Opinion of the Court. and governmental control by what they do, but beyond their corporate powers their acts are of no effect. It is not claimed that express authority was given the city of Ottawa to develop, or aid in developing, the natural advantages of its rivers for manufacturing purposes, and what we are now called on to decide is not whether, if such a power had been given, it would be within the general scope of the purposes of a city government, and thus a corporate purpose, within the meaning of that term as used in the Constitution, but whether it has been granted by the legislature. Much is said by the Supreme Court of Illinois in Taylor v. Thompson, 42 Ill. 9; Chicago, Danville & Vincennes Railroad Co. v. Smith, 62 Ill. 268; The People v. Depuy, 71 Ill. 651; Burr v. City of Carbondale, 76 Ill. 455; People v. Trustees of Schools, 78 Ill. 136; The Quincy, Missouri & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Morris, 84 Ill. 410; Hensley v. The People, Ib. 544, and other cases of like character, as to what may be made a corporate purpose; but these were all cases in which the legislative department of the government had undertaken to grant a power, and the question was whether the power was one that could rightfully be made a purpose of a municipal corporation. No matter how much authority there may be in the legislature to grant a particular power, if the grant has not been made the city cannot act under it. As power in a municipal corporation to borrow money and issue bonds therefor implies power to levy a tax for the payment of the obligation that is incurred, unless the contrary clearly appears, Ralls County Court v. The United States, 105 U. S. 733, it follows that the power contained in the charter to borrow money did not authorize the issue of the bonds in this case, unless they were issued for a corporate purpose, there being a constitutional prohibition against taxation by the city, except for corporate purposes. The question then is whether the city has been invested with power to raise money by public taxation to be donated to private persons or private corporations as a bonus for developing the water power in the city or its vicinity for manufacturing purposes. The charter confers all the powers usually granted to a city Opinion of the Court. for the purposes of local government, but that has never been supposed of itself to authorize taxes for everything which, in the opinion of the city authorities, would "promote the general prosperity and welfare of the municipality." Undoubtedly the development of the water power in the rivers that traverse the city would add to the commerce and wealth of the citizens, but certainly power to govern the city does not imply power to expend the public money to make the water in the rivers available for manufacturing purposes. It is because railroads are supposed to add to the general prosperity that municipalities are given power to aid in their construction by subscriptions to capital stock or donations to the corporations engaged in their construction; but in all the vast number of cases involving such subscriptions and donations that have come before this court for adjudication since The Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall, decided twenty-five years ago, and reported in the 21st Howard, 539, it has never been supposed that the power to govern of itself implied power to make such subscriptions or such donations. On the contrary, it has been over and over again held, and as often as the question was presented, that unless the specific power was granted, all such subscriptions, and all such donations, as well as the corporate bonds issued for their payment, were absolutely void, even as against bona fide holders of the bonds. Thomson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327; Marsh v. Fulton County, 10 Wall. 676; St. Joseph's Township v. Rogers, 16 Wall. 644; McClure v. Township of Oxford, 94 U. S. 429; Wells v. Supervisors, 102 U. S. 625; Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U. S. 80. In the present case there is nothing whatever to indicate any special authority in this city to pay a bonus for the work that was to be done. It did have power to provide the city with water, but there is nowhere anything looking to such a purpose in this transaction. The object here was to bring the water into use as power, to be leased or sold at reasonable rates. An attempt was made by the legislature to authorize a subscription to the stock of the manufacturing company, but that was of no avail, because in the form adopted the legislation was confessedly unconstitutional. The charter therefore stands the same Opinion of the Court. as though no such attempt had been made, and what was done did not create a corporate purpose to effect an improvement of the power. But even if there had been power to subscribe to the stock, it would not follow there was power to make a donation by way of a bonus to the company to aid in the improvement. In Chicago, Danville and Vincennes R. R. Co. v. Smith, supra, it was indeed said that the distinction between a donation to aid a company and a subscription to its stock "was more apparent than real," but that was said in reference to the question of making subscriptions and donations for corporate purposes, and not with reference to the effect of a power to subscribe as conferring a power to