der that law must have been summoned as sal vors. The salvors have resorted to an incompetent tribunal; they ought to have libeled in the district court, which has exclusive cognizance of the case. 2. But if any salvage was due, the amount decreed is exorbitant. The amount offered was a very liberal compensation for their time, risk and labor. There was no danger. The vessel was all the time within the bay; and they had pilot boats constantly alongside. The cargo was in its nature so buoyant, that the ship could not sink. 353*] *In the case in 19 Viner, 275, only one-tenth was given for salvage on the coast. In The Blaireau (ante, vol. 2, p. 240,) only onethird was given; and that was a case of great risk and merit. 1 Peters, 10, 37; Molloy, b. 5, c. 10. Broom and Van Dyke, contra. There are only two questions in this case. 1. Whether the goods are forfeited to the United States; and, 2. Whether the salvage allowed is too high? 1. The inspector had no authority to unlade the ship. No entry had been made, and no permit granted. He could only unlade in the character of a salvor. When the goods were landed, he had a right to direct where they should be deposited until the duties were ascertained, and paid or secured, but his right extended no further. The lien of the salvors was not inconsistent with that of the United States, As to every thing beyond the security of the revenue, the officer was a trustee for the salvors and the owners. He held as much for them as he did for the United States, until he undertook to hold adversely. The state courts had a right to issue the writs of replevin. Replevin, in Delaware, is a substitute for trover. It is the writ by which they try the question of property; and trover will certainly lie against a revenue officer for an illegal seizure. Esp. N. P. 583; 3 Rob. 178; 4 Rob. 160, 188; Burr. 2657. It is not denied that salvage is a question of admiralty jurisdiction, and that the court of admiralty has also cognizance of incidents; but not exclusive cognizance. It was never so contended in England. The court of admiralty had a hard struggle to get even a concurrent cognizance of incidental questions. Salvage goods are not liable to duties, nor, if they are, can the goods be forfeited by any act 1. The counsel for the appellees were permitted | in this court to read the following letter from Judge Winchester to Judge Bedford, stating the grounds of that decision: Shaware, Baltimore County, March 9, 1808. Dear Sir: It seems that the full statement of the arguments and opinion made by me in the case of duties on wreck and salvage goods, has been lost or mislaid. I can, therefore, only furnish you with the state of the case, the points and authorities. The ship La Blaireau, on a voyage from the West Indies to France, and wholly owned by foreign subjects, was run down at night by a Spanish ship of war, and abandoned by the crew, who were taken off by the Spanish vessel. The next morning The Blaireau was discovered by the British ship Firm, taken up as a wreck, and salvage; and conducted to the port of Baltimore. The cargo was very valuable, containing sugars, of the salvors. *Such was never the [*354 intent of the act of Congress. All statutes must have a reasonable construction. Vin. tit. Statute, 519; 1 Bl. Com. 91. By the revenue laws, goods are liable to forfeiture by landing at any other than a port of delivery, or without permit, or in the night, yet it will not be contended that these provisions apply to goods wrecked and driven on shore. But they are certainly within the letter of the act. In Courtney v. Borer, cited in 1 Lord Raym. 388 and 501, it is not stated that the goods were intended to be imported, and such is not the ground of decision in Shepherd v. Gosnold, Vaugh. 159. But the true ground of decision is, that the goods were not imported as merchandise, but were driven in by stress of weather; that it was not a voluntary importation. 6 Gwillim's Bac. Abr. 280. Although the words of the British navigation act, 12 Car. II. c. 18, are, “imported as merchandise,” yet those statutes which use only the word "imported," have received the same construction. Reeve's Law of Shipping, 203; 2 Wils. 257. The act of Congress means a voluntary importation. It is in many respects similar to the British statute. There is no importation until bulk is broken. Until then there is no forfeiture of the goods, although the vessel depart with them. There is only a penalty of 400 dollars on the master. Collection Law, s. 29, 31, 32, 33, 36, 45; Hallet & Bowne v. Jenks, (ante, vol. 3, p. 219.) The statute of 5 Geo. I. makes stranded goods liable to duty; hence it may be inferred that they would not have been so liable but for the statute. Bac. Abr. tit. Smuggling, 274; Hard. 360, Hargrave's Law Tracts, 215, 225; Reeve, 24, 66, 85, 207, 208, 212, &c.; 1 Plowd. 1, Reneger v. Fagossa; Cro. Eliz. 538; Coll. Jurid. 