SECTION III. CONSIDERATION. It is the general practice in bills and notes to insert the words "value received," but they are not material (a). Every bill and note is presumed to be honest in its inception and course, and an adequate consideration is always presumed, whether expressed or not (b). In order, therefore, to impeach the plaintiff's title, on the ground of want of consideration, it is incumbent on the defendant to prove that there was no consideration for the bill, either to himself or to any of the parties between him and the plaintiff. Where there is no fraud, nor any suspicion of fraud, but the simple fact is that the defendant received no consideration for his acceptance, then it is for the defendant to prove that he had no value for the bill. But where the bill is connected with some fraud, or a suspicion of fraud be raised from its being shown that something has been done with it of an illegal nature, or that it has been clandestinely taken away, or has been lost or stolen, then the holder must show that he gave value for it, and the onus probandi is cast upon the plaintiff (c). As between the immediate parties, that is, between the acceptor and drawer, the drawer and payee, and payee and indorsee, want of consideration is a good defence to an action on a bill or note, a valuable and sufficient consideration being necessary to support every contract (d). So where the drawee has accepted the bill or note for accommodation of the drawer he cannot recover upon it (e). But as between the parties and third persons holding the bill or note for value, no evidence of want of consideration or other grounds is admitted to impeach the apparent value received (ƒ). (a) The words "value received" im- (b) White v. Ledwick, 4 Doug. 247; (c) Mills v. Barber, 1 M. & W. 425; Hall v. Featherstone, 3 H. & N. 286. (d) Jackson v. Warwick, 7 T. R. 121; Barber v. Backhouse, Peake, 61; Knight v. Hunt, 5 Bing. 432. (e) Thomas v. Fenton, 2 C. B. 68; Crofts v. Beale, lì C. B. 172; Kearns v. Durell, 6 C. B. 596. (f) Collins v. Martin, 1 B. & P. 651; Masters v. Ibberson, 8 C. B. 100; Robinson v. Reynolds, 2 Q. B. 196; Bramah v. Roberts, 3 Bing. N. C. 963. A total failure of the consideration where the party has been deprived entirely of all benefit of the thing for which the bill was given would also constitute a valid defence as between the parties (a). total failure of When the consideration given was only partial, there will be Partial or a want of consideration for the surplus; provided the quantum consideration to be deducted on that account be liquidated and in the nature of a certain debt (b). Where, however, there is a failure of consideration, it furnishes only a distinct and independent cause of action. So in an action on a bill of exchange accepted for the price of goods, the defendant cannot give in evidence that the goods were of a bad quality, but is driven to a cross action (c). A considera consideration. A consideration is either a direct advantage granted by the What is a good drawer or payee to the drawee or maker of the bill or note, or to a third person by his desire, for some detriment, loss, responsibility, or service sustained by the drawer or payee for the sake or at the instance of the drawee or maker. tion must be valuable, legal, and sufficient. A consideration founded on natural affection, or mere love or gratitude, would not be a sufficient consideration to support a bill or note (d). Forbearance, or an agreement to suspend a judgment of a just debt; and even forbearance of a debt due by a third person would be a sufficient consideration (e). Future services may be be a contract for such a valid consideration, provided there Moral con And though mere moral consideration would not be sufficient (g), a pre-existing debt, even where the debt is barred by sideration not (a) Stephen v. Wilkinson, 2 B. & Ad. 326. (b) Moggridge v. Jones, 14 East, 486; Spiller v. Westlake, 2 B. & Ad. 155; Mann v. Lent, 10 B. & C. 877. (c) Tye v. Gwynne, 2 Camp. 347; Solomons v. Turner, 1 Stark. 51; Morgan v. Richardson, 7 East, 482; Fleming v. Simpson, 1 Camp. 40; Sully v. Frean, 10 Exch. 535; Trikey v. Larne, 6 M. & W. 278; Jones v. Jones, 9 M. & W. 84; Warwick v. Nairn, 10 Exch. 762. (d) Holliday v. Atkinson, 5 B. & C. 501; Fisk v. Cox, 18 John, U. S. R. (e) Baker v. Walker, 14 M. & W. (f) Hulse v. Hulse, 17 C. B. 711. sufficient. Illegal consideration, Bill illegal if granted under duress. the statute of limitation (a), a debt incurred during infancy when the bill or note is accepted after full age (b), and the debt of another person for a bill payable at a future day, would support a bill or note (c). A consideration is illegal if it violates the rules of religion or of morality, and if in contravention of public policy or in violation of law. Immoral considerations are prostitution (d), future illicit cohabitation (e), or sale or publication of libellous and indecent prints or pictures. Illegal considerations are contracts for general restraint of trade (f), restraint of marriage (g), marriage brokerage (h), evasion of the revenue (i); impeding or traversing the course of justice (k), sale of public offices (1), gaming (m), and gaming policies on ships or lives (n). A bill or note would be void if granted under duress, fraud, or imposition, or whilst the drawee or maker was intoxicated (0). SECTION IV. CUSTOMARY CLAUSES IN FOREIGN BILLS. A bill of exchange is often drawn on account of a third person, with the expressions, " valeur en compte avec M. P.," or "laquelle somme vous payerez au compte de M. P.;" but in such cases the party for whose benefit or account the bill is drawn acquires no direct liability on the bill, though he may be bound to (a) Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peter Am., R. 1; Hyeling v. Hastings, 1 Ld. Raym. 389; Dean v. Crane, 6 Mod. 309; Quantock v. England, 5 Burr. 2630. (b) Stevens v. Jackson, 6 Taunt. 