Shaler and Hall Quarry Company v. Bliss. shall be signed by the president and a majority of the trustees, and shall be verified by the oath of the president or secretary of said company, and filed in the office of the clerk of the county where the business of the company shall be carried on; and if any of said companies shall fail so to do, all tle trustees of the company shall be jointly and severally liable for all the debts of the company then existing, and for all that shall be contracted before such report shall be made." It is insisted by the plaintiffs' counsel, and doubtless correctly, that the legislature, in adopting this section, had in view that provision of the Constitution of 1846, which declares that "dues from corporations shall be secured by such individual liability of the corporators, and other means, as may be prescribed by law." The object of the provision, so far as relates to creditors, or persons dealing with the corporation, appears to have been to give such notoriety to the pecuniary condition of the company, through the publication of its annual statements, as to deprive it of credit, if it should be unworthy of it, and to give to persons to whom it might become indebted while the statement should be withheld, the personal responsibility of the trustees for such indebtedness. So much of that object as looks to the security of the creditor dealing with the corporation whilst it is in default, is accomplished by giving to the creditor the personal responsibility of those who are trustees when his debt is created. The theory of the statute in this respect, and of the present action, is, that the plaintiff, not finding the statement published which would have enabled him to decide whether the corporation was entitled to credit, entered into the contract in reliance upon the personal responsibility of the trustees. Upon that assumption, its reliance must have been upon the trustees who were such when the debt was created, and not upon persons who had ceased to be, or might thereafter become, trustees. The plaintiff cannot claim that it gave credit, under the provisions of the statute in question, to persons who were not trustees when the debt was contracted The true interpretation of the statute, I think, is, that three Mitchell v. Van Buren. circumstances must concur in point of time, to render a trustee liable, viz.: the existence of the debt; the existence of the default in making the report; and the trusteeship. Where these concur, the trustee is liable for all debts, if he was such trustee when the default occurred. If he was not a trustee at the time of the default, but became such afterwards, then his liability is limited to debts created while he remains trustee, and while the default continues. These positions are all substantially embraced in the decisions of this court in the cases of Garrison v. Howe (17 N. Y., 458), and Boughton v. Otis (21 id., 261). The plain letter of the statute, as well as its spirit, is against the liability of the defendants in this case. The only material words are "the trustees" shall be liable for the debts "that shall be contracted before such report shall be made." Only those who are trustees when the debts are contracted come within these terms. The judgment of the Supreme Court should be affirmed. MARVIN, J., delivered an opinion to the same effect, and all the judges concurred. Judgment affirmed. MITCHELL v. VAN BUREN et al. Upon a motion by a subsequent judgment creditor to set aside judgments confessed by his debtor under § 383 of the Code, the court may allow an amendment supporting the judgment by the signing and verifying a new statement stating the facts more specifically. APPEAL from the Supreme Court. On the 11th of October, 1856, John M. Olmstead and Horace Hanford recovered a judgment against Harmon Van Buren, for $337.77, and Levi Olmstead another judgment against the same defendant, for $406.50. Both these judgments were upon confession, and they were duly docketed in Delaware county. In March, 1860, Harmon Mitchell recovered a judgment Mitchell v. Van Buren. against Van Buren in an action; the particulars of this judg ment are not stated, but it was docketed in the same county. In February, 1862, Mitchel made a motion to set aside the judgments of the Olmsteads and Hanford, on account of the insufficiency of the statements. The motion was founded upon the confessions and records of these judgments, and upon an affidavit, stating the facts above quoted, and also that Van Buren was insolvent; that his real estate, upon which these judgments were liens, was about to be sold under foreclosures, and that there were other judgments against him. The motion was opposed, with affidavits showing the particulars and consideration of the debts for which the Olmstead judgments were confessed; that they were confessed in good faith, and that the insufficiency of the statements was occasioned by the ignorance of the person who drew them, who was not a lawyer; that the debtor continued to transact business afterwards, and that had the motion been made and the judgments set aside at an earlier day, the plaintiffs might, nevertheless, have collected their