72, 75, 79; Reeve, 200; Loft, 200; 1 Hawk. c. 17, s. 83; Raym. 377. The King has no remedy for his subsidy, unless the goods be landed. There must be fraud or negligence. No act of the salvors forfeited the goods. If they are trespassers, as *is contended, no act of [*355 theirs could forfeit them. It must be an act done by the owners, or with their privity, or by some person acting under their authority. In the case of The Blaireau, Judge Winchester decided that salvage goods were not liable to duties; and the decision on that point was not questioned on the appeal.1 *Misconduct is charged against the [*356 coffee, liquors, lace, and diamonds. The two latter articles were in very small boxes, and the facility of their concealment had tempted the British captain to conceal some of the boxes; but the fact was discovered, in consequence of a quarrel between him and another person, relative to a division of the booty. An action was instituted against the captain for the penalty imposed by the revenue law, on concealing these articles of lace and jewelry, upon the ground that they were chargeable with duties. Mr. Martin argued for the defendant, that the case was not within any statute; that it was not an importation, within the revenue laws, which go only to ordinary cases of trade, with the exception of the single case of distress, provided for by the 60th section of the act. He commented on the 23d, 29th, 30th, 60th, 68th, and 69th sections, to show that the whole of the provisions of the law applied only to voluntary importations; that they did not apply to salvage goods, which could not be accompanied cargo. salvors, because they prevented the mate and | vors, at most, can only claim a compensation three of the crew from taking away part of the for their time and labor. But they are not entitled to any thing. They resisted the officer of the ship, when, by the very law of Delaware, under which they pretend to have acted, they ought to have obeyed his orders. 357*] *But the salvors had a right so to do. They were in possession and had saved a considerable part of the cargo, and were in the act of saving the residue; they had a lien upon the whole for salvage. There is no evidence of any embezzlement by the salvors; that charge is not supported. Nor is there the least evidence that any part of the goods were concealed to evade payment of the duties. 2. The award is conclusive as to the rate of salvage. It is immaterial whether the law of Delaware be in force or not. But Delaware is a sovereign independent state, and has all the rights of sovereignty not given up to the United States by the constitution. The United States admiralty court is bound by the laws of Delaware, so far as they are consistent with those of the United States. The jurisdiction is given to the courts of the United States by the constitution and laws of the United States, but the state laws are rules of decision in those courts, in cases where they apply. It is said the award was not made agreeably to the act, and that the parties were not bound to submit to the arbitration. That act is like that which gives power to the commissioners of the cinque ports to decide the question of salvage; and if the parties submit to the jurisdiction, it is fit they should abide by the award; although the arbitrators had no jurisdiction otherwise than by consent. 3 Rob. 261, The American Hero. The libellants objected to the amount, not to the jurisdiction. Whether it be an award under the act of Delaware, or by consent of parties, it is equally binding; and the court cannot look into the reasonableness of it. As to the amount of salvage, the counsel cited 1 Rob. 263; 3 Rob. 286, and 5 Rob. 289. The Jonge Bastiaan, where two-thirds were given for salvage, in a case of derelict. 358*] *Rodney, (Attorney General,) in reply. There was not much risk to the owners of the cargo; it was not in great danger; and there was no danger in saving the goods. The sal by the manifests, bills of lading, &c., required in ordinary cases; nor could the oaths imposed by law be taken in the case of salvage. He then argued that no misconduct whatever of the salvors can create a forfeiture of goods of which they had taken possession as salvors, and referred to 6 Bac. Abr. 280, (Gwill. edit.) on the general question, relying on the cases there cited, and 1 Ld. Raym. 388, 501; Reeve's Law of Shipping, 201; Bunbury, 236; Stat. 5 Geo. 1. c. 11, 8. 13; 26 Geo. II. c. 19, 8. 5. The district attorney argued that the importation meant a bringing in. That the privity of owners was not necessary. Seamen forfeit the ship by running the goods, and by the 111th section of the revenue law, which provides for an entry where particulars are unknown, salvage goods might be entered. The court decided that salvage goods were not dutiable; and referred to the following authorities, in addition to those mentioned at the bar. The case of Dyson v. Lord Villars, (a very strong case); Collect. Juridica, 79, 80; Strange, 943; Hardres, 362; Parker, 212: Cro. Eliz. 534. The court relied on the 61st and the 62d sections of the revenue law to show that the duties were not due on importation, and to bring the case within Sir J. Marriot's opinion, Collect. Juridica, 