Sec. 1014. Same subject-Does not cease to be passenger by remaining on train after reaching his first destination with the intention to continue his journey to another point."There is no rule of law which requires a passenger, if he has only paid his fare to a certain point of destination, which absolutely requires him to leave the train at that point; but, if he desires to continue his journey, it is manifestly his right to remain on the car and when demanded of him, pay his fare to the place of destination. It is but common knowledge that persons traveling upon railroad trains very frequently do not alight and stop at the place of destination originally contemplated when they entered the car, but proceed to some other point where business may call them, and under such circumstances they simply remain on the train and proceed with their journey." In such case they are no less passengers in contemplation of law than if they had alighted from the train at the station originally contemplated, transacted business, and re-entered the coach for the purpose of continuing their journey. Alighting from the train and then re-entering it is a useless formality which the law does not impose upon any citizen in order to preserve his protection as a passenger.17 Sec. 1015. (§ 562.) Same subject-What elements must exist. While, therefore, neither the payment of the price of the transportation nor the contract to carry, nor the two together, will generally make one a passenger until he has put himself within the carrier's protection, and the risk of the journey has begun, there may be circumstances under which the contract will create that relation, even before the transportation has been commenced. But unless some contract, either express or implied from the circumstances, can be shown, it is difficult to see how the relation can be held to be established. The mere intention to take passage upon the carrier's vehicle ought not, certainly, to have that effect under any circumstances.18 But if the intention and the act of the 17. Anderson Mo. v. Railway Co. 18. June v. Railroad Co., 153 93 S. W. Rep. 394. Mass. 79, 26 N. E. Rep. 238; Rail party combined are such as to give rise to an implied contract to carry, the duty and obligation of the carrier as such at once begin. But so long as the party merely entertains the wish or intention, no obligation has arisen on either side, and he is at liberty to change that intention at any moment. When, however, he has done some act which puts him under an obligation to the carrier, the relation has commenced, and neither party can in good faith withdraw from it without the consent of the other.19 The case then becomes analogous to the bailment of goods to the common carrier, after which, as has been seen, the bailor cannot take them back without compensation to the carrier. So long, therefore, as the person who merely purposes to be carried is at perfect liberty to change his mind he is not a passenger, and for any injury which he may sustain through the negligence of the carrier he must seek redress as a stranger.20. Otherwise a liability would be imposed upon the carrier without compensation or the right to it, and the law which would make him responsible in such a case for that utmost care which is required of the carrier of a passenger would be palpably unjust. It may, therefore, be doubted whether the cases which have gone so far as to hold that the mere being or waiting at a depot or station of a railroad, or at the place at which any carrier takes on or puts off his passengers, with the purpose of taking passage, but road Co. v. Jennings, 190 Ill. 478, 107 N. W. Rep. 798. In Webster v. Railroad Co., 161 Mass. 298, 37 N. E. Rep. 165, 24 L. R. A. 521, the plaintiff alleged that his intestate was a passenger on defendant's railroad. The evidence was that he had in his pocket a ten-trip ticket between Boston and the station where the accident happened. He was running from the street across the company's tracks on its premises to catch a train about to start when he was struck and killed by another train. The court held that he had not become a passenger. 19. Murphy v. Railroad Co., 43 Mo. App. 342, citing Hutch. on Carr. 20. Railway Co. v. Stewart, 77 Ill. App. 66, citing Hutch. on Carr. without having engaged or paid for it, although the party may have announced his intention to the agents of the carrier or to the carrier himself, can be sustained; for no obligation therefrom arises to continue of the same mind, and the party may at any time change it and withdraw. And the correct rule in such a case would seem to be that, if the person who thus intends to become a passenger receives an injury through negligence of the carrier or its servants, he could recover from it only upon the principle upon which the owner of premises would be liable to one whom he had invited to go upon them, and who there receives an injury by reason of their insecure and dangerous condition,21 or who had entered upon them as a customer on business.22 Sec. 1016. Same subject-How long the relation of carrier and passenger continues.-As a general rule, it may be said. that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease with the arrival of the train at the passenger's destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time and opportunity to safely alight from the train at the place provided by the carrier for the discharge of passengers, and to leave the carrier's premises in the customary manner.23 And 21. Sweeny v. The Railroad, 10 Allen, 368; Indermaur v. Dames, L. R. 1 Com. P. 274, L. R. 2 Com. P. 311; Southcote v. Stanley, 1 Hurl. & N. 247. 22. Chapman v. Rothwell, El., B. & E. 168; Freer v. Cameron, 4 Rich. 228; Bigelow's Ld. Cas. on Torts, 702. 