debts. An order was made at the special term, granting the motion unless new and verified statements should be subjoined to the judgments, stating the facts more specifically; granting leave to amend the judgments by such statements, and denying the motion if the judgments were so amended, and upon payment of costs. The order to be without prejudice to the creditors making the motion to bring an action to vacate the judgments. The order was affirmed at the general term, on appeal, with costs, and the moving party in the court below appealed to this court. Abraham Becker, for the appellant. William Gleason, for the respondents. DENIO, Ch. J. The question involved in this appeal is, whether the Supreme Court possesses power to authorize an amendment of the statement required to be signed and verified, upon the confession of a judgment, under sections 382, 383 Mitchell v. Van Buren. and 384 of the Code. It has been plausibly argued, that the judgments contemplated by these provisions are statutory proceedings, as distinguished from judgments of courts, and that if a mistake be made, so that it could be said that the statute has not been substantially complied with, the proceeding is void and incapable of amendment, the courts having no more power in the matter than they would have to relieve against the omission to record a deed or mortgage, or any other thing which is wholly regulated by statute, irrespective of the courts. But I think the argument is not warranted by the language of the legislature. The last mentioned section expressly declares that, upon the statement being filed, the clerk shall enter in the judgment book, a judgment of the Supreme or said Superior Court. These courts, as is well known, have a jurisdiction over their records, and have always been accustomed to relieve, upon a summary application, against the errors and mistakes of their officers and the suitors of the courts, by amendments and by allowing papers to be filed and entries made nunc pro tunc in furtherance of justice. The proceedings of the appellant in the matter under review, can only be justified upon this theory. For if the judgment is to be considered as a matter unconnected with the court, there would have been no jurisdiction to entertain the appellant's motion to set aside the judgment; and the question whether it conformed to the statute, or was void for the want of such conformity, could only be litigated in a regular action in which its validity should be collaterally brought in question. In my opinion, the court had the same power which they would have possessed if it had been rendered in an action actually pending in the court. The courts of original jurisdiction have always exercised a large and very beneficial power, in supplying deficiencies or remedying defects in judgments and other judicial proceedings existing in their courts. But it will not be necessary to refer to the cases, since the jurisdiction has been affirmed in its greatest extent by the legislature. The 173d section of the Code declares what may be done in this respect by the court, in Mitchell v. Van Buren. furtherance of justice, and on such terms as it may judge proper It may amend any proceeding, by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect, or by inserting other allegations material to the case. This is very broad language, and plainly embraces a case like the present, where it was shown that the proceeding was in good faith, and the intention of the parties was to create valid judgments for debts honestly due, to the amount stated in the judgment. But we are only concerned with the question of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, having power to permit the amendment, had the exclusive right to determine whether a proper case was made for the exercise of its jurisdiction, and to prescribe the terms upon which the permission should be accorded. It is a jurisdiction of the same kind with that which it exercises in relieving against defaults and slips in practice, and its determinations in such matters are not reviewable on appeal to this court. I think the order should be affirmed. WRIGHT, SELDEN, Rosekrans, BALCOM and MARVIN, Js., concurred. EMOTT, J. (dissenting). The character and effect of sections 382 and 383 of the Code, relative to judgments by confession have been too well settled by the authority of the Supreme Court and of this court to be any longer open to question. The requisitions of the Code in regard to the confession of judg ments, are not precisely conditions precedent, which must be complied with, or there is no judgment. A judgment by confession, which does not conform to what the Code prescribes, in respect to the particularity of the statement of the debt, or satisfy its requirements in any and every respect, is not utterly void as to all parties and for all purposes. It is nevertheless good as between the parties, and it cannot be avoided collaterally by third persons, but must be directly impeached and set aside. (Sheldon v. Stryker, 34 Barb., 116; Miller v. Earle, 24 N. Y., 110; Neusbaum v. Keim, id., 325. Such a judgment may be amended, but with what effect and how far to the prejudice of other cre |