I share your hope, Mr. Chairman, that the hearings will stir discussion and debate on this issue and lead to a resolution of it.

I also share the concern expressed in your bill that the functions of the Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute allegations of wrongdoing by high officials must be and should be insulated from the political control of the executive branch.

As the petty and gross misdeeds of Watergate continue to come to light, we see more clearly the need for some machinery independent of the executive which will ferret out and prosecute corruption and wrongdoing in high levels of government.

We need an independent guardian to keep the Executive branch. honest.

Experience and history have shown that the Department of Justice moves cautiously in cases involving allegations of wrongdoing committed by members of the executive. In part, this is so because the Department is simply not sufficiently staffed with experienced lawyers in the field of corrupt practices, but more important, because the Attorney General is often appointed as a reward for service in the most partisan of roles, that of campaign manager, as the Senator from Maryland has pointed out.

Many citizens commonly view the Attorney General as the chief political operative of the President, and when he is not thought of as the chief operative, too often he is regarded by the public as a man who serves his master. Even our best Attorneys General have never been free from suspicions that because they are political appointees of the President, they will be loyal to him over any other call of duty.

The Attorney General, however, must not be the President's chief political operative. His client is not only the President of the United States but includes the people. An important part of his job as Attorney General of the United States is to see to it that the government remains within the boundaries of the law. How can the people have confidence in their lawyer if they know or believe that he serves the personal and political interests of the President above any other call of duty?

I have come to the view that perhaps we ought to remove from the jurisdiction of the Attorney General those responsibilities which arouse the greatest suspicions on the part of the people. This would be the responsibility to investigate and prosecute allegations of wrongdoing by high-ranking officials in the executive branch. By removing this responsibility from the Attorney General's jurisdiction, we will have shielded him from the conflicts of loyalty real and apparent which have cast suspicion on his handling of the special class of cases involving improprieties on the part of the executive.

Wategate has demonstrated the real obstacle to prosecution of high political figures is ferreting out the initial evidence which points to the probability of criminal conduct. Once the basic facts are out in the open, the Government dares not fail to take action.

This has been true in the major scandals of this century, Teapot Dome, Watergate, and the Agnew case. In this respect, there are those that believe that Mr. Jaworski and his staff, who are on the payroll of the Department of Justice, are permitted to stay there only

because the threat of extreme political retribution prevents a recurrence of last November's events.

At any rate, Mr. Jaworski's success which has resulted in the postponement of Senate action to establish an independent special prosecutor for Watergate, does not meet the need for a long-term solution to the problem of assuring that official wrongdoing and corruption will be relentlessly investigated and prosecuted.

To accomplish the purpose of ferreting out information of wrongdoing by high level officials in the executive branch and assuring full investigation and prosecution, I propose that we consider establishing a permanent independent body to hear allegations of such wrongdoing. This body would have the power to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate and prosecute such cases.

An official body for receiving and hearing complaints against Federal officials would make the cover-up of crimes within the Government more difficult. The commission would serve the purpose of looking into allegations of wrongdoing by high officials of the executive branch without the dangers of abuse inherent in placing great powers in the hands of a single Government official to police all political office-holders and Government officials.

The proposal which I have outlined-establishment of a permanent independent commission on prosecution of alleged wrongdoings by members of the executive-would be a concrete step toward achieving a system of justice which could deal effectively with instances of official and political corruption.

This would not be a radical departure from our present system. There is precedent for removing various classes of actions from the jurisdiction of the Attorney General in the area of labor-management relations, equal employment opportunity, and in certain regulatory matters.

Some 42 States have statutes providing in various ways for the appointment of special prosecutors to prosecute cases involving persons in government who hold important offices in those branches and agencies of government controlling the administration of justice.

There may be other and better approaches. So that we can consider and study the matter further, I introduced S. 2978, legislation establishing a special commission to study the question of how the nation should prosecute offenses involving high levels of the executive branch, particularly when the Justice Department-its top officials appointed by and answerable to the White House is called upon to investigate itself and the White House.

Among the questions which the study commission should consider would be what categories of possible violations of Federal law and other instances of official misconduct should be subject to the jurisdiction of a permanent prosecution machinery? Who would have standing to bring accusations before it? Should there be a permanent prosecutor who serves for an extended term, such as 15 years? Do we want a special prosecutor on hand all the time-looking for some high official to prosecute?

Should we have instead a permanent independent and bipartisan commission empowered, under specified and appropriate circumstances, to designate a special prosecutor?

