Supreme Court of the United States. FEBRUARY TERM, 1804. WOOD e. WAGNON. The courts of the United States have not jurisdiction in cases between citizens of the United States, unless the record expressly states them to be citizens of different states. ERROR from the circuit court of the district of Georgia. The judgment was reversed, because it did not appear upon the record that the circuit court had jurisdiction of the case. The proceedings stated, that the petition of John Peter Wagnon, a citizen of the state of Pennsylvania, showeth, "That James Wood, of the state of Georgia,” đc. for the plaintiff. The defendants took a bill of exceptions, and brought their writ of error. Youngs, for the defendant in error, cited 1 Call's Rep. 42, Scott v. Hornsby; and Bell v. Marr, p. 47. Worsham v. Egleston, p. 48, and Wilkinson v. M'Lochlin, p. 49. Judgment affirmed, with 10 per cent, damages and costs. Cited-3 Wood. & M. 174. FAW c. MARSTELLER.1 In a deed made in the year 1779, of land rendering an annual rent of 26 pounds current money of Virginia for ever, the rents are not to be reduced by the scale of depreciation, but the actual annual value of the land, at the date of the contract, in specie, or in other money equivalent thereto, is to be ascertained by a jury. The objection taken was, that it did not appear that the plaintiff and defendant were citi-THIS zens of different states, and on that ground the judgment was reversed, upon the authority of Bingham e. Cabot et al., 3 Dall. 382. Cited 8 Peters 116; 2 How. 21; 16 Id. 340; 19 Id. 473; 4 Biss. 126; 1 Blatchf. 485; 1 Brock. 392; Hemp. 424; 2 Wood. & M. 79; 1 Woods 639. HIS was an appeal by Faw, the original defendant, from a decree of the circuit court of the District of Columbia, sitting as a court of Chancery at Alexandria, in July, 1803. The case, as stated by Marshall, Ch. J. in delivering the opinion of the Court, was as follows: *In the month of May, 1779, the ex- [*11 ecutors of John Alexander, in pursuance of a power contained in the will of their testator, set up to the highest bidder on a ground rent WILLIAMS AND HODGSON v. LYLES. for ever, certain lots of land lying in the town In Virginia, a forthcoming bond which in reciting the execution, states the cost to be 20 dollars, instead of 12 dollars, is not thereby vitiated, if the aggregate of debts and costs be truly stated, but will support a judgment on motion. THIS HIS was a writ of error to a judgment of the circuit court of the District of Columbia, sitting at Alexandria, upon a forthcoming bond, taken under the laws of Virginia. The execution, upon which the bond was taken, was for "143 dollars and 67 cents, also twelve 10*] dollars and thirty-three *cents, and 355 pounds of tobacco at the rate of 13 shillings and 4 pence per cwt." The recital of the execution in the bond stated it to be for 143 dollars and 67 cents, also twenty dollars and thirty-three cents, and 355 pounds of tobacco, at the rate of 13 shillings and four pence per hundred weight; and marshal's fees and commissions, and all costs attending the execution of the said writ, 8 dollars and 11 cents, making in the whole the sum of one hundred and seventy-one dollars and ninety-nine cents." This aggregate sum was correct according to the execution, and not according to the recital, there having been a mistake in writing the word twenty for twelve. The court below, considering the recitel as correct in substance, rendered judgment of Alexandria. One of these lots, containing half an acre, was struck off to a certain Peter Wise, at the rent of 261. per ann. current money of Virginia. Wise bid for Jacob Sly, a citizen of Maryland, who transferred the lot to Abraham Faw, to whom the same was conveyed in fee-simple, by a deed bearing date the 5th of August, 1779, in which the said ground rent of 261. per annum, current money of Virginia, was reserved. In the year 1784, Abraham Faw divided the said half acre of ground into eight smaller lots, five of which he has sold, reserving a ground rent for ever, amounting to 84/. 12s. per annum. One of these lots was conveyed by Faw to Jacob Hess, in the year 1784, at the ground rent of 257. 168. per annum, which lot has been since purchased by Philip Marsteller, the ap 1.-The counsel in this cause had not furnished the court with a statement of the points of the case, Being called upon by the court for such a stateaccording to the rule of the court, ante. vol. 1, p. xvi. ment, Swann observed that there was but a single point in the case, and therefore they had not supposed it necessary to reduce it to writing. MARSHALL, Chief Justice. The court will proceed to hear this cause without having been furnished with a statement of the points; but they wish it to be understood that they always expect such a statement. If there is only one point, it is the easier to state it. pellee, who has also purchased from the devisee | ander excited at the time very great attention, of John Alexander all his rights in, or issuing from, the half acre lot of ground conveyed to Abraham Faw. Thus Abraham Faw becomes liable to Philip Marsteller, for the rent accruing under the deed of August, 1779, who is himself liable to the said Faw for the rent accruing on part of the same lot, under the deed executed by Faw to Hess, in November, 1784. In November, 1781, the legislature of Virginia passed an act calling paper money out of circulation and also another act directing the mode for adjusting and settling contracts made in that currency. The second section of this latter act, after stating, by way of preamble, that the good people of the state would labor under many inconveniences for want of some rule, whereby to settle and adjust the payment of debts and contracts entered into, or made between the first day of January, 1777, and the first day of January, 1782, unless some rule should be by law established for liquidating and adjusting the