88, Two decisions of Judge Paca were also referred to by the court; one of which decided that prize goods were not operated The goods were subject to duty, and forfeiture. There is no reason why goods having paid salvage should not be liable to duties. The decision of Judge Winchester, in the case of The Blaireau, is not admitted to be law. Even wearing apparel would be liable, but for the exception in the act. The exception proves the general rule. The British statute differs in its language from ours, and, therefore, the English authorities do not apply. The misfortune only exempts the owners from the penalties of the act, but does not exempt the goods from forfeiture. March 9. MARSHALL, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court as follows: In these cases two questions are to be decided by the court. 1st. Is the cargo of the Favourite, or any part of it, forfeited to the United States? 2d. Are Ware and others entitled to any, and if to any, to what salvage? The first count in the first libel filed on the part of the United States claims the brandies, wines and cordials therein mentioned, in consequence of their being found in the possession of certain persons therein named, unaccompa nied *with such marks and certificates [*359 as are required by law, the duties thereon not having been paid, or secured to be paid. The second count claims them as forfeited because they were removed, without the consent of the collector, before the quantity and quality of the said wines and spirits, and the duties thereon, were ascertained according to law; the duties thereon not having been paid or secured. The third count claims them because they were found concealed, the duties not having been paid or secured according to law. The second libel claims certain other goods, which were parcel of the cargo of the Favourite, as forfeited, by being found unlawfully con upon by the ordinary revenue laws; and that brandy (brought) in as prize by a French privateer, (before the prohibition to sell their prize goods in our ports,) though in vessels of less capacity than allowed in the ordinary course of trade, were not forfeitable. The other, under the statute of the United States which prohibited the exportation of arms, &c. Judge Paca held, that the exportation of arms, &c., constituting the equipment of the vessel, was not an exportation within the statute. The court (in the case of The Blaireau) intimated a strong opinion that importation implied a bringing in voluntarily; and referred to the decisions under the non-intercourse law with France, where it was holden that commercing after an involuntary going into French dominions, was not a commercing prohibited by law, and also relied strongly on O'Callion's Case, 1 Hawkins, c. 17, s. 83, upon the statute 27 Eliz. c. 2. The above contains the substance of the arguments and opinions, and all the authorities referred to in the case of The Blaireau. It will afford me pleasure if you shall be able to derive any assistance from them. I am very respectfully, Hon. Judge Bedford. J. WINCHESTER. ་ cealed, the duties thereon not having been paid or secured. can only be given by the owner or consignee, The act proceeds to require that this entry The facts of the case are these: The ship Favourite, belonging to Mr. Peisch, of Philadelphia, was discovered, about the last of October, adrift in the bay of Delaware, with her masts gone by the board, and without anchors, cables or rudder, and in danger of being carried out to sea. A company was formed to save the vessel and cargo; and with considerable labor, in the course of several days, the cargo was unladen and landed at Lewis, a small town on the bay, not a port of delivery, where it was, with the approbation of the collector, left under the care and in the custody of a revenue officer residing at that place, who was one of the party that had originally taken possession of the vessel, and under whose direction the whole business had been in a great measure conducted. On the 3d of November, while the salvors were unlading the vessel and landing the cargo, an imperfect entry was made by the owners or consignees, after which an award was made between the owners and salvors, by which the The salvors were allowed one-half the cargo. owners were dissatisfied with this award, and The collector refused to acquiesce under it. ordered the goods, which had been in the custody of a revenue officer, to be carried to Wil360*] mington for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of duties. The salvors objected to this, and requested that the duties might be ascertained at Lewis, offering at the same time to pay the duties on the moiety of the cargo claimed by them under the award. The collector persisting in his determination to remove the goods to Wilmington, the salvors sued out a writ of replevin from the state court, and by force of that writ took the goods out of the possession of the revenue officer. This act is the foundation of the forfeiture alleged in the libels. The 40th section directs the