But if a railroad company sells a ticket to a passenger through such a joint agent, it cannot thereafter repudiate the contract so made on account of any subsequent disagreement between the two companies. And if a passenger is wantonly ejected in disregard of such contract rights, exemplary damages will be allowed.22 Sec. 1064. Same subject-Where conductor on first line tears off coupon of second line. If a ticket has separate coupons for separate connecting lines, and the conductor on the first line, without the fault or knowledge of the passenger, tears off the wrong coupon, the first line is responsible in damages to the passenger for a subsequent expulsion from the train of the second line on the refusal of its conductor to honor the remaining coupon. The second line is entitled to the presentation of a proper ticket or the payment of fare, without regard to any explanation that may be made of the fault of another company in the performance of an act in the doing of which it was not acting as the second company's agent. But that does not relieve the first company of its responsibility for the consequences of its negligence in placing the passenger in a position where he can be rightfully ejected from the second company's train.23 Sec. 1065. (§ 580j.) Same subject-As between passenger and conductor the ticket produced must govern. It is obvious that as between the conductor of a passenger train and a person claiming the rights of a passenger thereon, there must be some rule by which the claims of the passenger can be determined safely, speedily and conclusively; otherwise endless confusion and altercation must ensue, distracting the attention of the conductor from other duties, jeopardizing the lives of passengers and entirely demoralizing the service. Where the passenger pays his fare upon the train, a ready means is af 22. Cowen v. Winters, 96 Fed. 929, 37 C. C. A. 628, affirming Winters v. Cowen, 90 Fed. 99; see also, Railway Co. v. Berryman, 11 Ind. 23. Railroad v. Conrad, 4 Ind. App. 83, 30 N. E. 406. forded of determining his rights, but the necessities of modern traffic have made this method the exception rather than the rule, and tickets are almost universally required. "How then,” it is said in a leading case,24 "is the conductor to ascertain the contract entered into between the passenger and the railroad company where a ticket is purchased and presented to him? Practically there are but two ways-one, the evidence afforded by the ticket; the other, the statement of the passenger contradicted by the ticket. Which should govern? In judicial investigations we appreciate the necessity of an obligation of some kind and the benefit of a crossexamination. At common law parties interested were not competent witnesses, and even under our statute the witness is not permitted, in certain cases, to testify as to facts which, if true, were equally within the knowledge of the opposite party, and he cannot be procured. Yet here would be an investigation as to the terms of a contract, where no safeguards could be thrown around it, and where the conductor, at his peril, would have to accept the mere statement of the interested party. I seriously doubt the practical workings of such a method, except for the purpose of encouraging and developing fraud and falsehood, and I doubt if any system could be devised that would so much tend to the disturbance and annoyance of the traveling public generally. There is but one rule which can safely be tolerated with any decent regard to the rights of railroad companies and passengers generally. As between the conductor and passenger, and the right of the latter to travel, the ticket produced must be conclusive evidence, and he must produce it when called upon as the evidence of his right to the seat he claims.25 24. Frederick v. Railroad Co., 37 Mich. 342. 25. Holding this rule are Bradshaw . Railroad Co., 135 Mass. 407; Thomas v. Railway Co., 72 Mich. 355; Cheney v. Railroad Co., 11 Metc. 121; Yorton v. Railway Co., 54 Wis. 234; Townsend v. Where a passenger Railroad Co., 56 N. Y. 295; Petrie v Railroad Co., 42 N. J. L. 449; Dietrich v. Railroad Co., 71 Penn. St. 432; McClure v. Railroad Co., 34 Md. 532; Southern, etc. R'y Co. v. Rice, 38 Kans. 398; Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Fleming, 14 Lea, 128; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Bills, 118 has purchased a ticket and the conductor does not carry him according to its terms, or if the company, through the mistake of its agent, has given him the wrong ticket, so that he has been compelled to relinquish his seat or pay his fare a second time in order to retain it, he would have a remedy against the company for a breach of the contract, but he would have to adopt a declaration" relying upon such breach and not upon the ejection. The application of this rule does not extend, however, to the case of a passenger who has been furnished with a ticket on its face sufficient and declared by the company's agent to be good, but which in fact was not so according to the company's regulations.26 Where the ticket is apparently good and has Ind. 221; Shelton v. Railway Co., 29 Ohio St. 214; Downs v. Railroad Co., 36 Conn. 287; Hufford v. Railway Co., 53 Mich. 118; MacKay v. Railroad Co., 34 W. Va. 65, 11 S. E. Rep. 737; Peabody v. Railway Co., 21 Oreg. 121, 26 Pac. Rep. 1053; Pennsylvania Co. v. Lenhart, 120 Fed. 61, 56 C. C. A. 457; Poulin v. Railway Co., 52 Fed. 197, 3 C. C. A. 23, 6 U. S. App. 298, 17 L. R. A. 800, affirming 47 Fed. 858; Railway Co. v. Bennett, 50 Fed. 496, 1 C. C. A. 544, 6 U. S. App. 95; Railroad Co. v. Deloney, 65 Ark. 177, 45 S. W. Rep. 351, 67 Am. St. Rep. 913; Railway Co. v. Daniels, 90 Ill. App. 154; Callaway v. Mellett, 15 Ind. App. 366, 44 N. E. Rep. 198; Ellsworth v. Railway Co., 95 Iowa, 98, 63 N. W. Rep. 584, 29 L. R. A. 173; Rolfs v. Railway Co., 66 Kan. 272, 71 Pac. Rep. 526; Chase v. Railway Co., 70 Kan. 546, 79 Pac. Rep. 153, citing Hutch. on Carr.; Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 25 Ky. L. R. 2087, 79 S. W. Rep. 1187; Nutter v. Railway Co., 25 Ky. L. R. 1700, 78 S. W. Rep. 470; Railway Co. v. Lyons, 20 Ky. L. R. 516, 46 S. W. Rep. 209; Spink v. , 89 S. W. Rep. 258. 