preferred stock, and that their only valid claim was one to a priority
over the holders of common stock. Warren v. King, 389.
3. The B. H. & E. Railroad, a corporation created by the State of Con-
necticut, purchased the franchises and railroad of the H. P. & F.
Railroad, a corporation created under the laws of Rhode Island and
Connecticut. The legislature of Rhode Island ratified the sale, and
authorized the B. H. & E. Company to exercise the rights, privileges,
and powers of the H. P. & F. Company: Held, That the B. H. & E.
Company thereby became the legal successor of the H. P. & F. Com-
pany in Rhode Island; and, in respect to its railroad in Rhode Island,
a corporation of that State. Clark v. Barnard, 436.
4. Grants of immunity from legitimate govermental control are never to be
presumed; unless an exemption is clearly established the legislature
is free to act on all subjects within its general jurisdiction, as the
public interests may require. Ruggles v. Illinois, 526.
See NUISANCE, 2;
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT;
RAILROADS.
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
See CONFLICT OF Law;
JURISDICTION.
1. Under Schedule B of § 2504 of the Revised Statutes, which imposes a
duty of 30 per cent. ad valorem on "glass bottles or jars filled with
articles not otherwise provided for," such duty is chargeable on bottles
filled with natural mineral water, although, by § 2505, mineral water,
not artificial, is declared to be exempt from duty. Merritt v. Stephani,
106.
2. The decision of this court, in Schmidt v. Badger, 107 U. S. 85, that, under
the statutory provisions in question in this case, the proper duty on the
importation of glass bottles containing beer, was a duty of 30 per cent.
ad valorem on the bottles, in addition to a specific duty of 35 cents
a gallon on the beer, confirmed and applied to this case. Merritt v.
Park, 109.
3. A non-enumerated article, if found to bear a substantial similitude to an
enumerated article, either in material, quality, texture, or use to which
it may be applied, is made by section 2499 Rev. Stat., liable to the
duty imposed upon the enumerated article. Arthur v. Fox, 125.
4. A non-enumerated article composed of cow-hair and cotton, resembling
and used for the same purposes as an enumerated article of goat's hair
and cotton, is liable to the same duty as the latter. Id.
5. Marble statues, executed by professional sculptors in the studio and
under the direction of another professional sculptor, whether from
models just made by a professional sculptor, or from antique models
whose author is unknown, are "professional productions of a statuary
or of a sculptor," liable to a duty of only ten per cent. ad valorem,
under the Revised Statues, § 2504, Schedule M. Tutton v. Viti, 312.
The measure of damages in an action at law against the maintenance of a
nuisance affecting real estate is not simply the depreciation of the
property. The jury are authorized also to take into consideration
personal discomfort which may be caused by the nuisance, and any
causes which produce a constant apprehension of danger in their esti-
mate of damages, even if there be no arithmetical rule for the esti-
mate. Baltimore & Potomac Railroad v. Fifth Baptist Church, 317.
See NUISANCE, 1, 2, 4.
See EVIDENCE, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7.
ILLINOIS, 1, 2.
1. In May, 1870, Congress authorized the Washington Market Company to
construct a market building on a tract in Washington between Penn-
sylvania and Louisiana avenues and B street, and between Seventh
and Ninth streets, then belonging to the United States, and to
occupy the same for a term of 99 years, paying a rental therefor to
the city of Washington of $25,000 a year. Buildings were to be con-
structed thereon by the company, within a period named and in
accordance with specified plans. In 1871, some changes were made
in the plans, and in March, 1873, no building having been erected,
Congress authorized the governor and board of public works of the
District of Columbia (the successor of the city), to erect a building for
District offices and to "make arrangements to secure sufficient land
fronting on Pennsylvania avenue between Seventh and Ninth streets."
Under this authority the market company conveyed to the District a
part of the tract described in the act of 1870; the District assumed
the obligations of the company respecting that part, and released it
on the payment of an agreed sum from liability for back rents, and
from the obligation to pay in future any other rental than $7,500 a
year; and the company paid the back rents and bound itself to pay
the newly agreed rental for the future; and has paid rent since then
at the rate of $7,500 per annum. On suit by the District to recover
at the rate of $25,000: Held, (1) That the act of 1873 fully empowered
the District and the company to make the new agreement, transfer-
ring a part of the land to the District and diminishing the rent for
the remainder. (2) That there was nothing in the act of 1870 which
established an irrevocable charitable trust for the benefit of the poor
of Washington. (3) That in this case the debates on the passage
of the act are not to be accepted as evidence of the meaning of the
clause in controversy. District of Columbia v. Washington Market
Company, 243.