surveyor, or chief The forfeiture said to be occasioned by the goods being found without the marks and cer- officer of inspection of the port or district in tificates required by law, depends upon the 43d which the said spirits, wines or teas shall be section of the act for collecting duties, and on | landed, to give the proprietor, importer or conother sections of the same act, which are ex-signee a general certificate; and the 41st secplanatory of the 43d section. The particular clause giving the forfeiture is in these words: And if any casks, chests, vessels or cases, containing distilled spirits, wines, or teas, which by the foregoing provisions ought to be marked and accompanied with certificates, shall be found in possession of any person, unaccompanied with such marks and certificates, it shall be presumptive evidence that the same are liable to forfeiture." The law then authorizes a seizure, and subjects such distilled spirits, &c., to forfeiture, unless it be proved at the trial that they were imported according to law, and that the duties were paid or secured. The 38th section requires that all distilled spirits, wines and teas, shall be landed under the inspection of the surveyor, or other officer acting as inspector of the revenue for the port, and, therefore, can relate only to cases of regular importation at the port of delivery, where the revenue officer may superintend the landing. He is directed to attend at all reasonable times, not at all places. The 39th section prescribes the duty of the officer of inspection of the port where the spirits, &c., may be landed. He is to ascertain the duties, and mark the casks. tion directs him to give a particular certificate *for each vessel, which certificate passes [*362 with the vessel to the purchaser. These sections are connected with those which precede them, and relate to regular importations, where the spirits, &c., are landed under a permit at a port of delivery, and there is a proprietor, importer or consignee, or an agent to whom the certificates may be granted; not to spirits, &c., which may, from the nature of things, lawfully get into the possession of individuals without the knowledge of a revenue officer. The 42d section only directs that blank certificates shall be provided. The objects of this clause are those vessels only which, by the foregoing provisions,' ought to be marked and accompanied with certificates. To determine its extent, the "fore-under this count of the libel. going provisions" must be looked into. These are the sections which precede that which is supposed to give the forfeiture claimed This subject is first taken up in the 37th section of the act. That section directs particular and additional entries to be made of distilled spirits, wines and teas, which provisions are adapted to regular importation, not to those articles when saved from a wreck. The entry is to be made by the importer or consignee, and specifications are required which The first part of the 43d section directs the proprietor, importer or consignee, who may receive the said certificates, to deliver them with the vessels to the purchaser; and then comes the clause which subjects to forfeiture all vessels containing spirits, &c., which may be found unmarked and not accompanied by certificates, which by the foregoing provisions ought to be marked and accompanied by certificates. 647 section. This act is not within the law. The 50th section is calculated for cases in which the general requisites of the law can be complied with, not for salvage goods, in cases where those general requisites cannot be complied with. In the foregoing provisions the legislature, in the opinion of this court, did not intend to comprehend wrecked goods, or goods found under circumstances like those in the Favourite, where the vessel was deserted by her crew, and where it might be necessary, for the preservation of the goods, to take them to the nearest accessible The 51st section relates to the removal of part of the coast. Either these spirits and wines goods from the wharf or place on which they would have been liable to forfeiture if brought may have been landed in conformity with the to land under the most pressing circumstances, directions of the 50th section. It presupposes where inevitable loss must attend any delay, if a permit, and that they were landed under the a revenue officer should not be present to take inspection of a revenue officer, in the manner possession of them, or the single circumstance prescribed by the 38th section. of their being found unmarked and unaccompanied with certificates, is not in itself sufficient to forfeit them. The opinion of the court that it was not the intention of the legislature to subject goods, under such circumstances, to 363*] forfeiture, is not formed exclusively *on the extreme severity of such a regulation. It is formed also on what is deemed a fair construction of the language of the several sections of the law, which seems not adapted to cases like the present. The second count in the libel claims the goods as