Opinion of the Court. agreed upon between himself and McPherson, Cochrane's executor, as his proper compensation. In his answer, McKee denied the general employment of the complainant by the Choctaw Nation, and averred that, if he were ever employed at all, it was only to assist and advise with the authorities of said nation in regard to the negotiation of the treaty of April 28, 1866, and denied that under such treaty the claim for net proceeds was secured, or that it had been prosecuted to a successful conclusion through the provisions of such treaty. Upon a hearing upon pleadings and proofs, the case resulted in a decree for $75,000 against McKee, with the further provision that if anything were paid to the complainant Latrobe out of the fund deposited in the court by McKee in the interpleader suit, such sum should be credited in favor of McKee on the decree. Upon the following day, a decree was entered in the interpleader suit, to which Latrobe was a party defendant, awarding him his distributive share of the entire amount, $75,000, out of the general fund of $147,057.63 in controversy in that case. McKee appealed from the decree in this case. Mr. John J. Weed and Mr. Jefferson Chandler for appellant. Mr. Enoch Totten, (with whom was Mr. Reginald Fendall on the brief,) for Mrs. Latrobe. MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court. This is another one of the claims made under the trust expressed in the McKee contract, "to adjust the claims of all parties who have rendered service heretofore in the prosecution of said claim, upon the principle of equity and justice, according to the value of the services so rendered." McKee's argument in this connection is, that this was a personal agreement and obligation of himself and Blunt with the Choctaw Nation; was not for the benefit of Latrobe; vested in no one any interest in the money which might become payable under that contract; and was not an assignment or dedication of Opinion of the Court. any part of the money which they might receive from the Choctaw Nation, in consideration of the performance by them of their contract in other words, that it was a contract of indemnity, by which McKee undertook to save the Choctaw Nation harmless from any claim that should be made for services that had been theretofore rendered by other agents and attorneys. We do not so read it. A trust so plainly declared would be of no avail, if the class of persons who are described therein could not take advantage of it. It was not needed to indemnify the Choctaws, since no possible action could lie against them after the contract had been abandoned by Black. It was evidently intended to satisfy any moral obligation for services which had been performed, but not completed, and to throw the burden of adjusting and paying them upon McKee. His theory, too, is inconsistent with his repeated statements to leading members of the Choctaw council, whose affidavits, received in the place of depositions, show that he declared to the leading authorities of the nation that he considered himself obligated under his contract to pay all outstanding obligations to persons for the services rendered in the prosecution of the claim prior to his own contract. In addition to that, and in corroboration of his own statements, he exhibited a letter written by his own attorney, and by his direction, to Leflore, in which he stated that "so far as I know, or have ever heard, every lawyer who has ever rendered service, or pretends to have rendered service, in regard to the net proceeds claim expects to get his pay out of the thirty per cent, and to get it through McKee. For myself, I expect to be paid by Mr. McKee out of his thirty per cent. I have no claim against the Choctaw Nation if Mr. McKee's thirty per cent is paid, even if he should not pay me, but of this I have not the slightest doubt. McKee's contract requires him to stand between the Choctaws and their attorneys who have rendered service. He would be liable to suit in the courts, here and elsewhere, wherever he could be found, if he should neglect or fail to carry out his agreement with the Choctaws to settle and adjust the claims of other attorneys, who have rendered ser Opinion of the Court. vice, upon principles of equity and justice. The Choctaws would not be liable to any such suit anywhere." Here follows a list of parties who had rendered service in the prosecution of the claim, among which is the name of John H. B. Latrobe, with the statement that "he looks to Mr. McPherson, executor of Mr. Cochrane, for his fee. Whatever sum Mr. Latrobe or Mr. Cochrane gets, comes out of McKee's thirty per cent." McKee's prompt repudiation of this promise, and his vigorous defence to all these claims, argues either a serious impairment of memory with reference to the transaction, or a deliberately dishonest purpose. The services of Mr. Latrobe in this connection seem to have had their origin in a visit made by the Choctaw delegation on their way to Washington, at Latrobe's residence in Baltimore. It seems they expressed to him the fear that