donate. In no case to which our attention has been called has it been held that a power to subscribe for stock would of itself authorize a donation. The case of Hickling v. Wilson, decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois in June of last year, and reported in 104 Ill. 54, is relied upon in support of this judgment. That was a suit by a creditor of the manufacturing company against the stockholders to collect his debt. The city was not a party, and its liability was in no way involved. In the opinion, as published in the official report of the case, it was not even assumed that there was corporate power to issue the bonds. The present case was submitted at the last term, and at a former day in this term a decision was announced reversing the judgment, but in the opinion reasons were assigned for the reversal different from those now given. That judgment was afterwards, upon application for a rehearing, set aside and a reargument ordered. Upon further consideration of the whole case, we prefer to rest the decision on the ground that as between Cushman and the city the bonds in question were illegal and void, and as the present holder occupies no better position than Cushman, he and all those under whom he claims having bought with full knowledge of all the facts, the judgment should have been in favor of the city. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the city on the facts found. Opinion of the Court. ARTHUR, Collector, v. FOX and Another. IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR Decided March 19th, 1883. Customs Duties. 1. A non-enumerated article, if found to bear a substantial similitude to an enumerated article, either in material, quality, texture, or use to which it may be applied, is made by section 2499, Rev. Stat., liable to the duty imposed upon the enumerated article. 2. A non-enumerated article composed of cow-hair and cotton, resembling and used for the same purposes as an enumerated article of goats' hair and cotton, is liable to the same duty as the latter. Action to recover back duties claimed to have been illegally exacted by the collector of New York. Mr. Solicitor-General for the plaintiff cited Davies v. Arthur, 96 U. S. 148; Arthur v. Herman, 96 U. S. 141; Murphy v. Arnson, 96 U. S. 131. Mr. Edwin B. Smith and Stephen S. Clarke for the defendants cited Smythe v. Fisk, 23 Wall. 374; Stuart v. Maxwell, 16 How. 150; Ross v. Peaselye, 2 Curtis, 499; Murphy v. Arnson, 96 U. S. 131; Arthur v. Herman, 96 U. S. 141; Davies v. Arthur, 96 U. S. 148. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. David Fox and Rose Fox, the defendants in error, imported from Liverpool certain goods called velours, composed of cow or calf hair, vegetable fibre, and cotton, an imitation of seal skin, and used for manufacturing hats and caps. The goods were not specifically enumerated in the tariff acts, but "in the use to which they were put, and in appearance and material, resembled manufactures of goats' hair and cotton more nearly than any other article of commerce. The goats' hair and cotton goods are also imitations of seal skin, and all these goods of both kinds are frequently commercially called 'seals,' and are made to represent seal skin and are used for the purposes 108 125 L-ed 675 127 368 31f 263 31f 264 31f 265 33f 654 108 125 L-ed 675 139 628 144 41 152 5:23 41f 881 44f 51. Opinion of the Court. for which seal skin is used." The component material of chief value in velours is cow and calf hair, and not cotton. The provisions of the tariff acts involved in the determination of the duties to be paid on the importation are as follows: "Cotton braids, insertings, lace, trimming, or bobbinet, and all other manufactures of cotton, not otherwise provided for, thirtyfive per centum ad valorem. "SCHED. L. * "Flannels, blankets, hats of wool, knit goods, balmorals, woolen and worsted yarns, and all manufactures of every description composed wholly or in part of worsted, the hair of the alpaca, goat or other like animals, except such as are composed in part of wool, not otherwise provided for, valued at not exceeding forty cents per pound, twenty cents per pound; valued at above forty cents per pound and not exceeding sixty cents per pound, thirty cents per pound; valued at above sixty cents per pound and not exceeding eighty cents per pound, forty cents per pound; valued at above eighty cents per pound, fifty cents per pound; and, in addition thereto, upon all the above-named articles, thirty-five per centum ad valorem. "SEC. 2499. There shall be levied, collected and paid on each and every non-enumerated article which bears a similitude, either in material, quality, texture, or the use to which it may be applied, to any article enumerated in this title, as chargeable with duty, the same rate of duty which is levied and charged on the enumerated article which it most resembles in any of the particulars before mentioned; "And if any non-enumerated article equally resembles two or more enumerated articles, on which different rates of duty are chargeable, there shall be levied, collected and paid on such nonenumerated article the same rate of duty as is chargeable on the article which it resembles paying the highest duty; "And on all articles manufactured from two or more materials the duty shall be assessed at the highest rates at which any of its component parts may be chargeable." |