records and identification [(CX 14 at 4, item 7, III, items 45, 46)]; food was not stored and refrigerated properly [(CX 14 at 2, item 7, III, item 13)]; an animal barn was not properly ventilated [(CX 14 at 3, item 7, III, item 15)]; polar bears did not have adequate space or water [(CX 14 at 3, item 7, III, items 29, 35)]; trash was scattered around the facility [(CX 14 at 3, item 7, III, item 37)]; the llama enclosure had an excessive accumulation of feces [(CX 14 at 4, item 7, IV, item 36(3); backed-up waste material was in the tiger cage due to a clogged drain (CX 14 at 2, item 7, III, item 14);] and water was not properly drained [(CX 14 at 3, item 7, III, item 24)]. 5. On January 25 [and 26], 1996, Respondents failed to allow an inspection of a quonset hut called "site 2" or the "Hunters Ridge Property[,]" where animals destined for the Noah's Ark Zoo were located [(CX 13 at 2, item 7, III, item 51: January 25, 1996; Tr. 314-15: January 26, 1996)]. 6. Since January 17, 1996, Respondents have not shown or exhibited animals. Conclusions of Law 1. On January 17, . . . January 25, [and January 26,] 1996, Respondents [failed] to allow APHIS [officials] to inspect their animals[, records,] and facilities, in [willful] violation of section 16 of the Animal Welfare Act (7 U.S.C. § 2146) and section 2.126 of the Regulations (9 C.F.R. § 2.126). 2. On January 25, 1996, Respondents failed [both properly to identify animals and properly] to maintain records, in [willful] violation of sections 10 and 11 of the Animal Welfare Act (7 U.S.C. §§ 2140, 2141) and sections 2.50 and 2.75 of the Regulations (9 C.F.R. §§ 2.50, .75). 3. On January 25, 1996, Respondents failed to provide adequate veterinary care, in [willful] violation of section 2.40 of the Regulations (9 C.F.R. § 2.40). 4. On January 25, 1996, Respondents did not provide for the adequate removal of animal wastes, in [willful] violation of section 3.125(d) of the Standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.125(d)). 5. On January 25, 1996, Respondents failed to properly store and refrigerate food items, in [willful] violation of sections 3.1(e) and 3.125(c) of the Standards (9 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(e), .125(c)). 6. On January 25, 1996, Respondents failed to provide adequate ventilation, in [willful] violation of section 3.126(b) of the Standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.126(b)). 7. On January 25, 1996, Respondents [failed to] provide for the adequate elimination of excess water, in [willful] violation of section 3.127(c) of the Standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.127(c)). 8. On January 25, 1996, Respondents [failed to] provide adequate space [and 57 Agric. Dec. 980 water] for polar bears, in [willful] violation of section 3.104[(a) and (e)] of the Standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.104[(a), (e)]). 9. On January 25, 1996, Respondents did not keep the area clean[, in good repair,] and free of accumulations of trash, in [willful] violation of section 3.131(c) [of the Standards] (9 C.F.R. § 3.131(c)). [10. On January 25, 1996, Respondents did not keep primary enclosures clean, in willful violation of sections 3.107(a)(1) and 3.131(a) of the Standards (9 C.F.R. §§ 3.107(a)(1), .131(a))]. ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS BY THE JUDICIAL OFFICER The proponent of an order has the burden of proof in proceedings conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 556(d)), and the standard of proof by which the burden of persuasion is met is the preponderance of the evidence standard." The standard of proof in administrative proceedings conducted under the Animal Welfare Act is preponderance of the evidence. Complainant made a list of the violations alleged in the Complaint, reproduced below; I matched 'Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387-92 (1983); Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 92-104 (1981). "In re Marilyn Shepherd, 57 Agric. Dec. 242, 272 (1998); In re John D. Davenport, 57 Agric. Dec. 189, 223 (1998), appeal docketed, No. 98-60463 (5th Cir. July 23, 1998); In re C.C. Baird, 57 Agric. Dec. 127, 149 (1998); In re Peter A. Lang, 57 Agric. Dec. 59, 72 n.3 (1998), appeal docketed, No. 9870807 (9th Cir. July 10, 1998); In re Samuel Zimmerman, 56 Agric. Dec. 1419, 1455-56 n.7 (1997), appeal docketed, No. 98-3100 (3d Cir. Feb. 19, 1998); In re Fred Hodgins, 56 Agric. Dec. 1242, 124647 n.