་ This case, even was the decision an authority, | to authorize a change in the legal import of a is too imperfectly reported to be permitted to written contract. overthrow a system which was previously established. It is the opinion of the court, that, on the legal construction of this policy, John Boonan Graves is insured to the extent of his own interest in the cargo, but that the interest of his copartner is not insured. Were it otherwise, the remedy would be complete at law, and of consequence the plaintiffs could not maintain their bill in a court of equity. 2d. It remains to inquire whether, under the circumstances of the case, a court of equity will relieve the plaintiffs against the mistake alleged to exist in the contract, and extend the insurance to the whole partnership interest. That Graves intended to insure the whole is proved in a manner which is perfectly satisfactory. The description obviously relates to the whole cargo; but the application for insurance was only for a part of it. If that application was made in the name of Graves only, it was no unreasonable supposition that the other parties concerned might be separately insured, and that the policy then required was designed to cover Graves only. That the application was so made must be inferred from the circumstance that the policy was so framed at a time when there could be no motive for varying it from the insurance applied for; and that Sigourney does not allege himself to have made any communications to the president indicating a wish to insure others than Graves. These grounds are too equivocal to warrant the court in varying a written contract in a case attended with the circumstances which appear in the present. That the company believed themselves to be insuring the property of Graves only is probable. The policy was in the possession of the agent Certainly such is the evidence in the cause. for the plaintiffs, and ought to have been unThere is no ground for imputing to the com-derstood by him before it was executed; he repany a knowledge that the policy did not correspond with the intentions of the insured. 443*] *If, then, the relief which they ask should be granted to the plaintiffs, it must be on the principle that the information laid before the insurance company was sufficient to apprise them of the fact, and to require that, on the principles of good faith, they should suggest to the agent of the plaintiffs the departure of their policy from the ancient form. This information is in writing, and is contained in the letter of the 5th of May, and in the representation of the risk which accompanied it. A The letter must be considered as having been seen by the officers of the company; but as it was shown not for the purpose of commencing a contract, but of inquiring into the terms on which a contract might probably be made, it is reasonable to suppose that the nature of the risk was the only subject of consideration, and that the question whether the property belonged to one or more persons never occurred. month elapsed before a second application was made, and as the description of the risk was again laid before the president, it could not be required from him to retain in his mind a circumstance casually suggested in a letter seen so long before, to which circumstance there was nothing to direct his particular attention. It is, then, on the representation of the risk, and on the verbal communications of Andrew Sigourney, that the case must depend. The representation contains an averment that "the ship and cargo really and truly belong to citizens of the United States." But as only a small part of the cargo was insured by the Boston company, this averment contains no information that any other than John Boonen Graves was interested in the particular policy then to be entered into. tained it in his possession for several months before a mistake was alleged. Under such circumstances, the information given to the insurance company ought to be very clear to justify a court of equity in conforming the policy to the intention of one of the parties, which was not communicated to the other till the loss had happened. Under the circumstances of the case, a court of equity cannot relieve against the mistake which has been committed; and as the remedy of the plaintiff, Graves, on the policy, to the extent of his interest, is complete at law, the decree of the circuit court dismissing his bill must be affirmed, Judgment affirmed. THIS HIS was a question certified from the circuit court for the fifth circuit, holden in the Virginia district, on which the opinions of the judges of that court were opposed. (See Lairs of U. S. col. 6, p. 89, s. 6.) The certificate sets forth that "in this cause Dundas, the plaintiffs in this cause, who are it occurred as a question whether Hepburn & citizens and residents of the District of Columbia, and are so stated in the pleadings, can maintain an action in this court against the defendant, who is a citizen and inhabitant of the commonwealth of Virginia, and is also stated so to be in the pleadings, or whether, for want of jurisdiction, the said suit ought not to be dismissed.” In the letter there is another expression which has been much relied on. It is, on this vessel's cargo we want insurance." This expression has been considered as sufficiently indicating that the application was made in behalf of more than one person; and this expression has produced 444*] the principal difficulty of the case; *but 1.