106; Harrison v. Clifton, 17 L. J. Exch. 233; Harrison v. Cotgreave, 4 C. B. 562; Roberts v. Bethell, 12 C. B. 71. (c) Popplewell v. Wilson, 1 Stra. 264. (d) Girardy v. Richardson, 1 Esp. 13. () Binnington v. Wallis, 4 B. & Ald. 651; Gibson v. Dickie, 3 M. & S. 463; Beaumont v. Reeve, 8 Q. B. 483. (f) Tallis v. Tallis, 1 E. & B. 391; Price v. Green, 16 M. & W. 346. (g) Lowe v. Peers, 4 Burr. 2225; Baker v. White, 2 Vern. 215; Hartley v. Rice, 10 East, 22. (h) Hall v. Potter, 3 Lev. 411; Roberts v. Roberts, 3 P. Wms. 66. (2) Nerot v. Wallace, 3 T. R. 17; Fallowes v. Taylor, 7 T. R. 475; Edgecombe v. Rodd, 3 East, 294. (k) Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229. (1) Willison v. Patteson, 7 Taunt. 440; 5 & 6 Ed. 6, c. 19; 49 Geo. 3, c. 126; 53 Geo. 3, c. 129. (m) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 17; Parsons v. Alexander, 5 E. & B. 263. (n) 19 Geo. 2, c. 37; 14 Geo. 3, c. 48. (0) Duncan v. Scott, 1 Camp. 100; Rees v. Marquis of Headfort, 2 Camp. 574; Pitt v. Smith, 3 Camp. 33; Gregory v. Fraser, 3 Camp. 454. are indemnify the drawer for the liability incurred on his behalf (a). " SECTION V. ALTERATIONS IN BILLS AND NOTES. alteration Any material alteration on a bill or note after it is issued, as A material in the date, sum, or time of payment, vitiates the instrument, vitiates the inexcept as against the parties consenting to the alteration (b). strument. Thus, altering the word "date" into "sight" (c), or changing the place of payment (d), or adding "and interest at 6 per cent." (e), are sufficient to invalidate a bill or note. So if a joint note be altered into a joint and several, any of the makers objecting, would be discharged, even if the other party consented to the alteration (f). alteration renders the new bill. Any material alteration made on a bill or note after it is A material issued, although with the consent of the parties, makes it a new bill or note, requiring a new stamp, though no fresh stamp could instrument a be imposed on it. But that such alteration may vitiate the bill under the Stamp Acts, the bill must be complete and ready to pass into the hands of other parties and available for exchange. When the alteration is immaterial, as where it consists merely in the correction of a mistake, or in furtherance of the apparent intention of the parties, the bill or note will not be invalidated either at common law or under the Stamp (a) Nouguier, Traité des Lettres de Change, p. 178. (b) Master v. Miller, 4 T. R. 320; Davison v. Cooper, 13 M. & W. 343; Outhwaite v. Luntley, 4 Camp. 179; Walton v. Hasting, 4 Camp. 223; Trapp v. Spearman, 3 Esp. 57. (c) Long v. Moore, 3 Esp. 155, 1 Taunt. 20. (d) Cowie v. Halsall, 4 B. & Ald. 197; M'Kintosh v. Haydon, Ry. & (e) Warrington v. Easley, 2 E. & P. (f) Perring v. Hone, 4 Bing. 28; Nicholson v. Revill, 4 A. & E. 675. An immaterial alteration does not invalidate the contract. Acts (a). Thus, changing the words "twenty pound" into "twenty pounds," or inserting the words "or order," if omitted by mistake, are immaterial alterations, not avoiding the bill or note. SECTION VI. IRREVOCABILITY OF BILLS. A bill of exchange once issued cannot be revoked. The engagement of the drawer is absolute and irrevocable, and he is not excused from the nonperformance of it unless prohibited by the laws of this country. No hindrance interposed to the drawee for the payment of the bill would absolve the drawer from the liabilities arising from the bill (b). All persons may be parties to bills. Infants. SECTION VII. BRITISH LAW. PARTIES TO BILLS AND NOTES. All persons capable of contracting, and not legally disqualified, may be parties to bills and notes. An infant or a person under twenty-one years of age cannot bind himself by bill or note even for necessaries (c). If, however, he accepts a bill after he becomes of age, he would be liable, though the bill was drawn when he was an infant (d). A bill or note made by an infant during his infancy may be ratified when he becomes of age, but such ratification must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged thereon (e). If one of two partners is an infant, the holder of a bill accepted by both partners may declare on it as accepted by the adult only (a) Kershaw v. Cox, 3 Esp. 246; (b) Mellish v. Simeon, 2 H. Bl. 378; (c) Harrison v. Cotgreave, 5 D. & L. 159; 4 C. B. 562; Roberts v. Bethell, 12 C. B. 778; Williamson v. Watts, 1 Camp. 552. (d) Stevens v. Jackson, 4 Camp. 164; Harrison v. Cliften, 17 L. J. Ex. 233. (e) 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, s. 15. |