as applying to all the instrumentalities employed, although belonging to others. Thus where a carrier by water was permitted to use a hulk which belonged to another, for the embarkation of passengers upon his steamer, it was held that he was liable to a pasenger for an injury sustained by him in falling through a hatchway upon the hulk which had been negli gently left open; and that the question whether he owned or had any control over the hulk, or had any hand in the negli gent act, was wholly immaterial, inasmuch as he used the hulk as a means for the embarkation, which was a part of the carriage of his passengers.41 And so where it became necessary for the carrier of the passenger by stage-coach to cross a ferry upon his journey, and, by the negligence of the ferry company, an accident occurred by which the passenger lost his life, it was held that the carrier was liable, being responsible for the management of the ferry under his contract with the passenger, and for his safe passage across it.12 So it is immaterial whether the carrier owns the vehicle which he uses or not, if the passenger is received in it for carriage.43 If, for instance, the carrier employs a sleeping car which is owned by another company, and invites passengers to travel in it, he will be responsible for any injury resulting from the negligent equipment or operation of the car.44 Sec. 917. (§ 515a.) Liability for injury caused by concurrent action of two carriers.-Where the injury is caused by the concurrent wrongful acts or omissions of two parties, all tending to produce the one resulting event complained ofas where a passenger is injured by a collision between the trains of different carriers upon the same track, or by a col 422, 63 N. E. Rep. 927, citing But see 41. John v. Bacon, L. R. 5 C. P. 437. 42. McLean v. Burbank, 11 Minn. 277. 43. Hannibal, etc. R. Co. t'. Martin, 111 Ill. 219. 44. Robinson t'. The Railroad, 135 Mich. 254, 97 N. W. Rep. 689, 10 Detroit L. N. 727; Pullman Co. v. Norton, (Tex. Civ. App.) 91 S. W. Rep. 841. 47 lision between two boats in a river45-an action against them severally or jointly is maintainable, although there was no concert of action or common purpose between them.46 Thus in Eaton v. The Railroad, where the plaintiff sued the defendants as carriers of passengers for injuries sustained by him, the defense was that the accident was caused by another train, over which the defendants had no control, running into that in which the plaintiff was being carried, through the concurring negligence of another; but the court decided that this was no defense. "At the time of the injury complained of," said Colt, J., "the relation of passenger and carrier existed by contract between the plaintiff and the defendants; they had received the plaintiff upon their cars, and were bound to the exercise of all that care and caution which the relation imposes. . . And it is no answer to an action by a passenger against a carrier, that the negligence or the trespass of a third party contributed to the injury." So where a carrier is sought to be held responsible for not furnishing safe stational accommodations, it is no defense that the station is used conjointly with another company, also in fault.48 45. Packet Co. v. Mulligan, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1287, 77 S. W. Rep. 704; Jung v. Starin, 33 N. Y. Supp. 650, 12 Misc. Rep. 362. / 46. Flaherty v. Railway Co., 39 Minn. 328; Colegrove v. Railroad Co., 20 N. Y. 492; Cuddy v. Horn, 46 Mich. 596; Tompkins v. Railroad Co., 66 Cal. 163; Central Pass. R'y Co. v. Kuhn, 86 Ky. 578; Union R'y Co. v. Shacklett, 19 Ill. App. 145; Holzal v. Railroad Co., 38 La. Ann. 185; McDonald v. The Railroad, 47 La. Ann. 1440, 17 So. Rep. 873; Railway v. Garreiss, 14 Ky. Law Rep. 397; Railroad Co. v. McDonnell, 91 Ill. App. 488. Where a passenger, while in the Sec. 918. Liability of carrier for acts of lessees, etc.-Liability for acts of receiver.-A carrier by railroad which has received special privileges from the state cannot, without legislative authority, divest itself of its duties to the public as a carrier, or delegate their performance to another, in such manner as to relieve itself of responsibility for their proper fulfillment.49 Where, therefore, the company, without such authorized exemption, has leased its road to another,50 or turns it over to be operated for a limited period by a construction company,51 or conveys it to trustees selected by itself,52 or otherwise delegates the performance of its duties to another, even to the state,53 it will be liable to passengers for injuries received from its own failure to keep the road and its appurtenances in proper condition,54 or through the negligence of such other,55 though the latter may be also liable severally or jointly.56 An authorized lease, however, not otherwise providing, will 49. Nugent v. Railroad Co., 80 Me. 62; Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 71; York, etc. R. Co. v. Winans, 17 How. 30; Pennsylvania Co. v. Railroad, 118 U. S. 290; Railroad Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall. 450; Gulf, etc. R. Co. v. Morris, 67 Tex, 692; Georgia R. & B. Co. v. Tice, Ga. 52 S. E. Rep. 916. 50. International, etc. R. Co. v. Dunham, 68 Tex. 231; Murray v. Railroad Co., 66 Conn. 512, 34 Atl. Rep. 506, 32 L. R. A. 539; Railroad Co. v. Newell, 212 Ill. 332, 72 N. E. Rep. 416; Railroad Co. v. Doan, 195 Ill. 168, 62 N. E. Rep. 826; Railroad Co. v. Roller, 100 Fed. 738, 41 C. C. A. 22, 49 L. R. A. 77; Arrowsmith v. Railroad Co., 57 Fed. 165. 