rates not to be exceeded by the carrier, it must do so with reference exclusively to what is just and reasonable as between the carrier and the public in respect of domestic business. The argument that a railroad line is an entirety, that its income goes into, and its expenses are provided for out of a common fund, and that its capitalization is on its entire line within and without the state, can have no application where the state is without authority over rates on the entire line, and can only deal with local rates and make such regulations as are necessary to give just compensation on local business.25

But it by no means follows that railway companies are entitled to earn the same percentage of profits upon all classes of freight carried. It often happens that, to meet competition from other roads at particular points, the companies themselves fix a disproportionately low rate upon certain classes of freight consigned to these points. And it is not beyond Line Ry. Co.,

Houston, etc. Navigation Co. v.
Insurance Co., supra.

25. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. R. 418, affirming Ames v. Railway Co., 64 Fed. 165.

See also, Railway Co. v. Keyes, 91 Fed. 47; State v. Seaboard Air

Fla.

37

So. Rep. 314; Osborn v. Railroad Co., 126 Mich. 113, 85 N. W. Rep. 466; State v. Express Co., 81 Minn. 87, 83 N. W. Rep. 465; Steenerson v. Railway Co., 69 Minn. 353, 72 N. W. Rep. 713.

the power of a state commission to reduce the freight upon a particular article, provided the companies are able to earn a fair profit upon their entire business, and the burden is upon then to impeach the action of the commission in this particular.26

Sec. 578. Reasonableness of state rates should be determined by a study of the rates themselves. The real question in every case is as to the reasonableness of the rates fixed, and that question should be decided on studying the rates themselves under all the conditions which would show reasonableness or unreasonableness.27 The fact that a member of the state railroad commission had pledged himself, before his election, to make certain changes in rates which are embodied in schedules by the commission, does not affect the validity of such schedule, nor does the interest, as a shipper, in the rates fixed, of one of the commissioners who takes part in fixing them, but whose vote is not necessary to the decision, render such decision invalid.28 The fact that a state railroad commission had previously considered the question of rates at different times, and had determined that the rates then in force were just and reasonable, coupled with an allegation that there has since been no change in conditions to warrant a reduction of rates is not impertinent in a bill by a railroad company to restrain the enforcement of an order by the commission reducing rates on the ground that they were not just and reasonable, nor are allegations that the commission without just ground for discrimination has not reduced rates on certain other roads similarly situated. But statements of the governor of the state and his attitude toward a reduction of rates are immaterial and impertinent, if alleged.29

Sec. 579. Mileage as a factor in determining the reasonableness of rates.-Mileage, although not a conclusive, is still

an important factor in determining the reasonableness of domestic rates. The fact, therefore, that a state railroad commission in fixing the rates between two points gradually reduced that rate in proportion to the mileage, while the railroad charged the same arbitrary rate to all stations between those points tends to show that the rates of the state railroad commission were fixed upon a more reasonable principle than that applied by the railroad.30

Sec. 580. Comparison of rates as a criterion of reasonableness. That rates fixed by a state railroad commission are unreasonable may not be proven by showing what carriers in other states charge, where there is no showing that conditions are similar.31 On the other hand, in determining the reason ableness of the rate on an article, a jury would certainly be at liberty to consider the fact that articles of the same kind and quality were carried by the same carrier over the same line and in the same direction for an equal distance at a much lower rate than the rate on the article in question.32

The rates under the Uniform Bill of Lading are necessarily lower than under the full common-law liability, and consequently distinct from the latter. If the rates under the full common-law liability are unreasonable and exorbitant, that fact will not render the Uniform Bill of Lading rates invalid, providing they are themselves reasonable.33

30. Railroad Co. v. State of Minnesota, 22 Sup. Ct. R. 900, 186 U. S. 257, 46 L. Ed. 1151, affirming 80 Minn. 191, 83 N. W. Rep.

60.

31. Hopper v. Railway Co., 91 Iowa 639, 60 N. W. Rep. 487; Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Railway Co., 40 So. Rep. 965.

Ala.

Where a petition alleges that joint rates were established for all stations upon either line of two railway companies, the rates and charges for the same class of goods over like distances of road may be considered, not only in arriving at the solution of the question of unjust discrimination,

the rate charged was unreasonable. Blair v. Railway Co., 109 Iowa 369, 80 N. W. Rep. 673.

32. That a carrier's rate was 8 but also in determining whether cents per hundred pounds on brick, while it was 42 cents on stone, may be taken into consideration by a jury. Railway Co. v. Bruce, 55 Ark. 65, 17 S. W. Rep. 363.

33. Mannheim Ins. Co. v. Transportation Co., 72 Minn. 357, 75 N. W. Rep. 602.