*** (1997), appeal docketed, No. 97-3899 (6th Cir. Aug. 12, 1997); In re David M. Zimmerman, 56 Agric. Dec. 433, 461 (1997), aff'd, No. 97-3414 (3d Cir. May 26, 1998) (unpublished); In re Volpe Vito, Inc., 56 Agric. Dec. 166, 169 n.4 (1997), appeal docketed, No. 97-3603 (6th Cir. June 13, 1997); In re Big Bear Farm, Inc., 55 Agric. Dec. 107, 109 n.3 (1996); In re Julian J. Toney, 54 Agric. Dec. 923, 971 (1995), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 101 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir. 1996); In re Otto Berosini, 54 Agric. Dec. 886, 912 (1995); In re Micheal McCall, 52 Agric. Dec. 986, 1010 (1993); In re Ronnie Faircloth, 52 Agric. Dec. 171, 175 (1993), appeal dismissed, 16 F.3d 409, 1994 WL 32793 (4th Cir. 1994), printed in 53 Agric. Dec. 78 (1994); In re Craig Lesser, 52 Agric. Dec. 155, 166 (1993), aff'd, 34 F.3d 1301 (7th Cir. 1994); In re Pet Paradise, Inc., 51 Agric. Dec. 1047, 1066-67 (1992), aff'd, 61 F.3d 907, 1995 WL 309637 (7th Cir. 1995) (not to be cited per 7th Circuit Rule 53(b)(2)); In re Terry Lee Harrison, 51 Agric. Dec. 234, 238 (1992); In re Gus White, III, 49 Agric. Dec. 123, 153 (1990); In re E. Lee Cox, 49 Agric. Dec. 115, 121 (1990), aff'd, 925 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir.), reprinted in 50 Agric. Dec. 14 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 860 (1991); In re Zoological Consortium of Maryland, Inc., 47 Agric. Dec. 1276, 1283-84 (1988); In re David Sabo, 47 Agric. Dec. 549, 553 (1988); In re Gentle Jungle, Inc., 45 Agric. Dec. 135, 146-47 (1986); In re JoEtta L. Anesi, 44 Agric. Dec. 1840, 1848 n.2 (1985), appeal dismissed, 786 F.2d 1168 (8th Cir.) (Table), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986). the paragraph numbers in the Complaint to Complainant's enumeration for ease of location, as follows: The number of the violations [alleged] in the [C]omplaint [is] 21. Those [alleged] violations are as follows: 1 violation of 9 C.F.R. § 2.40 [¶ IV(B)]. 1 violation of 9 C.F.R. § 2.50 [¶ IV(D)]. 1 violation of 9 C.F.R. § 3.1(e) [¶ IV(E)(2)]. Complainant's Brief at 26 n.20. An examination of the record reveals that the ALJ found that Complainant proved 15 of the 21 alleged violations: paragraphs IV(A), IV(B), IV(C), IV(D), 57 Agric. Dec. 980 IV(E)(1), IV(E)(2),’IV(E)(3), IV(E)(4), IV(E)(5),3 IV(E)(6), IV(E)(7), IV(E)(8),1o and V of the Complaint. I agree with the ALJ that Complainant proved the violations alleged in paragraphs IV and V of the Complaint, except the violation of 9 C.F.R. § 3.101(d), 'Paragraph IV(E)(2) of the Complaint alleges that Respondents violated sections 3.1(e), 3.101(d), and 3.125(c) of the Standards (9 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(e), .101(d), .125(c)). The ALJ concluded that Respondents violated 9 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(e) and 3.125(c), but did not violate 9 C.F.R. § 3.101(d) (Initial Decision and Order at 23). I agree with the ALJ's conclusion that Respondents violated 9 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(e) and 3.125(c), but did not violate 9 C.F.R. § 3.101(d). Paragraph IV(E)(5) of the Complaint alleges that Respondents failed to provide adequate space for polar bears, in violation of section 3.104(a) of the Standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.104(a)). The ALJ concluded that Respondents did not provide adequate space for polar bears, but concluded that the failure to provide adequate space for polar bears constitutes a violation of 9 C.F.R. § 3.104(e) (Initial Decision and Order at 24). I agree with the ALJ's conclusion that Respondents failed to provide adequate space for polar bears, but conclude that Respondents violated 9 C.F.R. § 3.104(a) and (e). 'Paragraph IV(E)(6) of the Complaint alleges that polar bears were not provided with adequate water on a continuing basis, in violation of section 3.106 of the Standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.106). However, 9 C.F.R. § 3.106 concerns water quality, and it appears that the reference to 9 C.F.R. § 3.106 in paragraph IV(E)(6) of the Complaint is error. The ALJ found in his discussion that Respondents failed to provide polar bears with adequate water and that this failure "did not meet the requirements of section 3.104(e)" (Initial Decision and Order at 17-18). Further, the ALJ found in the Findings of Fact that polar bears did not have adequate water (Initial Decision and Order at 22). However, the ALJ did not conclude that the Respondents' failure