Opinion of the Court. Although the libel was filed on the 9th of June, 1862, and the claim was promptly put in, the adjudication was not had until June of the following year, when all further proceedings were stayed with the consent of both parties to await an adjustment of damages by the two governments. Nothing further was done until nearly seven years afterwards, when the secretary of State informed the Spanish government of the wish of the United States that the parties interested should apply to the court, which still retained jurisdiction, for such relief as justice demanded, and in the mode that tribunal should deem most proper and convenient. Thereupon, on motion of the claimant, and with the consent of the United States district attorney, the reference was ordered to ascertain the damages. Under these circumstances we cannot but think the United States have voluntarily submitted themselves to the court at the instance of the Spanish government, and with the consent of the claimant, for the purpose of having the questions of damages growing out of the capture judicially settled according to the rules applicable to private persons in like cases. It is objected, however, that the executive department of the government had no power, in the absence of express legislative authority, to make such a submission. It was the duty of the United States, under the law of nations, to bring all captured vessels into a prize court for adjudication. If that had not been done in this instance, the Spanish government would have had just cause of complaint, and could have demanded reparation for the wrongs that had been done one of its subjects. The executive department had the right to bring the suit. In that suit it had been determined that the capture was unlawful. Necessarily, therefore, the question of damages to the owner of the captured vessel arose. Since, without the consent of the United States, no judgment for damages could be rendered against them in the pending suit that could be enforced by execution, the Spanish government had the right to assume the prosecution of the claim, and it did. Necessarily the negotiations on the part of the United States under this claim were conducted by the executive. After long delay no agreement was reached, and as a last resort for ending the controversy, it Opinion of the Court. was determined to refer the whole matter to the court for judicial inquiry and determination. We see no reason why this might not be done in such a case. It is true any judgment that may be rendered cannot be judicially enforced, but the questions to be settled are judicial in their character, and are incidents to the suit which the United States were required to bring to enforce their rights as captors. It is too late now to insist that the case is not one of prize, because in the libel it is expressly alleged that the vessel was captured as lawful prize, and condemnation was asked on that account. When, therefore, the United States, through the executive of the nation, waived their right to exemption from suit, and asked the prize court to complete the adjudication of a cause which was rightfully begun in that jurisdiction, we think the government is bound by the submission, and that it is the duty of the court to proceed to the final determination of all the questions legitimately involved. The next inquiry is as to the amount of damages. The duty of a captor is to institute judicial proceedings for the condemnation of his prize without unnecessary delay, and if he fails in this the court may, in case of restitution, decree demurrage against him as damages. This rule is well settled. Slocum v. Mayberry, 2 Wheat. 1; The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362; The Lively, 1 Gall. 314; The Corier Maritimo, 1 Rob. 287. Upon the facts in this case there can be no doubt of the propriety of such an allowance for the extraordinary detention of the vessel before she was delivered up for adjudication, especially since she was detained for the express purpose of use by the United States. And as to the amount of the allowance, there is no opportunity for discussion. The United States were willing and actually contracted to pay $200 a day for her use if she was not in fact lawful prize, and that is shown to have been a reasonable price for her charter at the time. She was seized on the 29th of November, and it is fair to assume that if due diligence had been used she might have been surrendered for adjudication by the 16th of December, when her charter began to run. She was not actually surrendered until the 9th of June-a delay of 175 days beyond what was necessary. It Opinion of the Court. is not disputed that her value at that time was $30,000. She cost when built $50,000, and was new when captured. As she has never been restored under the order to that effect, there can be no doubt of the liability of the United States for her value, when at their request she was delivered into their possession by the court. It is not a matter of any importance that the certificate of deposit in the treasury of the amount of her appraised value was not filed. By taking the vessel on the terms imposed by the court, the United States impliedly agreed to restore her in as good condition as she was when taken, or pay her value in money. By the surrender of the vessel for adjudication, the United States relieved themselves from any further liability for damages in the way of demurrage, and became bound for the vessel instead. The allowance for demurrage includes reasonable compensation for the pay and expenses of an agent to look after the interests of the owners up to the time of the delivery of the vessel to the navy department by the court. After that no agent was necessary. From that time the case stood as though a sale had been made and the proceeds paid into the registry of the court. Our conclusion is that damages should be allowed as follows: For unnecessary and unusual delay in proceeding to adjudication, 175 days at $200... For value of vessel.. In all .... $35,000 30,000 $65,000 To which add interest, at the rate of six per cent. per annum, from the time of the order of restitution, June 20th, 1863, until the decree. The decree of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to enter another decree in accordance with this opinion. Opinion of the Court. CROSSLEY & Another v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS & IN ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA.- -MOTION ΤΟ 108 105 L-ed 667 120 146 125 27 108 105 L-ed 667 165 189 DISMISS. Decided March 12th, 1883. Louisiana-Practice. The record shows that the cause presented two questions in the court below; one not federal, the other federal. The opinion of the court below shows that the cause was decided there on the first point only: Held, That in cases coming from the Supreme Court of Louisiana the opinion of the court, as presented by the record, may be examined to determine whether the judg ment can be reviewed. Mr. B. R. Forman for defendants in error, moving to dismiss. Mr. Henry C. Miller for plaintiffs, resisting. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. The record shows that the defendants in error sought to enjoin the collection of a judgment against their property to enforce an assessment under the drainage laws of Louisiana: 1, because under the operation of the laws authorizing the judg ment nothing more 'remained to be paid thereon; and, 2, because the judgment had, in terms, been released and discharged by certain acts of the general assembly of the State, passed in 1877 and 1878. If the case was decided below on the first of these grounds, no federal question is involved. It was settled long ago that, in cases coming to this court from the Supreme Court of Louisiana, the opinion of the court below, as set out in the record, may be referred to, if necessary, to determine whether the judgment is one we have authority to review. Armstrong v. Treasurer of Athens Co., 16 Pet. 281; Almonester v. Kenton, 9 How. 1; Grand Gulf R. R. and Banking Co. v. Marshall, 12 How. 165; Cousin v. Labatut, 19 How. 202; Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590. From the statement of the case and the opinion found in this record, it is manifest the decision was placed entirely on the Statement of Facts. ground that the judgment was not collectible under the law as it stood before the acts of 1876 and 1877 were passed. Consequently the case was disposed of before the federal question presented by the pleadings was reached, and that question was not and need not have been decided. Under these circumstances we have no jurisdiction, and the Motion to dismiss is granted. MERRITT, Collector, v. STEPHANI & Another. IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. Decided March 19th, 1883. Customs Duties. Under Schedule B of § 2504 of the Revised Statutes, which imposes a duty of 30 per cent. ad valorem on "glass bottles or jars filled with articles not otherwise provided for," such duty is chargeable on bottles filled with natural mineral water, although, by § 2505, mineral water, not artificial, is declared to be exempt from duty. This was a suit to recover back duties exacted by the plaintiff in error, as collector of the port of New York, on glass bottles imported in June, 1879, from Antwerp. The bottles contained natural mineral water. The collector charged on the bottles a duty of 30 per cent. ad valorem, under this provision of Schedule B of section 2504 of the Revised Statutes: "Glass bottles or jars filled with articles not otherwise provided for thirty per cent. ad valorem." The collector charged no duty on the water, as being free under this clause of section 2505: "The importation of the following articles shall be exempt from duty: Mineral waters, all, not artificial.” At the trial, it was proved on behalf of the plaintiffs that |