same, 12*] so as to do justice as well to the debtor as the creditor," enacts, that from and after the passing of the act, "all debts and contracts entered into or made in the current money of this state, or the United States, excepting, at all times, contracts entered into for gold and silver coin, tobacco, or any other specific property, within the period aforesaid, now remaining due, and unfulfilled, or which may become due at any future day or days, for the payment of any sum or sums of money, shall be liquidated, settled, and adjusted agreeably to a scale of depreciation hereinafter mentioned and contained; that is to say, by reducing the amount of all such debts and contracts to the true value in specie, at the days or times the same were incurred or entered into, and upon payment of said value so found, in specie, or other money, equivalent thereto, the debtors or contractors shall be for ever discharged of and from the said debts or contracts, any law, custom or usage to the contrary, in any wise notwithstanding. The fourth section establishes the scale of depreciation which shall constitute the rule by which the value of the debts, contracts and demands, in the act mentioned, shall be ascertained; and the fifth section enacts, that where a suit shall be brought for the recovery of a debt, and it shall appear that the value thereof hath been tendered and refused; or where it shall appear that the non-payment thereof hath been owing to the creditor; or where other circumstances arise, which, in the opinion of the court, before whom the cause is brought to issue, would render a determination agreeable to the above table unjust; in either case it shall and may be lawful for the court to award such judgment as to them shall appear just and equitable. The act then empowers the court to direct at what depreciation any judgment shall be discharged on a verdict given for damages, between the first day of January, 1777, and the first day of January, 1782, having "regard to the original injury or contract on which the damages are founded, and any other proper circumstances that the nature of the case will admit. 13*] *It was proved in the cause, that the contracts made by the executors of John Alex and were the subject of general conversation. The prevailing opinion among the bidders was, that the rents would be paid in paper money so long as paper should be the circulating medium, after which they would be paid in specie. Such, too, was the opinion of Peter Wise, the purchaser of the particular lot which occasioned the existing controversy, and there is reason to suppose it was also the opinion of those who were disposing of the property; it was also thought the rent reserved was low, when considered as payable in paper, but high if to be paid in specie. It was further proved, that a lot not more valuable than that which occasioned the present contest, was sold in 1774, on a ground rent of 137. 58. per annum, for ever, and that a lot less valuable was sold in the year 1784, on a ground rent of 351. per annum. But it appeared from other parts of the testimony, that the lots which were sold in the year 1784, in Alexandria, on ground rent, were contracted for so much above the value they afterwards bore, that the lessors, in very many instances, were under the necessity of reducing the rents one half below the sum originally stipulated, and in some instances the reduction was still greater. The circuit court decreed that the rents which accrued during the existence of paper money, should be reduced according to the scale for the time when they became payable, but that the subsequent rents should be paid in specie. From this decree Faw appealed, and the case was now argued by Swann and Mason, for the appellant; and by E. J. Lee, Jones and Key, for the appellee. For the appellant, it was contended, 1. That this was a contract within the letter and spirit of the 2d section of the act of assembly of Virginia before mentioned, passed in November, 1781, c. 22, (Chancery Revision of the laws, p. 147,) and entitled, "An act directing the mode of adjusting and settling the payment of certain debts and contracts, and for other purposes;" and, therefore, *1. It was not within the 5th section of [*14 that act. 1. This is a contract made in current money of the state, within the period contemplated by the act, payable at a future day or days, for the payment of money, and is, therefore, within the very words of the 2d section of the act. This point was decided by the Court of Appeals in Virginia, in the case of Watson and Hartshorne v. Alexander, 1 Wash. 340. The object of that section was to provide for contracts in which the fact of depreciation had increased the ideal value of the consideration of the contract. It is proved in the present case, that the rent was high if payable in specie. It is, therefore, a case within the spirit as well as within the words of the section; for it is reasonable to presume that the high rent was agreed to be given in consequence of the depreciated state of the paper currency. 