Where a passenger receives an injury, while embarking or disembarking, by the careless handling of the ship's appliances, the carrier will be liable although the accident may have been partly due to the action of the water.13

The degree of care required of carriers by water in providing proper wharves, approaches and stational facilities is the same as that already stated in respect of railroad companies.14

Sec. 943. (§ 522.) Power of carriers to adopt regulations as to admission into their stations and depots.-As there would be an inconsistency in requiring railway carriers to see that their depots and station grounds are rendered safe and reasonably comfortable for their passengers, without at the same. time allowing to them the right to adopt and enforce regulations reasonable and necessary to accomplish this end, the law has very justly been held to permit them to impose such restrictions upon third persons, as to admission to the grounds thus appropriated, as the convenience of their business and the comfort of their passengers may be thought to require. Such regulations, however, must be general and impartial, and no superintendent or other officer of the road will be justified in arbitrarily ordering a person to leave such premises merely because such superintendent or officer has become offended at his conduct to himself, or for a supposed violation of some rule of the company of which the person had never in fact been guilty.15 And as such companies are empowered to take

13. Louisville & J. Ferry Co. v. Nolan, 135 Ind. 60, 34 N. E. Rep. 710. In this case a passenger on a ferry boat was injured by the falling of a stanchion which was knocked down by the gang plank that had been run out to land the passengers, and had been brought in contact with the stanchion by the falling away of the boat. The carrier was held liable.

14. Bacon v. Steamboat Co., 90 Me. 46, 37 Atl. Rep. 328.

15. Commonwealth v. Power, 7 Met. 596.

Thus in People v. McKay, 46 Mich. 439, where a passenger had been ejected from the depot because he spat on the floor, the station-keeper was held properly convicted of assault and battery. "It is absurd to claim," said Campbell, J., "that the traveling community are bound to govern their behavior by the whims of an obstinate station-house keeper, or to leave the room whenever he

precautionary measures for the good order and correct management of their business, the presumption will be that their reasonable rules and regulations are for the public advantage, and do not conduce to the prejudice of particular individuals. Thus, where the frequenting of hotel-keepers or their servants at such depots, in order to solicit patronage to go to their hotels, or of peddlers or others seeking to do business with passengers, is an annoyance to the passengers or occasions an interruption or hindrance to the company's business, the superintendent or other officer in charge may make a regulation to prohibit,16 or to keep it within proper bounds.17 So he may exclude persons who come to do business with passengers, such as selling or soliciting orders for lunches.18 If, after notice of such prohibition, such persons enter upon the forbidden ground, and refuse to leave when ordered to do so, they may be forcibly ejected by the company.19

Railway companies may also adopt reasonable regulations regulating the conduct of the passengers themselves while within the depot or on the station grounds. Thus a regulation prohibiting passengers awaiting the arrival or departure of trains from going to sleep in the station waiting rooms, or lying down on the benches, is not, in a legal sense, unreasonable.20 And a carrier may adopt a regulation requiring that white and colored passengers shall occupy different waiting rooms, provided the accommodations in each room are in all respects equal.21

Sec. 944. Same subject-Right of railway companies to exclude all but certain favored hackmen from their grounds

thinks proper to drive them out. They are invited by the railroad company, and are entitled to remain there so long as they have occasion to do so, and commit no offense against the good order of the place and the reasonable regulations made to govern it."

16. Commonwealth v. Power, supra.

17. Perth Committee v. Ross,

(1897) App. Cas. 479, 66 L. J. P. C. 81.

18. Fluker v. Railroad Co., 81 Ga. 461.

19. Commonwealth V. Power, supra; Hall v. Power, 12 Met. 482; Harris v. Stevens, 31 Vt. 79.

20. Railway Co. v. Motes, 117 Ga. 923, 43 S. E. Rep. 990, 62 J. R A. 507, 97 Am. St. Rep. 223.

21. Smith v. Chamberlain, 3.

Courts which uphold such right. All the courts agree that a railway company cannot prohibit the entrance of the passenger's own carriage to the station grounds to carry him or his goods to or from the train, and that it cannot prohibit the en trance of the carriage of a hackman which, by contract made elsewhere with the passenger, has become the carriage of the passenger pro hac vice.22 But there is a sharp division of authority on the right of a railroad company to grant an exclusive right to certain hackmen to solicit patronage in its station or grounds, and exclude all other hackmen from exercising a similar privilege. The right to grant such an exclusive privilege has been upheld by the courts of England,23 by the Supreme Court of the United States, 24 and by the Supreme Courts of Connecticut,25 Georgia,26 Massachusetts,27 Minnesota, 28 New Hampshire,29 New York,30 Ohio,31 Rhode S. C. 529, 17 S. E. Rep. 371, 19 L. R. A. 740.

22. Griswold v. Webb, 16 R. I. 649, 19 Atl. Rep. 143, 7 L. R. A. 302; Railroad Co. v. Warren, 64 N. Y. Supp. 781, 31 Misc. 571; State v. Union Depot Co., 71 Ohio St. 379, 73 N. E. Rep. 633, 68 L. R. A. 792; Godbout v. St. Paul Union Depot Co., 79 Minn. 188, 81 N. W. Rep. 835, 47 L. R. A. 532; Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U. S. 279.

27. Old Colony R. Co. v. Tripp, 147 Mass. 35; Railroad Co. v. Brown, 177 Mass. 65, 58 N. E. Rep. 189, 52 L. R. A. 418; Railroad Co. v. Sullivan, 177 Mass. 230, 58 N. E. Rep. 689.

