abandoning the rule at first adopted and above referred to, laid down the broad rule that when the passenger tells the conductor that he has paid his fare, and states the amount he paid to the ticket agent, who told him it was good, it is the duty of the conductor to accept the passenger's statement until he finds out it is not true, "no matter what the ticket contained in words, figures or other marks. '29 But the same but might rely upon the presumption that the ticket agent had given her a proper ticket. The rule laid down in the second report of Hufford v. Railroad Co., 64 Mich. 631, was cited with approval, and Railroad Co. v. Olds, 77 Ga. 673, was said to be substantially to the same effect. The second decision in the Hufford Case was also approved in Kansas City, etc. R'y Co. v. Riley, 68 Miss. 765, 9 S. Rep. 443. 29. Hufford v. Railroad Co., 64 Mich. 631. This case is first reported in 53 Mich. 118, and the facts and the rule there laid down are stated in a preceding note. On the last appeal, Sherwood, J., said: "There seems to be no question but that the plaintiff purchased his ticket of an agent of the company, who had the right to sell the same and receive the plaintiff's money therefor; that the ticket covered the distance between the two stations, and was purchased by the plaintiff in perfect good faith; that the ticket was genuine, and was issued by the company, and one which its agents had the right to sell to passengers. The plaintiff had the right to rely upon the statements of the agent that it was good, and entitled him to a ride between the two stations. It was a contract for a ride between the two sta tions, that the defendant's agent had a right to make, and did make, with the plaintiff. "The ticket given by the agent to plaintiff was the evidence agreed upon by the parties, by which the defendant should thereafter recognize the rights of plaintiff in his contract; and neither the company, nor any of its agents, could thereafter be permitted to say the ticket was not such evidence, and conclusive upon the subject. Passengers are not interested in the internal affairs of the companies whose coaches they ride in, nor are they required to know the rules and regulations made by the directors of a company for the control of the action of its agents and the management of its affairs. "When the plaintiff told the conductor on the train that he had paid his fare, and stated the amount he paid to the agent who gave him the ticket he presented, and told him it was good, it was the duty of the conductor to accept the statement of the plaintiff until he found out it was not true, no matter what the ticket contained in words, figures, or other marks. All sorts of people travel upon the cars; and the regulations and management of the company's business and trains which would not protect the edu court, in the later case of Brown v. The Railway Co.,30 adhered to the earlier rule as announced by it in the Frederick case, and held that, as between the conductor and the passenger, it was incumbent on the latter to produce a ticket apparently good upon its face, or else pay his fare in cash. Sec. 1066. (§ 580k.) Same subject-But passenger is not without remedy.-But while as between the passenger and the conductor the ticket may properly be regarded as the test of the passenger's rights, yet, as between the passenger and the company, the rule is otherwise, and the former is by no means without an adequate remedy. If the passenger applies and pays for a ticket for a certain journey, there is clearly an implied contract on the part of the company that the ticket furnished is adequate and proper to enable the passenger to obtain the carriage contracted for, and that the carrier's servants will duly honor it as such. If, therefore, the carrier fails to furnish the proper ticket,31 or, having furnished it, if the car cated and uneducated, the wise and the ignorant, alike, would be unreasonable indeed. On the undisputed facts in this case, I think the plaintiff was entitled to go to Walton Junction upon the ticket he presented to the conductor. Maroney v. Old Colony & N. R'y Co., 106 Mass. 153; Murdock v. Boston & A. R. R. Co., 137 id. 293." To the same effect are Railroad Co. v. Fix, 88 Ind. 381, and Pennsylvania Co. v. Bray, 125 Ind. 229, 25 N. E. Rep. 439, where it is held that where, by the conductor's mistake in the separation of a round-trip ticket, the return part is taken up on the going trip, the passenger