26. Murdock v. Railway Co., 137 Mass. 293; Railroad v. Harper, 35 So. Rep. 764, 83 Miss. 560, 102 Am. been purchased as such in good faith by the passenger, who has no notice of the company's regulations making it invalid, he has, it is said, an absolute right to be carried accordingly; and while it would undoubtedly be prudent for him to yield to the conductor's interpretation, and leave the car to seek his remedy by action, it is yet said that he has the right to refuse to leave the car.27 St. Rep. 469, 64 L. R. A. 283. Where the passenger presents a ticket which on its face entitles him to be carried, the company will not be permitted to show a custom under which it issues such tickets on certain days only, the passenger having no knowledge of the custom. Carvey v. Railroad Co., 133 Mich. 659, 95 N. W. Rep. 716. So it has been held that when, from the facts appearing on the face of the ticket and the surrounding circumstances known to the conductor, it is probable that a mistake has been made by the company in issuing the ticket, and this probability is so strong that the conductor should investigate further before ejecting the passenger, the conductor cannot regard the ticket as conclusive. The statements of the passenger, however, need not be accepted in such a case except so far as they call the conductor's attention to facts and circumstances which he can then and there observe. Krueger v. Railway Co., 68 Minn. 445, 71 N. W. Rep. 683, 64 Am. St. Rep. 487; Railway Co. v. Holmes, 75 Miss. 371, 23 So. Rep. 187; Railway v. Wright, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 463, 21 S. W. Rep. 399; Scofield v. Railroad Co., 112 Fed. 855, 50 C. C. A. 553, 56 L. R. A. 224. 27. Railroad Co. v. Winter's Adm'r, 143 U. S. 60, 12 Sup. Ct. R. 356, 36 L. Ed. 71; Railroad Co. v. Littell, 128 Fed. 546, 63 C. C. A. 44; Ellsworth v. Railway Co., 95 Iowa, 98, 63 N. W. Rep. 584, 29 L. R. A. 173; Railroad Co. v. Rice, 64 Md. 63, 21 Atl. Rep. 97. In Hufford v. Railroad Co., 53 Mich. 118, it appeared that on September 19, 1882, the plaintiff and one Goodyear were at Manton, on the road of defendant, and about to proceed north. They had then been together some days. At Manton they bought tickets for Traverse City from the agent of the defendant. Plaintiff noticed that the ticket given to him was not like that given to Goodyear, and he called the agent's attention to the fact, and inquired if it was good, and was told it was. In this the agent was mistaken. was one part of an excursion ticket from Sturgis to Traverse City, and had been canceled from Sturgis to Grand Rapids. The evidence is conflicting as to whether it had also been canceled from Grand Rapids to Walton, a station north of Manton. When the ticket was presented to the conductor he told the plaintiff it was not good separated from the other part. He also claimed it had been used by some other person to Walton, and he told the plaintiff he must pay his fare to Walton or he should The ticket A few cases also go further and hold that the law does not require a person purchasing a ticket from the ticket agent to examine it and see what it purports to be, and that, though the ticket on its face is insufficient, the passenger who is ejected may recover for the ejection.28 The court in Michigan, put him off the cars. The plaintiff ent duty to his employer, that he at first refused, and was advised by Goodyear to persist in his refusal; but when the conductor took hold of the bell-rope to stop the train, and, as plaintiff says, put his hand on plaintiff's shoulder, he consented to pay the fare, and did so, taking the conductor's receipt therefor. The fare paid was twenty-five cents. The plaintiff then proceeded on his journey. Said the court, per Cooley, C. J.: "In Frederick v. Marquette, etc. R. R. Co., 37 Mich. 342; s. c. 26 Am. Rep. 531, it was decided that, as between the conductor and the passenger, the ticket must be the conclusive evidence of the extent of the passenger's right to travel. No other rule can protect the conductor in the performance of his duties, or enable him to determine what he may or may not lawfully do in managing the train and collecting the fares. If, when a passenger makes an assertion that he has paid fare through, he can produce no evidence of it, the conductor must at his peril concede what the passenger claims, or take all the responsibilities of a trespasser if he refuses, it is easy to see that his position is one in which any lawless person, with sufficient impudence and recklessness, may have him at disadvantage, and where he can never be certain, if he performs his appar may not be subjected to severe pecuniary responsibility. Such a state of things is not desirable, either for railroad companies or for the public. The public is interested in having the rules whereby the conductors are to govern their action certain and definite, so that they may be enforced without confusion and without stoppage of trains; and if the enforcement causes temporary inconvenience to a passenger, who by accident or mistake is without the proper evidence of his right to a passage, though he has paid for it, it is better that he submit to the temporary inconvenience than that the business of the road be interrupted to the general annoyance of all who are upon the train." See s. c. 64 Mich. 631. 28. Thus in Georgia R. Co. v. Dougherty, 86 Ga. 744, 12 S. E. Rep. 747, plaintiff applied to the ticket agent for a ticket from Aiken, S. C., to Atlanta, Ga., but when on the train found that her ticket was to Asheville, N. C. She stated to the conductor that her trunk had been checked to Atlanta on that ticket, which he denied, but which proved to be true. The conductor refused to recognize the ticket, and, as plaintiff had no more money, ejected her. The action was for the ejection. The court held that she was not obliged to examine her ticket |