obligation, on the one Opinion of the Court. hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws. Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, treating of the question in what department of the government of any State, in the absence of any clear declaration of the sovereign will, resides the authority to determine how far the laws of a foreign State shall have effect, and observing that this differs in different States, according to the organization of the departments of the government of each, says: "In England and America, the courts of justice have hitherto exercised the same authority in the most ample manner: and the legislatures have in no instance (it is believed) in either country interfered to provide any positive regulations. The common law of both countries has been expanded to meet the exigencies of the times as they have arisen; and so far as the practice of nations, or the jus gentium privatum, has been supposed to furnish any general principle, it has been followed out." Story's Conflict of Laws, $ 23, 24. Afterwards, speaking of the difficulty of applying the positive rules laid down by the Continental jurists, he says that "there is indeed great truth" in these remarks of Mr. Justice Porter, speaking for the Supreme Court of Louisiana: "They have attempted to go too far, to define and fix that which cannot, in the nature of things, be defined and fixed. They seem to have forgotten that they wrote on a question which touched the comity of nations, and that that comity is, and ever must be, uncertain; that it must necessarily depend on a variety of circumstances which cannot be reduced to any certain rule; that no nation will suffer the laws of another to interfere with her own to the injury of her citizens; that whether they do or not must depend on the condition of the country in which the foreign law is sought to be enforced, the particular nature of her legislation, her policy, and the char Opinion of the Court. acter of her institutions; that in the conflict of laws it must often be a inatter of doubt which should prevail; and that, whenever a doubt does exist, the court, which decides, will prefer the laws of its own country to that of the stranger." Story's Conflict of Laws, § 28; Saul v. His Creditors, (1827) 5 Martin (N. S.) 569, 596. Again: Mr. Justice Story says: "It has been thought by some jurists that the term comity is not sufficiently expressive of the obligation of nations to give effect to foreign laws when they are not prejudicial to their own rights and interests. And it has been suggested that the doctrine rests on a deeper foundation; that it is not so much a matter of comity or courtesy, as a matter of paramount moral duty. Now, assuming that such a moral duty does exist, it is clearly one of imperfect obligation, like that of beneficence, humanity and charity. Every nation must be the final judge for itself, not only of the nature and extent of the duty, but of the occasions on which its exercise may be justly demanded." And, after further discussion of the matter, he concludes: "There is then not only no impropriety in the use of the phrase 'comity of nations,' but it is the most appropriate phrase to express the true foundation and extent of the obligation of the laws of one nation within the territories of another." Story's Conflict of Laws, §§ 33-38. Chief Justice Taney, likewise, speaking for this court while Mr. Justice Story was a member of it, and largely adopting his words, said: "It is needless to enumerate here the instances in which, by the general practice of civilized countries, the laws of the one will, by the comity of nations, be recognized and executed in another, where the rights of individuals are concerned." "The comity thus extended to other nations is no impeachment of sovereignty. It is the voluntary act of the nation by which it is offered, and is inadmissible when contrary to its policy, or prejudicial to its interests. But it contributes so largely to promote justice between individuals, and to produce a friendly intercourse between the sovereignties to which they belong, that courts of justice have continually acted upon it, as a part of the voluntary law of nations." "It is not the comity of the courts, but the comity Opinion of the Court. of the nation, which is administered and ascertained in the same way, and guided by the same reasoning, by which all other principles of municipal law are ascertained and guided." Bank of Augusta v. Earle, (1839) 13 Pet. 519, 589; Story's Conflict of Laws, § 38. Mr. Wheaton says: "All the effect, which foreign laws can have in the territory of a State, depends absolutely on the express or tacit consent of that State." "The express consent of a State, to the application of foreign laws within its territory, is given by acts passed by its legislative authority, or by treaties concluded with other States. Its tacit consent is manifested by the decisions of its judicial and administrative authorities, as well as by the writings of its publicists. There is no obligation, recognized by legislators, public authorities, and publicists, to regard foreign laws; but their application is admitted, only from considerations of utility and the mutual convenience of States - ex comitate, ob reciprocam utilitatem." Wheaton's International Law, (8th ed.) §§ 78, 79. "No sovereign is bound, unless by special compact, to execute within his dominions a judgment rendered by the tribunals of another State; and if execution be sought by suit upon the judgment, or otherwise, the tribunal in which the suit is brought, or from which execution is sought, is, on principle, at liberty to examine into the merits of such judgment, and to give effect to it or not, as may be found just and equitable. The general comity, utility and convenience of nations have, however, established a usage among most civilized States, by which the final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally carried into execution, under certain regulations and restrictions, which differ in different countries." § 147. Chancellor Kent says: "The effect to be given to foreign judgments is altogether a matter of comity, in cases where it is not regulated by treaty." 