SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
It is ordered that the following additional rule of practice be, and the same is hereby, adopted:
Mandates shall issue as of course after the expiration of thirty days from the day the judgment or decree is entered, unless the time is enlarged by order of the court, or of a justice thereof when the court is not in session, but during the term.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.
See JURISDICTION, A, 24.
The court appoints commissioners to run the disputed boundary line in
accordance with its decision, announced May 19, 1890, 136 U. S.
479. Indiana v. Kentucky, 275.
Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 296. Rash v. Farley, 263.
See JURISDICTION, A, 3, 5;
TAXATION, 1.
CASES DISTINGUISHED.
See JURISDICTION, A, 23.
COMMON CARRIER.
See RAILROAD.
1. A license to pursue any business or occupation, from the governing
authority of any municipality or State, can only be invoked for the
protection of one in the pursuit of such business or occupation so long
as the same continues unaffected by existing or new conditions, which
it is within the constitutional power of the legislature to enact. Gray
v. Connecticut, 74.
2. The provisions in the statutes of Connecticut that a person selling or
offering for sale, or owning or keeping with intent to sell or exchange,
spirituous liquors, without having a license therefor, and that the
granting of such license to a druggist shall be discretionary with the
county commissioners, are not in conflict with any of the provisions
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. Ib.
3. When the parties have been fully heard in the regular course of judi-
cial proceedings, an erroneous decision of a state court does not de-
prive the unsuccessful party of his property without due process of
law, within the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 103.
4. The act of the legislature of Massachusetts of June 1, 1867, c. 308, to
enable the city of Boston to abate a nuisance, and for the preservation
of the public health in said city, and which provided for the taking
of certain private lands therein, and for their improvement, filling up,
and complete draining, so as to abate an existing nuisance and pre-
serve the health of the city, and which further provided for the pay-
ment of the cost of the lots so taken through judicial proceedings, was
within the constitutional power of the legislature of that State, and
the fee in said lands, when acquired by the city, passed to it under the
act, and the previous owners ceased to have any interest in them, but
were only entitled to reasonable compensation, to be ascertained in
the manner provided by the act. Sweet v. Rechel, 380.
5. It is within the power of Congress to provide, for persons convicted of
conspiracy to do a criminal act, a punishment more severe than that pro-
vided for persons committing such act. Clune v. United States, 590.
6. The provision in § 3959 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri that pris-
oners convicted two or more times of committing offences punishable
by imprisonment in the penitentiary, shall be punished with increased
severity for the later offences, does not in any way conflict with the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. Moore v. Missouri, 673.
7. A State may provide that persons who have been before convicted of
crime may suffer severer punishment for subsequent offences than for
a first offence against the law, and that a different punishment for the
same offence may be inflicted under particular circumstances, provided
it is dealt out to all alike who are similarly situated. lb.
8. No question which could be regarded as a Federal question having
been raised at his trial, the prisoner was not subjected to an unconstitu-
tional ruling in not being allowed to have his case heard at large by
seven judges, instead of by three. Ib.
See TAXATION, 3;
TOWNSHIP, 2.
The parties to these suits having had extensive dealings founded upon
mutual agreements and arrangements respecting the manufacture of
and licenses to manufacture patented articles, and having had seri-
ous. misunderstandings touching their accounts, came to an agree-
ment whereby the Thorn Company, in consideration of the sum of
$10.000 paid to it by the Washburn and Moen Company, released and
discharged the latter from all claims and demands of every kind and
nature whatsoever, which it had or could have against that company
for and on account of any moneys, properties, or valuable things
which the Washburn Company had received from any persons in
settlement for damages or profits accruing to it, on account of infringe-
ments committed upon any letters patent, and also on account of any
moneys which it had received by way of bonuses or premiums paid
to it by parties receiving licenses from it; and discharged and
released the Washburn Company from any obligation to account to
the Thorn Company for any sums which it might thereafter receive
in settlement of claims for damages for infringements prior to the
date of that agreement, or for moneys which it should thereafter
receive for bonuses or premiums for licenses. The parties worked
under this agreement for several years, the Washburn Company pay-
ing and the Thorn Company receiving, without objection, from time
to time considerable sums as royalties, etc., due thereunder, the
Washburn Company settling with parties from whom the royalties
were due, sometimes receiving cash in full, sometimes notes, and
sometimes compromising on receipt of a lesser sum. After the lapse
of about eight years the Thorn Company filed its bill in equity to set
aside the agreement and the settlements made under it, claiming that
it was entitled to a much larger sum than it had received; and the
Washburn Company in its answer denied this claim and filed a cross-
bill claiming to recover from the Thorn Company large sums which
it had been obliged to yield to licensees in compromising settlements
with them. Held, (1) That the agreement released the Washburn
Company from claims for damages due at its date, but received subse-
quent thereto, and from claims for royalties due on its own products,
or products of its licensees sold prior to its date; (2) that under the
circumstances disclosed it was not open to the Thorn Company to
claim that $10,000 was not a sufficient consideration for such release;
(3) that the Thorn Company, by receiving, for so long a period, roy-
alties as accruing and receipting for them as collected without chal-
lenging the accounts rendered, and by its delay in setting up claims
for moneys received by the Washburn Company before the date of
the agreement, and its delay in contesting settlements and compro-
mises made by that company, must be deemed to have acquiesced in
the construction put upon the contract by the Washburn Company,
and to have assented to its settlements with licensees; and that the
evidence showed no want of diligence or good faith by the latter com-
pany in this respect; (4) that the Washburn Company was not
entitled to recover the sums claimed in its cross-bill. Thorn Wire
Hedge Co. v. Washburn & Moen Manufacturing Co., 423.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
See RAILROAD.
CORPORATION.
See JURISDICTION, B;
TOWNSHIP, 1, 2.
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