28. Godbout v. St. Paul Union Depot Co., 79 Minn. 188, 81 N. W. 835, 47 L. R. A. 532.

29. Hedding v. Gallagher, 72 N. H. 377, 57 Atl. Rep. 225, 64 L. R. A. 811, overruling 70 N. H. 631, 47 Atl. Rep. 614 and 69 N. H. 650, 45 Atl. Rep. 96, 76 Am. St. Rep. 204.

23. Barker v. The Railroad, 18 Com. B. 46; Barret v. The Railway, 1 Com. B. 30. (N. S.) 423; Painter, Ex parte, 2 id. 702.

24. Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U. S. 279, 26 Sup. Ct. R. 91, affirming 124 Fed. 1016, 60 C. C. A. 168; s. c. 120 Fed. 215, 57 C. C. A. 362, 61 L. R. A. 140, modifying 116 Fed. 907.

25. Railroad Co. v. Scovill, 71 Conn. 136, 41 Atl. Rep. 246, 42 L. R. A. 157, 71 Am. St. Rep. 159. 26. Kates v. Cab Co., 107 Ga. 636, 34 S. E. Rep. 372, 46 L. R. A. 431.

Brown v. Railroad Co., 75 Hun, 355, 27 N. Y. Supp. 69; affirmed, 151 N. Y. 674, 46 N. E. Rep. 1145; Railroad Co. v. Sheeley, 27 N. Y. Supp. 185; Railroad Co. v. Flynn, 74 Hun, 124, 26 N. Y. Supp. 859; Railroad Co. v. Warren, 64 N. Y. Supp. 781, 31 Misc. 571.

31. State v. Union Depot Co., 71 Ohio St. 379, 73 N. E. Rep. 633; Snyder v. Depot Co., 19 O. C. C. 368.

Island,32 and Virginia.33 The principle underlying these decisions is stated by the Supreme Court of the United States,34 as follows: "We cannot say that that arrangement was either unnecessary, unreasonable or arbitrary; on the contrary, it is easy to see how, in a great city and in a constantly crowded railway station, such an arrangement might promote the comfort and convenience of passengers arriving and departing, as well as the efficient conduct of the company's business. The record does not show that the arrangement referred to was inadequate for the accommodation of passengers. But if inadequate, or if the Transfer Company was allowed to charge exorbitant prices, it was for passengers to complain of neglect of duty by the railroad company, and for the constituted authorities to take steps to compel the company to perform its public functions with due regard to the rights of passengers. The question of any failure of the company to properly care for the convenience of passengers was not one that, in any legal aspect, concerned the defendants as licensed hackmen and cabmen. It was not for them to vindicate the rights of passengers. They only sought to use the property of the railroad company to make profit in the prosecution of their particular business. A hackman, in nowise connected with the railroad company, cannot, of right and against the objections of the company, go upon its grounds or into its stations or cars for the purpose simply of soliciting the custom of passengers; but, of course, a passenger upon arriving at the station, in whatever vehicle, is entitled to have such facilities for his entering the company's depot as may be necessary."

"But the right of the railroad company as abutting owner, and the rights of passengers are not, in their nature, para

32.

Railroad Co. v. Bork, 23 R. Co., 199 U. S. 279, 26 Sup. Ct. R.

I. 218, 49 Atl. Rep. 965.

33. Railway Co. v. Old Dominion Baggage Co., 99 Va. 111, 37 S. E. Rep. 784, 50 L. R. A. 722. 34. Donovan v. Pennsylvania

91, affirming 124 Fed. 1016, 60 C. C. A. 168; s. c. 120 Fed. 215, 57 C. C. A. 362, 61 L. R. A. 140, modifying 116 Fed. 907.

mount to the rights of others of the general public to use the sidewalk in question in legitimate ways and for legitimate purposes. Licensed hackmen and cabmen, unless forbidden by valid local regulations, may, within reasonable limits, use a public sidewalk in prosecuting their calling, provided such use is not materially obstructive in its nature, that is, of such exclusive character as, in a substantial sense, to prevent others from also using it upon equal terms for legitimate purposes. Generally speaking, public sidewalks and streets are for use by all, upon equal terms, for any purpose consistent with the object for which such sidewalks and streets are established; subject of course to such valid regulations as may be prescribed by the constituted authorities for the public convenience; this, to the end that, as far as possible, the rights of all may be conserved without undue discrimination. ''35

Sec. 945. (§ 523.) Same subject-Courts which deny such right. Other courts, however, deny that this right of a railway company to grant exclusive privileges in soliciting custom within its station to certain favored hackmen exists. The ground that these courts stand upon is that monopoly prices are always higher than competitive prices, and the exploitation of the passenger should not be permitted by the creation of this monopoly. As has been said in a leading case36 upon this subject, "The question is one that affects not only the excluded hackmen, it affects the interests of the public. The upholding of the grant of this exclusive privilege would prevent competition between rival carriers of passengers, create a monopoly in the privileged hackmen, and might produce

35. See on the question of the the privilege of hackmen solicituse of public sidewalks or streets ing custom in railroad stations, by hackmen, Pennsylvania Co. v. see, Cosgrove v. City Council of City of Chicago, 181 Ill. 289, 54 Augusta, 103 Ga. 865, 31 S. E. Rep. N. E. Rep. 825, 53 L. R. A. 223, 445, 42 L. R. A. 711. affirming 73 Ill. App. 345.

On the right of a city council to interfere by ordinance with

36. State v. Reed, 76 Miss. 211, 24 So. Rep. 308, 43 L. R. A. 134.