51. Chattanooga, etc. R. Co. v. Liddell, 85 Ga. 482. 53. Littlejohn v. Railroad Co., 148 Mass. 478, citing Peters v. Rylands, 20 Pa. St. 497. 54. Nugent v. Railroad Co.,. supra; St. Louis, etc. R'y Co. c. Carl, 28 Kan. 622; Augusta, etc. R. Co. v. Killian, 78 Ga. 749. 55. Nugent v. Railroad Co., supra; Singleton . Railroad Co., 70 Ga. 464; Nelson ľ. Railroad Co., 26 Vt. 717; Pratt v. Railroad Co., 42 Me. 579; Stearns . Railroad Co., 46 Me. 95; Abbott . Railroad Co., 80 N. Y. 27; Macon, etc. R. Co. v. Mayes, 49 Ga. 355; Railroad Co. v. Newell, supra; Railroad Co. v. Doan, supra. 56. Both are liable. International, etc., R. Co. v. Dunham, 68 Tex. 231; Ingersoll v. Railroad Co., 8 Allen, 438; Davis v. Railroad Co., 121 Mass. 134; Pennsylvania Co. v. Greso, 102 Ill. App. 52. Naglee v. Railroad Co., 83 252; s. c. 79 Ill. App. 127. Va. 707. absolve the lessor from the torts of the lessee resulting from the negligent operation and handling of its trains and the general management of the leased road over which the lessor has no control.57 So if the owner of a vehicle, such as a steamboat, leases his boat to another, thereby relinquishing all control over it, such owner never having received any special privileges from the state, he cannot be held liable for an injury to a passenger occasioned by the negligence of the person to whom he has leased the boat.58 Where a railroad company is placed in the hands of a receiver, the surrender of its properties to him is an act which the company is compelled to do by law, and it cannot therefore be held to answer for the receiver's negligence.59 But if the income of the road, while being operated by the receiver, has been used in improving the property, and the road in its improved condition has been returned to the railroad company and the receiver discharged, it is held that a recovery may be had against the company for an injury caused by the receiver's negligence up to the extent of the income expended by the receiver in improving the road.60 Sec. 919. Liability of carrier for the negligence of an independent contractor.-The duty of the carrier to provide for the safe conveyance of his passengers, as far as human care and foresight will go, being absolute, he cannot, by delegating the performance of an act to an independent contractor, when 57. Nugent v. Railroad Co., supra; Mahoney v. Railroad Co., 63 Me. 68; Arrowsmith v. The Railroad, 57 Fed. 165; Phillips v. The Railroad, 62 Hun, 233, 16 N. Y. Supp. 909. 58. Phelps v. Steamboat Co., 131 N. Car. 12, 42 S. E. Rep. 335; Gulzoni v. Tyler, 64 Cal. 334, 30 Pac. Rep. 981. 59. Parr v. Railroad Co., 43 S. Car. 197, 20 S. E. Rep. 1009, 49 Am. St. Rep. 826; San Antonio, etc., Ry. Co. v. Lynch (Tex. Civ. App.), 55 S. W. Rep. 517. That the receiver may be sued for his negligent acts without leave of the court first being obtained, see Fullerton v. Fordyce, 121 Mo. 1, 25 S. W. Rep. 587, 42 Am. St. Rep. 516. 60. Texas, etc., Ry. Co. v. Barnhart, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 601, 23 S. W. Rep. 801; Railway Co. v. Boyd, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 205, 24 S. W. Rep. 1086; Railway Co. v. Edmond (Tex. Civ. App.), 29 S. W. Rep. 518. such act concerns the safety of his passengers, relieve himself from liability for an injury caused by the negligence of the independent contractor or his subordinates. If, for instance, a carrier by railroad engages an independent contractor to perform work upon its track, and such contractor negligently places a pile of stone so near the track that it comes in contact with the side of a moving coach, causing injury to a pas senger in the coach, the carrier will be responsible, although he exercised the utmost care in selecting the contractor to do the work.1. So if a railroad company contracts with a gas light company to supply its cars with gas, and by reason of the negligence of a servant of the gas light company while filling a tank in one of the cars, an explosion occurs, causing injury to a passenger, the railroad company will be liable for the injury thus caused.2 But where a state required the elevation of a railroad company's tracks, and created a municipal board for the purpose which was given entire control of the work, and on account of the negligence of one of the servants of a contractor employed by the municipal board a derrick was permitted to swing over the track of the railroad company in such a way as to strike a moving passenger train, it was held that as the state had assumed entire control of the work, the railroad company was not liable for an injury thereby occasioned a passenger unless its servants had failed to exercise due care and diligence.3 Sec. 920. Liability for injury caused passenger by article brought into vehicle by another passenger.-Where the carrier has provided properly constructed vehicles and established reasonably proper rules for their management, he will not be liable for an injury to a passenger caused by an article brought into the vehicle by another passenger, unless such injury could 1. Carrico v. The Railroad, 39 W. Va. 86, 19 S. E. Rep. 571, 24 L. R. A. 50; s. c. 35 W. Va. 389, 14 S. E. Rep. 12. See also, Steamship Co. v. Kane, 88 Fed. 197, 31 C. C. A. 452. 2. Chicago, Rhodes, etc., Ry. Co. t. Tex. Civ. App. 80 S. W. Rep. 869. 3. Railroad Co. v. Baker, 98 Fed. 694, 39 C. C. A. 237, 50 L. R. A. 201. |