I have no instant answers to any of these questions. I do believe they, along with similar issues, should be studied by a commission consisting of experienced and able persons in the field of administration of justice; under my proposal they will be studied.

I recognize, Mr. Chairman, that perhaps your committee will fulfill the role of a temporary study commission I suggest. In that event, I trust that you will consider my proposal for establishment of a permanent commission empowered under appropriate and specified circumstances to designate a special prosecutor.

Mr. Chairman, I have abbreviated my testimony in the interest of time and I submit for the record the full text.

Senator ERVIN. Let the record show that the entire statement will be printed in full in the record immediately following Senator Cranston's remarks.

[The prepared statement of Senator Cranston follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR ALAN CRANSTON

I greatly appreciate the opportunity to explain the purpose of my bill (S. 2978) which would establish a commission for the study of a Permanent Independent Prosecutor.

Before beginning, I would like to thank the Chairman for holding these hearings on legislation which addresses a question basic to continued public confidence in our system of justice

How are we to keep politics out of the administration of justice?

In my view, the removal of political influence from the Department of Justice-even the appearance of such influence-is one of the most pressing reforms required by the discoveries of the events involved in Watergate.

I share the Chairman's hope that these hearings will stir discussion and debate on this issue.

I also share the concern expressed in S. 2803 that the functions of the Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute allegations or wrongdoing by high officials must be and should be insulated from the political control of the Executive Branch. We have seen dramatic evidence of the need for a prosecutor who will be independent of the persons who are the subject of the investigation and whose independence cannot be summarily intruded upon by those persons or their protectors.

As the petty and gross misdeeds of Watergate continue to come to light, we see more clearly the need for some machinery independent of the Executive which will ferret out and prosecute corruption and wrongdoing in high levels of Government.

We need an independent guardian to keep the Executive Branch honest. As the distinguished Chairman knows from his extensive studies in the law, the founders of the nation looked to the impeachment process as the means for dealing with misconduct and corruption by high Federal officeholders. They were acquainted with the English history of impeachment as a means of controlling corrupt Crown officers.

But impeachment by Congress of high Federal office holders in modern times ordinarily is too cumbersome and consumes too much of Congress' time. A procedure adequate for keeping individuals in the Executive branch in check in the 18th Century simply won't do for a Government employing over two million persons of whom some 20,000 or more hold important and responsible positions up to and including the Cabinet.

Since impeachment by Congress has been a remedy reserved only for the most extraordinary cases, we have been forced to rely principally on the Department of Justice-a creature of the Executive-to do the job of prosecuting wrongdoing alleged to be committed by members of the Executive branch.

Experience and history have shown that the Department of Justice moves slowly in such cases. In part because the Department simply is not sufficiently

staffed with experienced lawyers in the field of corrupt practices, but more important, because the Attorney General is often appointed as a reward for service in the most partisan of roles, that of campaign manager. This was the case in the Truman and Kennedy Administrations and in the Eisenhower and Nixon Administrations.

Many citizens commonly view the Attorney General as the chief political operative of the President and when he is not thought of as a chief operative, too often he is regarded by the public as a man who serves his master.

Even our best Attorneys General have never been free from suspicions because they are political appointees of the President to whom it is expected that they will be loyal.

The Attorney General, however, must not be the President's chief political operative. His client is not only the President of the United States, but includes the People. An important part of his job as Attorney General of the United States is to see to it that the Government remains within the boundaries of law. How can the People have confidence in their lawyer if they know or believe that he serves the personal and political interests of the President above any other call of duty?

As the distinguished Chairman has observed,

"A cornerstone of our system of justice is the faith of the American people in that system and their belief in its fairness."

In circumstances of apparent conflicts of interest, almost any action toward politically sensitive prosecutions will lead to political trouble. If the Attorney General seeks to prosecute persons in his own party he will be considered disloyal. As one writer puts it: "The realities of political life raise serious doubts that an investigation controlled by a prosecutor who owes his position and salary to those under investigation will be faithfully and rigorously pursued."

Last fall we saw the example of three high ranking lawyers in the Department of Justice, Archibald Cox, Elliott Richardson and William Ruckelshaus, who, in the words of Dean Bamberger of the Catholic University Law School, "came down on the side of a 'ministry of justice' chosen by the Executive with absolute, uncompromising fidelity to only one client-the people, whose causes allow no obligation to the President when the interests of people and President are in conflict."