-Present, Marshall, Ch. J. Cushing, Pateron reflection it has been thought too ambiguous son, Chase, and Washington, Justices. E. J. Lee, for the plaintiffs. This question arises under the 2d section of the 3d article of the constitution of the United States, which de fines the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. The particular words of the section which apply to the question are those declaring that the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States shall extend "to controversies between citizens of different states." If such words are used in the constitution as, according to their literal meaning, will give jurisdiction to the court, it is all that is necessary to be established. It is essential, in determining this question, to ascertain the import of the term "states," which in itself is a vague expression. It will sometimes mean an extent of country within certain limits, within which the authority of the neighboring country cannot be lawfully exercised. It sometimes means the government which is established in separate parts of a territory occupied by a political society. It may also be said to be a society by which a multitude of people 446*] unite together under *the dependence of a superior power for protection. 2 Burlamaqui, 21. And sometimes it means a multitude of people united by a communion of interest and by common laws. This is the definition given by Cicero. Either of the above definitions will bring the district within the meaning of the constitution. It is certainly such an extent of country as excludes from within its limits the force and operation of the laws of the governments which adjoin it. There exists within it a political society with a government over it. That government, for all general concerns of the society, is the Congress and President of the United States. And as to its local concerns, there are subordinate authorities acting under the superintendence of the national government. This political society is dependent upon the superior power of the United States. It is not essential to the formation of a state that the members of it should have the power in all cases of electing their own officers; but it is sufficient that there are certain rules laid down either by themselves, or those by whom they have submitted to be governed, for their conduct. The people of the district are governed by a power to which they have freely submitted. They do not possess in as great degree the rights of sovereignty as those people who inhabit the states. And if the free exercise of all the rights of sovereignty, uncontrolled by any other power, is essential in the formation of a state, none of those sections of the country which form the United States are entitled strictly to the appellation of a "state:" for there are certain rights of sovereignty which they cannot exercise in their state capacity, such as regulating commerce, making peace and war, &c. The term "states," as used in the constitution, may, according to the subject matter, be understood in either of the above senses. It has been understood by a majority of the judges of this court in the case of Chisholm's Executors v. The State of Georgia, 2 Dall. 457, to mean the government. 447*] *The idea, that those territories which are under the exclusive government of the | United States are to be considered in some respects as included in the term "states," as used in the constitution, is supported by the acts of Congress. In the 2d paragraph of the 2d section of the 4th article of the constitution, it is declared, that "a person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime." It is also declared in the same article of the constitution, that "no person held to service or labor in one state under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due. Congress, in prescribing the mode of executing the powers contained in these clauses of the constitution, passed a law dated February 12, 1793, c. 7, 8. 1, vol. 2, p. 165, which declares, that whenever the executive authority of any state in the union, or of either of the territories northwest or south of the river Ohio, shall demand any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any such state or territory to which such person shall have fled," and shall produce such evidence of the fact as is pre scribed by the act, the person so escaping shall be surrendered, &c. A similar provision, with respect to persons held to labor or service under the laws of the states or territories, is contained in the same act of Congress. If these territories are not, as to some purposes, included in the term "states," used in the above clauses of the constitution, Congress could not constitutionally pass a law making it the duty of the executive of a state to comply with such a requisition of the executive of one of those territories. If they are thus included, why may they not also be included in that part of the constitution which uses the same term, states," in defining the jurisdiction *of the [*448 courts? The citizens of the territories are subject to the same evil, if they are obliged to resort to the state courts, which was intended to be remedied by that clause of the constitution which authorizes citizens of different states to resort to the federal courts. And if being within the same evil authorized Congress to give a latitude to the term "states," in one part of the constitution, the same reason will authorize the same constitution of the same term in another part. The words of the constitution only authorize such a requisition to be made by the executive of a state, upon the executive of another state. It