forfeited, because they were, without the consent of the proper officer, removed from the place where they were deposited, before the amount of duties was ascertained, the duties at that time not being paid or secured. It presupposes a case in which the gauging and marking may be done, and the other means prescribed for the ascertainment of the duties and security of the revenue may be taken, at the place of landing; not a case in which a landing must be made without a permit, often in the absence of a revenue officer, and where the goods could not be permitted, without extreme peril, to remain at the place of landing until these measures should be taken. The court is also of opinion that the removal for which the act punishes the owner with a forfeiture of the goods must be made with his consent or connivance, or with that of some person employed or trusted by him. If, by private theft, or open robbery, without Neither this count, nor the first, supposes any fault on his part, his property should be any forfeiture to have been incurred by the invaded, while in the custody of the officer of landing of the goods, or the unlading of the the revenue, the law cannot be understood to vessel. The spirits and wines are presumed to punish him with the forfeiture of that properhave been legally brought on shore, and it is ty. In the 52d section, therefore, to which the the removal only which gives title to the revenue officers seem to have intended to conUnited States. The court, therefore, is to in- form, so far as the case would admit, which diquire, whether these goods were under such rects them in the case of an incomplete entry to circumstances that a removal, such as has store the goods at the risk and expense of the taken place in this case, will produce a for-owner or consignee, no forfeiture is annexed to feiture. This depends on the 51st section of the law, in expounding which it becomes proper to notice the 50th also. This section prohibits the unlading of any vessel, or the landing of any goods, without a permit granted by the proper officers, and subjects the master or other person having the command of such vessel, and all those who shall be concerned in unlading, removing, or storing such goods, to heavy penalties, and the goods themselves to forfeiture. It was well observed that the application of this section to cases where the goods must perish, if not immediately brought on shore, and to cases in which a permit cannot regularly be granted, would be not only to prohibit, but to punish every attempt to save a cargo about to be lost on the coast. This construction of the law could only be made where the words would admit of no other. But it is unquestionably a correct legal principle, that a forfeiture can only be applied to those cases in which the means that are prescribed for the prevention of a forfeiture may be employed. The means prescribed to save the forfeiture given in the 50th section cannot be employed where a vessel is deserted by her crew, or cannot be brought into port. The permit cannot be obtained, nor can those steps which must 364*] precede the attainment of a permit be taken. Upon just legal construction, then, the landing of these goods without a permit did not subject them to the forfeiture of the 50th their removal, unless the penalties of the 51st section, or of the 43d section, be applied to the 52d. The court is of opinion that those penalties cannot be so applied in this case, not only because, from the whole *tenor of the [*365 law, its provisions appear not to be adapted to goods saved from a vessel under the circumstances in which the Favourite was found, but because, also, the law is not understood to forfeit the property of owners or consignees, on account of the misconduct of mere strangers, over whom such owners or consignees could have no control. It has been urged on the part of the United States, that although the property of the owner should not be forfeited, yet that moiety which is claimed by the salvors has justly incurred the penalties of the law. But if the award rendered in this case be not binding, the salvors could have only a general claim for salvage, such as a court might allow; and if it be binding, still they acquired no title to any specific property. Their claim was in the nature of a general lien, and any irregular proceeding on their part would rather furnish motives for diminishing their salvage, if that be not absolutely fixed by the award, than ground of forfeiture. The irregularity, too, if any, which has been committed by them, being merely an attempt to assert, in a course of law, a title they supposed themselves to possess, and with no view to defraud the revenue, this court would not be inclined to put a strained construction on the act of Congress, in order to create a forfeiture. The third count in the first libel, and the second libel, claim a forfeiture on the allegation that the goods were concealed. The fact does not support this allegation. There was no concealment in the case. RROR to the circuit court for the district