2 Kent Com. (6th ed.) 120. In order to appreciate the weight of the various authorities cited at the bar, it is important to distinguish different kinds of judgments. Every foreign judgment, of whatever nature, in order to be entitled to any effect, must have been rendered Opinion of the Court. by a court having jurisdiction of the cause, and upon regular proceedings and due notice. In alluding to different kinds of judgments, therefore, such jurisdiction, proceedings and notice will be assumed. It will also be assumed that they are untainted by fraud, the effect of which will be considered later. A judgment in rem, adjudicating the title to a ship or other movable property within the custody of the court, is treated as valid everywhere. As said by Chief Justice Marshall: "The sentence of a competent court, proceeding in rem, is conclusive with respect to the thing itself, and operates as an absolute change of the property. By such sentence, the right of the former owner is lost, and a complete title given to the person who claims under the decree. No court of coördinate jurisdiction can examine the sentence. The question, therefore, respecting its conformity to general or municipal law can never arise, for no coördinate tribunal is capable of making the inquiry." Williams v. Armroyd, 7 Cranch, 423, 432. The most common illustrations of this are decrees of courts of admiralty and prize, which proceed upon principles of international law. Croudson v. Leonard, 4 Cranch, 434; Williams v. Armroyd, above cited; Ludlow v. Dale, 1 Johns. Cas. 16. But the same rule applies to judgments in rem under municipal law. Hudson v. Guestier, 4 Cranch, 293; Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400, 430; Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 291; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, 46; Castrique v. Imrie, L. R. 4 H. L. 414; Monroe v. Douglas, 4 Sandf. Ch. 126. A judgment affecting the status of persons, such as a decree confirming or dissolving a marriage, is recognized as valid in every country, unless contrary to the policy of its own law. Cottington's case, 2 Swanston, 326; Roach v. Garvan, 1 Ves. Sen. 157; Harvey v. Farnie, 8 App. Cas. 43; Cheely v. Clayton, 110 U. S. 701. It was of a foreign sentence of divorce, that Lord Chancellor Nottingham, in the House of Lords, in 1688, in Cottington's case, above cited, said: "It is against the law of nations not to give credit to the judgments and sentences of foreign countries, till they be reversed by the law, Opinion of the Court. and according to the form, of those countries wherein they were given. For what right hath one kingdom to reverse the judgment of another? And how can we refuse to let a sentence take place till it be reversed? And what confusion would follow in Christendom, if they should serve us so abroad, and give no credit to our sentences." Other judgments, not strictly in rem, under which a person has been compelled to pay money, are so far conclusive that the justice of the payment cannot be impeached in another country, so as to compel him to pay it again. For instance, a judgment in foreign attachment is conclusive, as between the parties, of the right to the property or money attached. Story on Conflict of Laws, (2d ed.) § 592 a. And if, on the dissolution of a partnership, one partner promises to indemnify the other against the debts of the partnership, a judgment for such a debt, under which the latter has been compelled to pay it, is conclusive evidence of the debt in a suit by him to recover the amount upon the promise of indemnity. It was of such a judgment, and in such a suit, that Lord Nottingham said: "Let the plaintiff receive back so much of the money brought into court as may be adequate to the sum paid on the sentence for custom, the justice whereof is not examinable here." Gold v. Canham, (1689) 2 Swanston, 325; S. C. 1 Cas. in Ch. 311. See also Tarleton v. Tarleton, 4 M. & S. 20; Konitzky v. Meyer, 49 N. Y. 571. Other foreign judgments which have been held conclusive of the matter adjudged were judgments discharging obligations contracted in the foreign country between citizens or residents thereof. Story's Conflict of Laws, §§ 330-341; May v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15. Such was the case, cited at the bar, of Burroughs or Burrows v. Jamineau or Jemino, Mosely, 1 ; S. C. 2 Stra. 733; 2 Eq. Cas. Ab. 525, pl. 7; 12 Vin. Ab. 87, pl. 9; Sel. Cas. in Ch. 69; 1 Dickens, 48. In that case, bills of exchange, drawn in London, were negotiated, indorsed and accepted at Leghorn in Italy, by the law of which an acceptance became void if the drawer failed -without leaving effects in the acceptor's hands. The acceptor, accordingly, having received advices that the drawer had failed |