has a right to return on the going part, where he has not discovered the mistake till the returning trip and then explains to the conductor of the return train how the mistake arose. But see Thomas v. Railway Co., 72 Mich. 355. A In Scofield v. Railroad Co., 112 Fed. 855, 50 C. C. A. 553, 56 L. R. A. 224, the court laid down an especially broad rule concerning parol agreements between the ticket agents and passengers. passenger had been given the right of stop-over at an intermediate point, but was left by the conductor of the first train, over the passenger's protest, without written evidence of his right to resume his journey from the place of stop-over, and the conductor of a later train was held to have no authority to eject the passenger. 30. 134 Mich. 591, 96 N. W. Rep. 925, 10 Det. L. N. 579. 31. Georgia R. Co. v. Olds, 77 Ga. 673; Bradshaw v. Railroad Co., 135 Mass. 407; Murdock v. Railroad Co., 137 Mass. 293; Townsend v. Railroad Co., 56 N. Y. 295; Fred rier's servants refuse to honor it as such,32 or misdirect the passenger as to its use,33 and the passenger thereby fails to procure the rights for which he paid, there is clearly a breach of the carrier's contract and the passenger may recover damages for the injury he has sustained. These damages must include compensation not only for increased expense, loss of time and inconvenience, but also for the mortification, physical and mental suffering and added indignities, if any, with which the violation of the passenger's rights may be attended.34 Sec. 1067. (§ 5801.) Right of passenger to rely on instructions given him.-As will be seen,35 it is the duty of the carrier erick v. Railroad Co., 37 Mich. 342; St. Louis, etc. R'y Co. v. Mackie, 71 Tex. 491; Pennsylvania Co. v. Bray, 125 Ind. 229, 25 N. E. Rep. 439; Railway Co. v. Street, 26 Ind. App. 224, 59 N. E. Rep. 404; Krueger v. Railway Co., 68 Minn. 445, 71 N. W. Rep. 683, 64 Am. St. Rep. 487. Notwithstanding the fact that the declaration fails to allege damages suffered, it is not demurrable in a case where a mileage book has been refused by a conductor in payment of fare on account of the agent's mistake in inserting the purchaser's name therein, since the injured party is at least entitled to nominal damages. Holden v. Railroad Co., 72 Vt. 156, 47 Atl. Rep. 403. 32. Lake Erie, etc. R. Co. v. Fix, 88 Ind. 381; Philadelphia, etc. R. Co. v. Rice, 64 Md. 63; Pennsylvania Co. v. Lenhart, 120 Fed. 61, 56 C. C. A. 457; Railway Co. v. Berryman, 11 Ind. App. 640, 36 N. E. Rep. 728. In an action for damages for ejection from the train when the defense is that the passenger did not produce a proper ticket, it is competent for the conductor to testify that the ticket offered by the passenger was not of the kind used by the railroad company for several months prior to the ejection, and that it was of an issue used and discontinued several years before. Railroad Co. v. Ault, 10 Ind. App. 661, 38 N. E. Rep. 492. 33. A passenger bought a limited ticket good only on train 1 and if passage begun at A. and continued uninterruptedly to D. He inquired of the proper official which was train 1 and showed him his ticket. The official pointed out a train which the passenger took, but which proved to be train 2, on which his ticket was not good, and he was ejected at B. and told to await train 1, which was following. When train 1 arrived at B. the station-master directed the passenger to go on board, which he did; but the conductor of train 1 also ejected him, because he had not gotten on at A. as his ticket provided. The carrier was held liable. Elliott r. Railroad Co., 53 Hun, 78. 34. Georgia R. Co. v. Olds, 77 Ga. 673; Southern, etc. R'y Co. v. Rice, 38 Kan. 398; Lake Erie, etc. R. Co. v. Fix, 88 Ind. 381. 35. Post, § 1129. to give the passenger such instructions and directions as are reasonably necessary to enable him to pursue his journey with safety and dispatch. This being so, it is obvious that the passenger is entitled to rely and act upon information or instructions given him by the carrier, or by his agent if the giving of such instructions is within the apparent scope of the latter's authority, and if the information or instructions are not manifestly erroneous or do not lead him into plain danger.36 Illustrations of the right to so rely and act are found in many of the cases noticed in the preceding sections, wherein it has been held that the passenger may rely upon representations as to the sufficiency