brought (on the 15th of October, 1804,) by Irvine's lessee against Shearman, for a tract of land in Camden county, in the state of Georgia. The defendant below took a bill of exceptions to the refusal of the court to nonsuit the plaintiff on the trial, because he had not proved Taking all the circumstances into considera-"an entry within seven years after the title of tion, it is the unanimous opinion of the court, that no forfeiture has been incurred, and that the libels filed on the part of the United States were properly dismissed. The next question to be considered is, to what amount of salvage are the salvors entitled? That their claim is good for something, is the opinion of all the judges; but on the amount to be allowed the same unanimity does not prevail. the grantees accrued, or any entry by either of the heirs or persons claiming under the grantees within seven years after their titles respectively accrued." The lessor of the plaintiff had produced in evidence two grants from the province of Georgia, in 1766, to Alexander Baillie, under whom he claimed title by descent, and whose heir at law he had proved himself to be. There was no evidence of title, or even of 366*] *For the quantum of salvage to be adverse possession, on the part of the defendallowed no positive rules are fixed. It de-ant, before the bringing of the suit, other than pends on the merit of salvors, in estimating which, a variety of considerations have their influence. In the case before the court, the opinion of the majority. is, that the sentence of the circuit court ought to be affirmed. This opinion, however, is made up on different grounds. Two of the judges are of opinion that the award was fairly entered into, and although both parties might be mistaken with respect to the obligation created by the law of Delaware, yet there is no reason to suppose any imposition on either part; nor is there any other ground on which the award can be impeached or set aside. Two other judges, who do not think the award obligatory, view it as the opinion of fair and intelligent men, on the spot, of the real merit of the salvors, and connecting it with the testimony in the cause, are in favor of the salvage which has been awarded, and which has been allowed by the sentences of the district and circuit courts. Three judges are of opinion that the award is of no validity, and ought to have no influence. They think the conduct of the salvors, in taking the goods out of the possession of the revenue officer, though by legal process, is improper, and that the salvage allowed is too great. They acquiesce, however, cheerfully in the opinion of the majority of the court, and express their dissent from that opinion, solely for the purpose of preventing this sentence from having more than its due influence on future cases of salvage. The sentence of the circuit court is affirmed, without costs. the averment of ouster in the declaration, which was laid on the 10th of September, 1804; nor any evidence of title out of the lessor of the plaintiff. In support of his motion for a nonsuit, the defendant relied on the act of limitations of Georgia, passed in the year 1767, by which it it enacted, "That all writs of formedon in descender, remainder and reverter of any lands, &c., or any other writ, suit or action whatsoever, hereafter to be sued or brought, by occasion, or means of any title heretofore accrued, happened, or fallen, or which may hereafter descend, happen, or fall, shall be sued or taken within seven years next after the passing of this act, or after the title and cause of action shall or may descend or accrue to the [*368 same, and at no time after the said seven years. And that no person or persons that now hath, or have any right or title of entry into any lands, &c., shall at any time hereafter make any entry, but within seven years next after the passing of this act, or after his or their right or title shall or may descend or accrue to the same, and in default thereof, such persons so not entering, and their heirs, shall be utterly excluded and disabled from such entry after to be made." The verdict and judgment below being against the defendant, he sued out his writ of error. There being no appearance in this court for the plaintiff in error, P. B. Key, for the defendant in error, opened the record, and prayed an aflirmance of the judgment. 1. Because, from the facts disclosed, after the descent had been cast nearly thirty years, and no adverse possession at any time proved, the jury had a right to presume and find an actual entry within seven years; if such actual entry was necessary. 2. Because, in this case, on the facts disclosed, no entry was necessary. Two things only must concur to complete a title. Possession, and the right of property. The right of property is proved to be in the plaintiff as heir of the patentee; and possession by operation of law accompanies the title, unless the contrary is shown; and until it is shown. If possession is taken by a wrongdoer, and severed from the title, (of which there is no |