23. Pennsylvania Co. v. McCaf fery, 173 Ill. 169, 50 N. E. Rep. 713, affirming 68 Ill. App. 635; Railroad Co. v. Tracey, 109 Ill. App. 563; Glenn v. Railroad Co., (Ind. App.), 73 N. E. Rep. 861; s. c. (Ind. Sup.) 75 N. E. Rep. 282; Railroad Co. v. Batchler, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 14, 73 S. W. Rep. 981, 83 S. W. Rep. 902; Railway Co. v. Wood, 104 Fed. 663, 44 C. C. The mere fact that a passenger gets off the car on the side of the train opposite the depot does not, as a matter of law, make him a trespasser. Whether he is or not is dependent on the attendant facts and circumstances. And if the carrier's watchman accuses him of being a "hobo" and of getting off the "blind baggage," refuses to accept his explanation that he was a regular passenger and strikes him on the head with a club, the carrier will be liable in damages. Railroad Co. v. Tracey, 109 Ill. App. 563. A person who takes the rail where the passenger is necessarily hindered or delayed in leaving the carrier's premises, the question whether he failed to depart within a reasonable time is one of fact for the jury.24 But where a passenger, after having alighted from the carrier's vehicle, stopped for ten or fifteen minutes at the depot to engage in social converse with friends, and later, in leaving the carrier's premises, he fell over a railroad tie and was injured, it was held that the relation of carrier and passenger had, as a matter of law, terminated at the time the injury was received.25 So where a peddler, after having arrived at his destination, proceeded to a section house some distance away from the station for the purpose of engaging in his regular business, and he was there assaulted by the carrier's section foreman, it was held that the relation of carrier and passenger had ceased, and that the carrier was consequently not liable.26 But a failure to immediately leave the train by a passenger who is asleep has been held not to terminate the relation of carrier and passenger where those in charge of the train know that the stop is at the passenger's destination, and they fail to awaken him and acquaint him with the fact that he should alight.27 Sec. 1017. (§ 563.) Same subject-Duty of protection does not depend on contract alone-Mail-carrier-Servant-Excursionist Sunday traveler.-If the carriage of the passenger has road track en route to his residence is no longer a passenger. Railway Co. v. Beecher, 65 Ark. 64, 44 S. W. Rep. 715. If a passenger voluntarily reenters the train for the purpose of using it as a means of crossing to the other side of the track, he is but a trespasser. Rattersee v. Railway Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 81 S. W. Rep. 566; Hendrick v. Rail road Co., 136 Mo. 548, 38 S. W. Rep. 297. If a person delays an unreason. able length of time in the depot after alighting from the train, he is no longer a passenger. Davis v. Railroad Co., 25 Tex. Civ. App. 8, 59 S. W. Rep. 844. 24. Glenn v. Railroad Co., Ind. 75 N. E. Rep. 282, affirming, s. c. (Ind. App.) 73 N. E. Rep. 861. 25. Glenn v. Railroad Co., supra. 26. Krantz v. Railway Co., 12 Utah, 104, 41 Pac. Rep. 717, 30 L. R. A. 297. 27. Bass v. Railway Co., been undertaken, it will not be necessary to a recovery for the injury which may be occasioned by the carrier's negligence to show a contract, either express or implied, directly between him and the passenger. In other words, the obligation to the passenger may arise without privity of contract. Thus, where by contract with the government the carrier was bound to carry its mail-agent, and whilst being so carried the agent was injured by the negligence of the carrier, for which he brought suit, it was held that, though he could not avail himself of the contract between the defendant and the government and make it the foundation of a recovery, he could rest his claim upon the breach of the duty which the law always imposes upon every person who undertakes to perform a service for another, whether gratuitously or not, to exercise the degree of care and skill in its performance which the nature of the undertaking requires.28 And the same is true of an express agent the car for some length of time after it has arrived at his destina. tion, he is no longer a passenger. Kaase v. Railway Co., Tex. Civ. App. 92 S. W. Rep. 444. 28. Nolton v. The Railroad Corporation, 15 N. Y. 444; Blair v. Railway Co., 66 N. Y. 313; Sey bolt v. Railroad Co., 95 N. Y. 562, distinguishing Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Price, 96 Penn. St. 256; Gulf, etc. R'y Co. v. Wilson, 79 Tex. 371, 15 S. W. Rep. 280; McGoffin v. Railway Co., 102 Mo. 540, 15 S. W. Rep. 76 (distinguishing Railroad Co. v. Price, supra, and Price v. Railroad Co., 113 U. S. 218); Mellor v. Railway Co. 105 Mo. 455, 14 S. W. Rep. 758; Grant v. Railroad Co., 108 N. C. 462, 13 S. E. Rep. 209; Southern Pacific Co. v. Schuyler, 68 C. C. A. 409, 135 Fed. 1015; Cavin v. Southern Pacific Co., 136 Fed. 592, aff'd, So. Pac. Co. v. Cavin, C. C. A. 144 Fed. 348; Railway Co. v. Ketcham, 133 Ind. 346, 33 N. E. Rep. 116, 19 L. R A. 339, 36 Am. St. Rep. 550; Railroad Co. t. Kingman, 18 Ky. L. R. 82, 35 S. W. Rep. 264; Libby v. Railroad Co., 85 Me. 34, 26 Atl. Rep. 943, 20 L. R. A. 812; Railway Co. v. Davis, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 340, 43 S. W. Rep. 540; Railway Co. v. McCullough, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 208, 55 S. W. Rep. 392; Railroad Co. v. Shott, 92 Va. 34, 22 S. E. Rep. 811; Railway Co. v. Wilson, 79 Tex. 371, 26 S. W. Rep. 131, 11 L. R. A. 486; Sproule v. Railway Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 91 S. W. Rep. 657. Contra, Martin v. Railway Co., 200 Pa. 603, 50 Atl. Rep. 193; Foreman v. Railroad Co., 195 Pa. St. 499, 46 Atl. Rep. 109. But the Pennsylvania rule will not be applied in a case arising in Pennsylvania where the accident was the result of negligence on the part of employes of another and distinct company, the defendant |