of the ticket given him by the ticket agent or conductor, or upon directions as to the train which he should take, the place at which he should alight, and the like.37 Other illustrations will be found in later sections.38 on the latter's representation that 36. Murdock v. Railway Co., 137 a ticket from the carrier's agent Mass. 293; Hufford v. Railroad Co., 64 Mich. 631; Georgia R. Co. v. Murden, 86 Ga. 434, 12 S. E. Rep. 630; Olson v. Railroad Co., 45 Minn. 536; Wilsey v. Railroad Co., 83 Ky. 511; Philadelphia, etc. R. Co. v. Rice, 64 Md. 63; Burnham v. Railway Co., 63 Me. 298; Pennsylvania Co. v. Hoagland, 78 Ind. 2037 Chance v. Railway Co., 10 Mo. App. 351; Hardy v. Railroad Co., 12 N. Y. Suppl. 55; Atkinson v: Railway Co., 114 Ga. 146, 39 S. E. Rep. 888, 55 L. R. A. 223; Railway Co. v. Street, 26 Ind. App. 224, 59 N. E. Rep. 404; Railroad Co. v. Little, 66 Kan. 378, 71 Pac. Rep. 820, 61 L. R. A. 122, 97 Am. St. Rep. 376; Railroad Co. v. Harper, 83 Miss. 560, 35 So. Rep. 764, 64 L. R. A. 283; St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. White, Tex. 89 S. W. Rep. 746, reversing (Tex. Civ. App.) 86 S. W. Rep. 71. In The Normannia, 62 Fed. 469, a person desiring passage on a ship from an infected port bought See also, Railroad Co. v. Winter's Adm'r, 143 U. S. 60, 12 SupCt. R. 356, 36 L. Ed. 71; Robert son v. Railroad Co., 37 So. Rep. 831; Railroad Co. v. Roberts, 91 Ga. 513, 18 S. E. Rep. 315. Ala. 37. Ante, § 1060 et seq. See also, S. Car. Trapp v. Railway Co., 51 S. E. Rep. 919; International, etc. R. Co. v. Smith, Tex Civ. App. 90 S. W. Rep. 709. 38. Post, § 1221. But is expected that passengers will exercise ordinary intelligence and prudence, and the carrier will not be in fault, in the absence of special circumstances requiring unusual diligence, where he has used such means and given such information as would be sufficient for the needs of a traveler of ordinary intelligence using reasonable care and attention.39 Neither can the carrier be bound by directions or information given by an agent in reference to a matter not within the apparent scope of his authority.40 A fortiori is this so when 39. Barker v. Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 599; Railway Co. v. Walden, (Tex. Civ. App.) 46 S. W. Rep. 87, citing Hutch. on Carr. Walden, 40. Railway Co. v. (Tex. Civ. App.) 46 S. W. Rep. 87, citing Hutch. on Carr. Statements made, or directions given, by a conductor to a passenger, on board the wrong train by his own mistake, and let off the cars away from the station at his own request, as to the course the passenger shall pursue after leaving the train, are not binding on the company because not made in reference to a matter within the scope of the conductor's authority. Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. v. Carper, 112 Ind. 26. "Broad as the authority of the conductor is," said the court, "it is by no means unlimited; on the contrary, it is limited to the management and control of the train committed to his care. He has authority to control the train in its movements, and it is his duty to take measures to preserve passengers from injury while getting on the train, while they are on it, and while they are alighting. In the discharge of this duty he must, as the representative of the company, exercise a high degree of care and diligence; but when the relation of carrier and passenger terminates, the authority of the conductor as the representative of the carrier is at an end. His authority ceases when the passenger has safely alighted from the train. The company does not vest him with either apparent or actual authority beyond such as is necessary for the proper care of the persons and property placed in his charge and control. When the person who enters as a passenger has finally left the train, the conductor no longer stands to him as the representative of the carrier. His representative character does not extend to acts done after the relation of passenger and carrier has been severed. It is his duty to afford the passenger whom he directs to leave his train a safe alighting place, but he is not bound, as the representative of the company, to look after the passenger after he has left the train." On the other hand, directions given by the conductor to a passenger as to his conduct on the train, or in getting on or off the train, would be clearly within his authority. International, etc. R. Co. v. Gilbert, 64 Tex. 536. The directions of the brakeman or |