2. The 5th section could not mean to provide for cases which were within the spirit of the 2d; because that would be to render the latter section a mere nullity. There would be no use in fixing a scale, if the court were to make a rule according to the circumstances of each particular case. But the 5th section was intended for the ben- | was presumed to pass at the time when the obliefit of debtors only. Every case of equity gation was given, or the contract entered into; in favor of creditors was provided for by the and if entered into between certain periods, the exception in the 2d. The only two cases par- value of the consideration was supposed to have ticularly specified in the 5th section to authorize been measured by the paper medium. But the equitable interposition of the court, are, where any thing on the face of the contract where the money has been tendered and re- showed that paper money was not in contemplafused, or where the non-payment is owing to tion, then the rule was not to apply as where the creditor. In both these cases, the equity is the contract was made for gold and silver, in favor of the debtor. The act then proceeds, tobacco, or other specific thing. A contract, "or where other circumstances arise, which in therefore, in which the parties did not estimate the opinion of the court would render a de- the value of the consideration by the paper termination according to the above table unjust; medium, was not a contract within the spirit of in either case it shall be lawful for the court to the 2d section of this act of assembly. So if the award such judgment as to them shall appear parties themselves had provided for the event just and equitable." The two cases are only of the depreciation and total failure of paper put by way of example, to show the nature of money, and had regulated the price accordingly, those other circumstances which will justify the the case would be out of the spirit of the law; court in departing from the general rule. for the parties themselves had taken care to do the thing which the law supposed them to have neglected, and only for that reason provided a remedy. 15* *In the present case there are no such other circumstances as come within the intention of the legislature; nothing like the examples which they have stated. The act of assembly is founded upon the idea that every contract for the payment of current money made within the period described, is to be considered prima facie, a contract for the payment of paper money. This idea is founded in reason, because, during that period, it was almost the only circulating medium. Gold and silver were scarcely known. But if the 5th section was intended for the benefit of creditors, as well as debtors, still it authorizes the court to interfere only in cases attended with extraordinary circumstances. No such circumstances appear in the present case. It was an ordinary and a common contract, not differing from the great mass of cases which the legislature intended to subject to the operation of the scale. Hence, in the construction of this act, courts have always traced the contract up to the time when the consideration first moved from the plaintiff to the defendant, as in the case of Pleasants v. Bibb, 1 Wash. 8, where the bond was dated 1st of February, 1780, with condition to pay 1057. on or before December 17, 1781, with interest thereon from the 16th of February, 1779, and it was decided that the debt arose in February, 1779, and was to be reduced by the scale for that month. By the same reason if the debt had been stated to have accrued before January, 1777, it would not have been reduced at all, yet it would, by the tender law, have been payable in paper money during its existence, but if not actually paid or tendered *in paper during that time, it would not [*17 come within the act of assembly of 1781. Suppose a contract made in 1779, when the depreciation was twenty for one, and a bond given to pay 201. current money on delivery of a horse worth 201. current money in 1785. This is another case not within the spirit of the act. At the time when this contract was made, May, 1779, the parties could have had no idea of a scale of depreciation. It was even in a manner criminal to doubt the faith of the money. It might have appreciated until it gained the par of gold and silver. It was, therefore, natural Again, suppose a contract made in 1777, when that they should have had an expectation that the market price of wheat was 208. a bushel, the rents would at some future time be payable payable in paper money, by which A. should in specie. Such must also have been the ex-bind himself and his heirs, to deliver to B. and pectation of all those who made contracts for the payment of current money at distant future periods, and, therefore, that circumstance cannot vary this case from all others, where the money was to be paid in future. The injury arising from that expectation was the very evil which the legislature intended to guard against. Argument for the appellee. 1. This case is not within the letter or the spirit of the 2d section of the act. 2. It is within the 5th section. 1. It is not within the spirit or letter of the 2d section. 16*] *The object of the legislature was to prevent injury arising from the depreciation of paper money in cases where the contract was not made with a view to that currency, and where the parties had not guarded themselves from the effect of its depreciation. The act was not expected to do abstract justice in each case, but to fix a rule which should produce a general good effect. It was predicated upon the idea, that an equivalent ought to be paid for the consideration received. The consideration his heirs, 1,000 bushels of wheat per annum, for 1,000 years, for which B. agrees for himself and his heirs, to pay ten shillings current money of Virginia per bushel on delivery. Would this contract be within the spirit of the act? In the present case the lease creates no debt; it is only inducement. The debt arises only from the enjoyment of the property; and nil debet is a good plea, which it would not be if the debt was due by specialty. The consideration of the rent due at the end of any one year was the enjoyment for that year; and if the tenant should be evicted by a paramount title, the rent would not be recoverable. The consideration for all the rents since 1781 has accrued since the passage of the law. If the debt in 1800 arises from the enjoyment of the preceding year, is it possible to measure the value of that enjoyment by the depreciated paper of 1779? No consideration passed at the date of the deed, and no debt was then created. It is impossible to conceive that an interminable contract, when a new debt is always rising |