to provide polar bears with adequate water constitutes a violation of 9 C.F.R. § 3.104(e). Instead, the ALJ concluded that Respondents did not provide adequate space for polar bears, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 3.104(e) (Initial Decision and Order at 24). I find that the ALJ's failure to include a reference to Respondents' failure to provide adequate water to polar bears in his Conclusions of Law was inadvertent error. I agree with the ALJ's finding that Respondents did not provide polar bears with adequate water, and I conclude that Respondents failed to provide adequate water to polar bears, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 3.104(a) and (e). 10Paragraph IV(E)(8) of the Complaint alleges that primary enclosures were not kept clean and sanitized, in violation of sections 3.107(a)(1) and 3.131(a) and (b) of the Standards (9 C.F.R. §§ 3.107(a)(1), .131(a)-(b)). The ALJ found in his discussion that Respondents' "failure to keep the facility clean of standing water, excessive trash and animal wastes constitutes a violation of 3.125(d), 3.131(a), (b) and (c), 3.107(a) and 3.127(c)" (Initial Decision and Order at 18). Further, the ALJ found in the Findings of Fact that "the llama enclosure had an excessive accumulation of feces" (Initial Decision and Order at 23). However, the ALJ did not include in his Conclusions of Law a conclusion that Respondents failed to keep primary enclosures clean and sanitized, as alleged in paragraph IV(E)(8) of the Complaint. I find that the ALJ's failure to include a reference to Respondents' failure to keep primary enclosures clean was inadvertent error. I agree with the ALJ's finding that Respondents violated 9 C.F.R. §§ 3.107(a) and 3.131(a) and have included references to those violations in the Conclusions of Law. by a preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, neither Respondents nor Complainant appealed the ALJ's findings of the violations alleged in paragraphs IV and V of the Complaint, and Complainant did not appeal the violation of 9 C.F.R. § 3.101(d) alleged in paragraph IV(E)(2) of the Complaint not found by the ALJ. Therefore, the ALJ is affirmed as to his findings in paragraphs IV and V of the Complaint. Regarding paragraph II of the Complaint, at almost the end of the hearing, the ALJ granted Complainant's motion to conform the Complaint to the evidence presented, to the effect that Stanley Curtis and John Curtis are charged "with operating without a license from January 1, 1993 through the present" (Tr. 626-29). Stanley Curtis and John Curtis are already named Respondents in paragraph II of the Complaint. It is not entirely clear why Richard Lawson is not included in the expanded time period sought in Complainant's motion to amend the Complaint, but Complainant sought only charges against Stanley Curtis and John Curtis. The motion, as granted, changes the period of time covered from February 1, 1996, through May 6, 1996, to the period from January 1, 1993, to the day of the hearing motion on September 17, 1997. For reasons explained in this Decision and Order, infra, I find that Complainant did not prove the allegation in paragraph II of the Complaint or the Amended Complaint. Since the ALJ found no violation as alleged in paragraph II of the Complaint, his conclusion is not disturbed. Regarding paragraph III of the Complaint, Complainant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondents refused to allow APHIS officials to inspect their animals, facilities, and records. Therefore, the ALJ is reversed as to paragraph III of the Complaint, as explained in this Decision and Order, infra. In summary, of the 21 violations charged, I affirm the ALJ on the 15 violations he found, and I add the one violation alleged in paragraph III of the Complaint, for a total of 16 violations, leaving unproven only the four violations alleged in paragraph II of the Complaint and one of the three violations alleged in paragraph IV(E)(2) of the Complaint. Complainant raises four issues on appeal. The first issue concerns the ALJ's reasoning vis-a-vis the effective date of Respondents' voluntary license termination, as follows: I. The reasoning employed by the ALJ in the Decision to determine when the Respondents' license was terminated is inconsistent with the language in the regulations. Complainant's Appeal at 3. Should Complainant prevail in this argument, then both the January 25 and 26, 1996, inspections would be duly conducted inspections |