all their treaties with the government had been abrogated by the war that had just ended; that he expressed some doubt upon the point, said he would look into the matter, and a short time afterwards called upon the delegation and told them that he had made up his mind that their treaties had not been abrogated by the war; that the right had been given to the President to abrogate them by proclamation, and that he had not done so; that the occasion had passed, and that the treaties were still in force. The value of his services was subsequently agreed upon by McPherson, executor of Cochrane's estate, and fixed at $75,000. This was the value put upon them by the court below, and we see no occasion to disturb it. The decree of the court below is, therefore, Affirmed. Statement of the Case. MCCORMICK v. HAYES. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IOWA. No. 87. Argued March 27, 28, 1895. - Decided October 21, 1895. In an action in which the plaintiff claims title under the act of September 28, 1850, c. 84, 9 Stat. 519, granting to the several States the swamp and overflowed lands in each unfit for cultivation, and the defendant claims title under the act of May 15, 1856, c. 28, 11 Stat. 9, making a grant of lands to the State of Iowa to aid in the construction of railroads, parol evidence is inadmissible to show, in opposition to the concurrent action of Federal and state officers having authority in the premises, that the lands in controversy were, in fact, at the date of the act of 1850, swamp and overflowed ground. THIS writ of error brought up a judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa, which affirmed a judgment of the District Court of Linn County in that State, declaring the defendant in error, who was the plaintiff in the suit, to be the owner of the southwest quarter of the northwest quarter of section nineteen, township eighty-five, range eight, west of the fifth principal meridian. It was assigned as error that the judgment of the state court deprived the defendant of rights secured to him under the laws of the United States. The plaintiff Hayes claimed title under the Swamp Land act of Congress of September 28, 1850, 9 Stat. 519, c. 84 ; the defendant, under an act of Congress, approved May 15, 1856, (and the acts amendatory thereof,) granting lands to the State of Iowa in aid of the construction of certain railroads. 11 Stat. 9, c. 28. The question of title cannot be fully understood without examining various enactments, Federal and state, under which the parties respectively claim the lands in dispute, as well as some of the decisions of this court. This court felt, it said, the more disposed to enter upon this examination because of the statement by counsel in argument that many cases in the Statement of the Case. Supreme Court of the State depend, in whole or in part, on the determination of the questions involved in this suit. By the Swamp Land act of 1850 Congress granted to Arkansas, to enable it to construct the necessary levees and drains for reclaiming the swamp and overflowed lands within that State, the whole of such lands made "unfit thereby for cultivation." § 1. The act made it the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to make out, as soon as practicable after its passage, an accurate list and plats of those lands, and transmit it to the governor of the State, and, at the request of the latter, to cause a patent to be issued to the State therefor. "On that patent," the act declared, "the fee simple to said lands shall vest in the said State of Arkansas, subject to the disposal of the legislature thereof." § 2. The required list and plats, it was provided, should include all legal subdivisions, the greater part of which were wet and unfit for cultivation, and exclude each subdivision the greater part of which was not of that character. § 3. The provisions of the act were extended to and their benefits conferred upon each State in which swamp and overflowed lands were situated. § 4. The legislature of Iowa authorized the commissioner of the State Land Office to provide the proofs necessary to secure those lands to the State. Laws of Iowa, 1850, 1851, 169, c. 69. By a subsequent statute of the State, approved January 13, 1853, all the swamp and overflowed lands granted to Iowa were granted to the counties respectively in which they were situated, for the purpose of constructing the necessary levees and drains for reclaiming the same. If it appeared that any of such lands had been sold by the United States after the passage of the act of 1850, the counties in which they lay were authorized to convey to the purchasers-the county court taking from the purchaser an assignment of all his rights in the premises, with authority to receive from the United States the purchase money. Where a county surveyor had made no examination and report of swamp lands within his county, in compliance with instructions from the governor, the county court was directed to appoint a competent person with authority to examine such lands, and make reports and plats to the |