Because of their choice to be loyal to duty, rather than to the President, they had to leave the Department.

In thinking about these issues, I have come to the view that perhaps we ought to cut out from the jurisdiction of the Attorney General those responsibilities which arouse the greatest suspicions on the part of the people. This would be the responsibility to investigate and prosecute allegations of wrongdoing by high ranking officials in the Executive Branch. By removing from the Attorney General jurisdiction to prosecute wrongdoing by members of the Executive branch, we will have shielded his office from the conflicts of loyalty -real and apparent-which have cast suspicion on his handling of the special class of cases involving improprieties on the part of the Executive.

For the time being, I hesitate to go so far as to establish the Attorney General as an independent body insulated from the normal political checks and accountability so essential to a democracy. In the first place, I fear the dangers inherent in placing great powers in the hands of one individual, no matter how honest he or she may be. Second, there are many policy considerations in the administration of justice which should be made accountable to the political process. As a corollary, basic policy decisions made through the democratic process should find their way into the administration of justice.

These are legitimate political considerations. But changes in policy are different from interference in the prosecution of individual cases or the politicallymotivated cover-up of official corruption, misconduct and wrongdoing.

Watergate has demonstrated that the real obstacle to prosecution of high political figures is ferreting out the initial evidence which points to the probability of criminal conduct. Once the basic facts are out in the open the Government dares not fail to take action. This has been true in the major scandals of this century-Teapot Dome, Watergate and the Agnew

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case. (In this respect, there are those who believe that Mr. Jaworski and his staff, who are on the payroll of the Department of Justice, are permitted to stay there only because the threat of extreme political retribution prevents a recurrence of last November's events. At any rate, Mr. Jaworski's success, which has resulted in the postponement of Senate action to establish an independent special prosecutor for Watergate, does not meet the need for a long term solution to the problem of assuring that official wrongdoing and corruption will be relentlessly investigated and prosecuted.)

To accomplish the purpose of ferreting out information of wrongdoing by high level officials in the Executive branch and assuring full investigation and prosecution, I propose that we consider establishing a permanent independent body to hear allegations of such wrongdoing. This body would have the power to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate and prosecute such

cases.

An official body for receiving and hearing complaints against federal officials would make cover-up of crimes within the Government more difficult. The commission would serve the purpose of looking into allegations of wrongdoing by high officials of the Executive branch without the dangers of abuse inherent in placing great powers in the hands of a single Government official to police all political office-holders and government officials.

The proposal which I have outlined-establishment of a permanent independent commission on prosecution of alleged wrongdoing by members of the Executive would be a concrete step toward achieving a system of justice which could deal effectively with instances of official and political corruption. This would not be a radical departure from our present system.

There is precedent for removing various classes of actions from the jurisdiction of the Attorney General in the area of labor-management relations, equal employment opportunity, and in certain regulatory matters.

Some 42 States have statutes providing in various ways for the appointment of special prosecutors to prosecute cases involving persons in Government who hold important offices in those branches and agencies of government controlling the administration of justice.

There may be other and better approaches. So that we can consider and study the matter further, I introduced S. 2978, legislation establishing a special commission to study the question of how the nation should prosecute offenses involving high levels of the Executive branch, particularly when the Justice Department-its top officials appointed by and answerable to the White House -is called upon to investigate itself and the White House.

The Commission which I am proposing to study the feasibility of a permanent prosecutor would be composed of six persons who have achieved eminence in a field of public service, including the administration of justice, and who would be appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The Attorney General would be an ex-officio member of the Commission.

To preserve further the independence of the Commission, the bill exempts the Commission from those provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act which place similar bodies under the control of a full-time federal employee, who typically is a political appointee of the Executive. This Commission will have the power to select and hire its own executive director and other personnel.

The Commission also is directed to consult with the Special Prosecutor to obtain the benefit of his experience.

The Commission will have one year in which to conduct its study and prepare its report. Following submission of the report to Congress and the President, the President and the Department of Justice are directed to respond to the recommendations of the Commission within 90 days. The Commission continues its existence in the meantime and does not expire until 90 days following the submission of the President's response to its recommendations. Among the questions which the study commission should consider would be: What categories of possible violations of federal law and other instances of official misconduct should be subject to the jurisdiction of a permanent prosecution machinery? What would trigger action by the permanent prosecution machinery? Who would have standing to bring accusations before it? Should there be a permanent prosecutor who serves for an extended term, such as