PREFACE. MUCH of that uncertainty of the law, which is so frequently, and perhaps so justly, the sub ject of complaint in this country, may be attributed to the want of American reports. Many of the causes, which are the subject of litigation in our courts, arise upon circumstances peculiar to our situation and laws, and little information can be derived from English authorities to lead to a correct decision. Uniformity, in such cases, cannot be expected where the judicial authority is shared among such a vast number of independent tribunals, unless the decisions of the various courts are made known to each other. Even in the same court, analogy of judgment cannot be maintained if its adjudications are suffered to be forgotten. It is therefore much to be regretted that so few of the gentlemen of the bar have been willing to undertake the task of reporting. In a government which is emphatically styled a government of laws, the least possible range ought to be left for the discretion of the judge. Whatever tends to render the laws cert in, equally tends to limit that discretion; and perhaps nothing conduces more to that object than the publication of reports. Every case decided is a check upon the judge. He cannot decide a similar case differently, without strong reasons, which, for his own justification, he will wish to make public. The avenues to corruption are thus obstructed, and the sources of litigation closed. One of the effects, expected from the establishment of a national judiciary, was the uniformity of judicial decision; an attempt, therefore, to report the cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, cannot need an apology; and perhaps none can be given for the inadequate manner in which that attempt has been executed. It has been the endeavor of the Reporter to give a faithful summary of the arguments of counsel. To do them complete justice he acknowledges himself incompetent. In no instance, perhaps, has he given the words in which the ideas were conveyed, as his attention was almost entirely occupied in collecting the point of the argument. He may have omitted ideas deemed important, and added others supposed to be impertinent; but in no case has he intentionally diminished the weight of the argument. It may possibly be alleged that he has introduced into the reports of some of the cases more of the record than was necessary. If he has erred in this, he has been led into the error by observing that many of the cases in the books are rendered useless by the want of a sufficient statement of the case as it appeared upon the record; and he imagined it would be a less fault to insert too much, than to omit anything material. He has been relieved from much anxiety, as well as responsibility, by the practice which the Court has adopted of reducing their opinion to writing, in all cases of difficulty or importance; and he tenders his tribute of acknowledgment for the readiness with which he was permitted to take copies of those opinions. He is indebted to Mr. Caldwell, for his notes of the cases which were decided prior to February term, 1803, without the assistance of which he would have been unable to report them, as his own notes of those cases, not having been taken with that view, were very imperfect. He also feels his obligation to those gentlemen of the bar, whose politeness has prompted a ready communication of their notes, which have enabled him more correctly to report their arguments. Should an apology be deemed necessary for the liberty he has taken in his notes to some of the cases reported, that apology exists in a wish candidly to investigate the truth. In doing this in a respectful manner, he does not feel conscious of giving cause of offence to liberal and candid minds. If the fate of the present volume should not prove him totally inadequate to the task he has undertaken, it is his intention to report the cases of succeeding terms. RULES AND ORDERS OF THE ATTORNEY AT LAW 490 Louisiana Ave. WASHINGTON, D, C, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. II.-1790, FEBRUARY 5. ORDERED, That (until further orders) it shall be requisite to the admission of attorneys, or counselors, to practice in this court, that they shall have been such for three years past in the Supreme Courts of the state to which they respectively belong, and that their private and professional character shall appear to be fair. III.-1790, FEBRUARY 5. ORDERED, That counselors shall not practice as attorneys, nor attorneys as counselors, in this court. IV. 1790, FEBRUARY 5. ORDERED, That they shall respectively take the following oath, viz., "I do solemnly swear, that I will demean myself (as an attorney or counselor) of the court, uprightly, and according to law, and that I will support the constitution of the United States." V.-1790, FEBRUARY 5. ORDERED, That (unless and until it shall otherwise be provided by law) all process of this court shall be in the name of the President of the United States. VI.-1791, FEBRUARY 7. ORDERED, That the counselors and attorneys, admitted to practice in this court, shall take either an oath, or, in proper cases, an affirmation, of the tenor prescribed by the rule of this court on that subject, made February term, 1790, viz. "I do solemnly swear (or affirm as the case may be) that I will demean myself, as an attorney, or counselor of this court, uprightly, and according to law, and that I will support the constitution of the United States." VII.-1791, August 8. The Chief Justice, in answer to the motion of the Attorney General, made yesterday, informs him and the bar, that this court consider the practice of the courts of king's bench, and of chancery, in England, as affording outlines for the practice of this court; and that they will, from time to time, make such alterations therein as circumstances may render necessary. VIII-1795, FEBRUARY 4. The Court gave notice to the gentlemen of the bar, that hereafter they will expect to be furnished with a statement of the material points of the case from the counsel on each side of a IX.-1795, FEBRUARY 17. The Court declared that all evidence on motions for a discharge upon bail must be by way of deposition, and not viva voce. X.-1796, AUGUST 12. out of this court in any suit in equity, shall be ORDERED, That process of subpoena issuing served on the defendant sixty days before the return day of the said process; and further, that if the defendant, on such service of the subpoena, shall not appear at the return day contained therein, the complainant shall be at liberty to proceed ex parte. .XI.-1797, FEBRUARY 13. IT IS ORDERED, by the Court, that the clerk of the court to which any writ of error shall be directed may make return of the same by transmitting a true copy of the record, and of all proceedings in the cause, under his hand and the seal of the court. XII.-1797, AUGUST 7. IT IS ORDERED, by the Court, that no record of the court be suffered by the clerk to be taken out of his office but by the consent of the court; otherwise to be responsible for it. XIII.-1800, AUGUST 15. In the case of Course v. Stead's Executors. ORDERED, That the plaintiff in error be at liberty to show to the satisfaction of this court, that the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of 2,000 dollars, exclusive of costs; this to be made appear by affidavit, on days' notice to the opposite party, or their counsel, in Georgia. Rule as to affidavits to be mutual. XIV.-1801, AUGUST 12. ORDERED, That counselors may be admitted as attorneys in this court on taking the usual XV.-1801, DECEMBER 9. oath. IT IS ORDERED, That in every cause where the defendant in error fails to appear, the plaintiff may proceed ex parte. XVI.-1803, FEBRUARY TERM. IT IS ORDERED, That where the writ of error issues within 30 days before the meeting of the i court, the defendant in error is at liberty to enter his appearance and proceed to trial: otherwise the cause must be continued. XVII.-1803, FEBRUARY TERM. In all cases where a writ of error shall delay the proceedings on the judgment of the circuit merely for delay, damages shall be awarded at court, and shall appear to have been sued out the rate of ten per centum per annum, on the amount of the judgment. XVIII-1803, FEBRUARY TERM. In such cases where there exists a real controversy, the damages shall be only at the rate of six per centum per annum. In both cases the interest is to be computed as part of the |