must, therefore, be acknowledged either that the territories are included in the term states, or that the act of Congress is unconstitutional. As a further proof of the same construction of the word state, Congress, by the 6th section of the act supplementary to the act concerning the District of Columbia, have enacted that in all cases where the constitution or laws of the United States provide that criminals and fugitives from justice, or persons held to labor in any state, escaping into another state, shall be delivered up, the chief justice of the said district shall be, and he is hereby required to cause to The jurisdiction given to the federal courts in cases between citizens of different states, was, at the time of the adoption of the constitution, supposed to be of very little importance to the people. See the debates in the Virginia Convention, p. 109, 122, 128. In no case from any one of the territories has this court ever considered itself as having jurisdiction; and in that of Clarke c. Bazadone, (ante, vol. 1, p. 212,) the writ of error was quashed because the act of Congress had not given this court appellate jurisdiction in cases from the territories. This is not a case between citizens of different states, within the meaning of the constitution. And in the case of Bingham v. Cabot, 3 Dall. 382, it was decided by this court that the courts of the United States were courts of limited jurisdiction, and that it must appear upon the record that the parties were citizens of different states in order to support the jurisdiction. be apprehended and delivered up such criminal, | judiciary act of 1789 *has given, yet the [*450 &c., who shall be found within the district. court can take no jurisdiction which is not Independent of these considerations, it seems to given by the act. I, therefore, call for the law be agreable to the first principles of government, which gives a jurisdiction in this case. that all persons who are under the peculiar and exclusive government and protection of a particular power, have, as it were, a natural claim upon that power for protection and redress of wrongs. And that the courts of the United States are the most proper tribunals to which the people of the District of Columbia can apply for redress in all cases where the aggressor can be found within the jurisdiction of those courts. It seems to be a denial of that protection which the United States are bound to afford to those who reside under their exclusive jurisdiction, to say that because you may sue your debtor in a foreign tribunal, (if I may use the expression,) therefore, you shall not resort to our own courts, although your debtor may be found within our jurisdiction. The framers of the constitution could never have supposed it necessary to declare in express terms that the courts of the United States should have power to hear and decide on the complaints of one of the citizens of those districts that were under the exclusive 449*] government and care of the *United E. J. Lee, in reply. A law was not necessary States, to whom alone allegiance was due. They to give the federal courts that jurisdiction which could not have intended to deny to that part of is provided for by the constitution. It was only the citizens of the United States who inhabit the necessary to limit the amount of the claims which territories, the privileges which were granted to should come before the different inferior courts. citizens of particular states, and even to foreign- If a demand should be made by the executive ers; especially the right of resorting to an im- power of the District of Columbia, upon the expartial tribunal of justice. When they permit-ecutive of a state to deliver up a fugitive from ted aliens to resort either to the state or to the federal courts, they could not mean to confine one of their own exclusive citizens to a remedy in the state courts alone. It would be strange that those citizens who owe no allegiance but to the United States, should be debarred from going into the courts of the United States for redress, when that privilege is granted to others in like circumstances, who owe allegiance to a foreign, or to a state government. C. Lee, contra. This is a new question, which has arisen in consequence of the cession of the District of Columbia, by the states of Virginia and Maryland, to the United States. The words of the constitution do not take in the case, and the act of Congress is also too nar row. justice, the constitution would apply, and oblige the state executive to respect the demand. If the term state is to have the limited construction contended for by the opposite counsel, the citizens of Columbia will be deprived of the general rights of citizens of the United States. They will be in a worse condition than aliens. By the 4th article of the constitution of the United States, sec. 1, "Full faith and credit shall be given, in each state, to the [*451 public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state." If the District of Columbia is not to be considered as a state for this purpose, there is no obligation upon the states to give faith or credit to the records or judicial proceedings of this district. But Congress, in carrying into effect this provision of the conThe constitution is a limited grant of power. stitution, by the act of March 27th, 1804, (col. Nothing is to be presumed but what is expressed. 