2. The relation between the railroad company and the District respect-
ing the maintenance and repair of the streets in the District through
which the railroad passes considered and settled.
Georgetown Railroad v. District of Columbia, 522.
1. A proposed in writing to B to exchange A's real estate for B's real
estate with a cash bonus. B accepted in writing. A complied in
full, B in part only. Suit is brought for specific performance of the
remainder Held, That it is unnecessary to determine whether the
memorandum was sufficient under the Statute of Frauds, as it was
the duty of the court below on the facts disclosed, and in view of
the full performance by A, to decree performance by B. Bigelow v.
Armes, 10.
2. Under the circumstances of this case there was no error in charging
the amount found due to the appellees as next of kin, upon the real
estate conveyed to Devereux by his mother, and in the hands of his
assignees in bankruptcy; and the assignees took the estate charged
with the specific equity to which it was subject in the bankrupt's
hands, and must hold and apply it to the purposes to which in equity
it is devoted. Hawkins v. Blake, 422.
3. The facts in the case showed no claim in the plaintiff against the
county defendant. The claim, if any, was against the district in the
county benefited by the levees which he claims to have constructed.
It being conceded that an action at law for the enforcement of the
claims set up in the suit was barred when the suit was brought, no
equitable reason was found why the limitation of the statute should
not be applied in equity. Meath v. Phillips County, 553.
PRACTICE, 5;
SUBROGATION, 1, 2;
TRADE MARK, 1, 2, 3.
1. Suggestion of the death of a plaintiff in the record, and an order to
make his devisees parties, is prima facie evidence of his death for the
purposes of the trial. Stebbins v. Duncan, 32.
2. The existence of a deed, and its destruction by fire being proven, it is
competent for the party offering it to prove its contents by a witness
who knows them. Id.
3. It being shown that a paper produced is a copy of a lost deed (but
without the official certificate), the copy is competent evidence. Id.
4. The witnesses to a deed being dead, the execution of the deed is to be
proven by proof of the handwriting of the subscribing witnesses. Id.
5. When a deposition has been destroyed by fire, and a copy, admitted
to be such, is offered in evidence, it is not sufficient to object that it
has not been shown that the witness is dead, or is incompetent to
testify, or that the deposition cannot be retaken. It should be also
objected that the witness does not live in another State, or more than
one hundred miles distant from the place of trial, in order to lay
ground for excluding the copy. Id.
6. The execution of the deed being proven according to law, slight proof
of the identity of the grantor is sufficient. In tracing titles, identity
of names is prima facie proof of identity of persons. Id.
7. The deed under which the plaintiff claimed was not acknowledged and
certified as required by the laws of Illinois to admit it to record. It
was, however, recorded. A duly certified copy of this record, and a
certified copy of the original memorandum of record were offered,
and a witness testified that the deed was a copy of the original deed:
Held, That under the decisions of the courts in Illinois, this was proof
that such deed and memorandum were of record, so as to give notice
to subsequent purchasers. Id.
8. When the question at issue is whether certain contracts for the sale
and purchase of merchandise were gambling, and the defendant who
impeaches them in his pleadings, says as a witness testifying about
them, "I could not say that I had any understanding on the subject
of the nature and character of the board of trade deals, whether the
property was to be actually delivered or whether it was settled for,"
the court rightly instructed the jury that there was no evidence in
regard to this issue which they could consider. Roundtree v. Smith,
269.
9. In a suit to recover taxes alleged to be in arrear on the profits of a
railroad company carried to a fund or expended in construction,
the burden of proof is on the United States to show that the com-
pany earned such profits, and that losses shown by the company were
not suffered during the period. Little Miami & Columbus & Xenia
Railroad v. United States, 277.
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
When a debt due to a deceased person is voluntarily paid by the debtor at
his own domicil in a State in which no administration has been taken
out, and in which no creditors or next of kin reside, to an adminis-
trator appointed in another State, and the sum paid is inventoried
and accounted for by him in that State, the payment is good as
against an administrator afterwards appointed in the State in which
the payment is made, although this is the State of the domicil of the
deceased. Wilkins v. Ellett, 256.
See INSURANCE;
TRADE MARK.
1. If the husband, being insolvent, mortgages his real estate to secure a
debt to his wife, previously incurred, a court of equity will not set
aside the mortgage as fraudulent against the assignee in bankruptcy if
the wife was ignorant of the insolvency and if there was no fraud.
Medsker v. Bonebrake, 66.
2. A creditor, dealing with a debtor whom he may suspect to be in failing
circumstances, but of which he has no sufficient evidence, may receive
payment or take security without necessarily violating the bankrupt
law. When such creditor is unwilling to trust a debtör further, or
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