7, p. 152,) has expressly declared that it shall It is contended that a citizen of the District of apply as well to the public acts," &c., of the Columbia is a citizen of a state. It is said that respective territories of the United States, and he is a citizen of the United States, and not be- countries subject to the jurisdiction of the Unit ing a citizen of the same state with the defend-ed States, as to the public acts," &c., of the ant, he must be a citizen of a different state. several states," thereby giving another clear legBut there may be a citizen of the United States islative construction to the word states, conformwho is not a citizen of any one of the states. able to that for which we contend. The expression "a citizen of a state," has a constitutional meaning. The states are not absolutely sovereigns, but(if I may use the expression) they are demi-sovereigns. The word state has a meaning peculiar to the United States. It means a certain political society forming a constituent part of the union. There can be no state unless it be entitled to a representation in the senate. It must have its separate executive, legislative and judicial powers. The term may also comprehend a number of other ideas. Even if the constitution of the United States authorizes a more enlarged jurisdiction than the Again, by the 9th sec. of the 1st art. of the constitution of the United States, No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state." Can Congress lay a tax or duty on articles exported from the District of Columbia, without a violation of the constitution? By the same sect. "no perference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state over those of another." Can Congress constitutionally give a perference to the ports of the District of Columbia over those of any of the states? 1804 HEPBURN AND DUNDAS V. ELLZEY. bound to or from one state be obliged to enter, | necessary to inquire whether Columbia is a stateclear, or pay duties in another." Can vessels in the sense of that instrument. The result of sailing to or from the District of Columbia be that examination is a conviction that the memobliged to enter, clear or pay duties in Mary-bers of the American confederacy only are the land or Virginia? Yet all this may be done if states contemplated in the constitution. the rigid construction contended for, be given to the word state. The house of representatives is to be composed of members chosen by the people of the several states; and each state shall have at least one representative. It is true that the citizens of Columbia are not entitled to the elective franchise in as full a manner as the citizens of states. They have no vote in the choice of president, vice-president, senators and representatives in congress. But in this they are not singular. More than seven-executive, a number of electors equal to its eighths of the free white inhabitants of Virginia are in the same situation. Of the white population of Virginia, one-half are females; half of the males probably are under age; and not more than one-half of the residue are freeholders, and entitled to vote at elections. The same case hapA great pend in some degree in all the states. 452*] majority *are not entitled to vote. But in every other respect the citizens of Columbia are entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. The senate of the United States shall be composed of two senators from each state. Each state shall appoint, for the election of the MARSHALL, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. whole number of senators and representatives. These clauses show that the word state is used in the constitution as designating a member of the union, and excludes *from the term [*453 the signification attached to it by writers on the law of nations. When the same term which has been used plainly in this limited sense in the articles respecting the legislative and executive departments, is also employed in that which respects the judicial department, it must be understood as retaining the sense originally given to it. Other passages from the constitution have been cited by the plaintiffs to show that the term state is sometimes used in its more enlarged sense. The question in this case is, whether the plaintiffs, as residents of the District of ColumBut on examining the passages quoted, bia, can maintain an action in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Virginia. they do not prove what was to be shown by them. It is true that as citizens of the United States, This depends on the act of Congress describing the jurisdiction of that court. That act and of that particular district which is subject gives jurisdiction to the circuit courts in cases to the jurisdiction of Congress, it is extraordibetween a citizen of the state in which the suit nary that the courts of the United States, which To are open to aliens, and to the citizens of every is brought, and a citizen of another state. support the jurisdiction in this case, therefore, state in the union, should be closed upon them. But this is a subject for legislative, not for judiit must appear that Columbia is a state. cial consideration. On the part of the plaintiffs it has been urged that Columbia is a distinct political society; and is, therefore, a state" according to the definitions of writers on general law. This is true. But as the act of Congress obin reference to viously uses the word "state that term as used in the constitution, it becomes Cranch 2. The opinion to be certified to the circuit court is, that that court has no jurisdiction in the case. Distinguished-Deady 121. Cited 2 How. 21; 5 How. 377; 1 Wheat. 92; 6 Wall. 335 287; 7 Id. 737; 12 Id. 86; Deady 33; 14 Blatchf. 152. |