1972, "I don't think he (Peterson) has done anything improper," Dean said, “but he did make sure that the investigation was narrowed down to the very, very fine criminal thing, which was a break for us."

In April, 1973, after Dean and other White House aides had begun detailing the extent of the Watergate cover-up to prosecutors, eventually including allegations against Mr. Nixon himself, the President talked almost daily to Peterson, relying heavily on him for information and advice about strategy.

As late as April 27, 1973, when President Nixon learned of the accusations Dean was making against him, Mr. Nixon was assured by Petersen: "I've said to U.S. Attorney Harold H.) Titus 'We have to draw the line. We have no mandate to investigate the President. We investigate Watergate.'

At the same meeting, Petersen referred to the "very suspicious atmosphere" that existed at the U.S. attorney's office because of his frequent contacts with the White House.

Referring to the U.S. attorney's office, Petersen said:

"We had a kind of crisis of confidence night before last. I left to come over here and I left my two principal assistants to discourse with Silbert (Earl Silbert, the U.S. attorney who headed the original Watergate investigation) and the other three. And in effect it concerned me whether or not they were at ease with my reporting to you, and I pointed out to them that I had very specific instructions, discussed that with them before on that subject, and well

Mr. Nixon: Yes.

Petersen: As a consequence-I kind of laid in to Titus yesterday and it cleared the air a little bit, but there is a very suspicious atmosphere. They are concerned and scared. Ah-and I will check on this but I have absolutely no information at this point that

Mr. Nixon: Never heard anything, like that-
Petersen: No, sir. Absolutely not.

Petersen, a career Justice employee who rose through the ranks over 25 years, denied yesterday that he had done anything ethically or legally wrong in his conduct and supervision of the Watergate probe. "I'm not a whore," Petersen told reporters, “You newspaper people are disappointed that I'm not a whore. I walked through a minefield and came out clean."

There is no suggestion in the transcripts that Petersen was part of any formal conspiracy to foreclose the Watergate investigation. Rather, the recorded conversations show that he went along with the White House intention of keeping the probe in hand.

"Why did Petersen play the game so straight with us?" Mr. Nixon asked Dean on March 21.

"Because Petersen is a soldier," Dean replied. "He kept me informed. He told me when we had problems, where we had problems and the like. He believes in you and he believes in this administration." But Dean, added, Petersen, had done nothing illegal.

In the months following the break-in, Mr. Nixon and his aides dealt with then Attorney General Richard Kleindienst and acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray on Watergate matters, in addition to Petersen.

But as the pace of activity quickened in the spring of 1973, Kleindeinst_was by-passed because of his close association with former Attorney General John Mitchell, who became a principal target of the prosecutors and has since been indicted by a grand jury and charged with participating in the cover-up.

Gray, whom the President described at one point as "not very smart," ran into trouble in his confirmation hearings on Capitol Hill and later admitted destroying Watergate-related evidence. Gray then resigned, as did Kleindienst, who has never been charged with any Watergate-connected offense.

Both Kleindienst and Gray are portrayed in the transcripts as being, in effect, agents of the White House, which is normal enough for officials of the Justice Department, except when they are investigating the government and the White House itself.

In the March 21 meeting between Dean and Mr. Nixon, Dean said of Gray: "Not that I don't think Pat won't do what we want . . . like he is still keeping in touch with me. He is calling me. He has given me his hot line. We talk at night, how do you want me to handle this, et cetera . . ."

In Kleindienst's case, he was, for example directed to serve as liaison for the White House with the Senate Watergate committee, particularly with the vice chairman, Sen. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.). In a March 27, 1973, meeting of Mr. Nixon and presidential aides H. R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman and Ronald Ziegler, Haldeman said:

"Mitchell is very distressed that Kleindienst isn't stepping up to his job as the contact with the committee, getting Baker programed and all that (A) and (B) that he isn't getting-see Dean got turned off by the grand jury. Dean is not getting the information . . . on those things said at the grand jury. And Mitchell finds that absolutely incompetent and says it is Klein- supposed to be sending us . . .”

Petersen, on the other hand, is spared the errand-boy characterization. In the March 21 meeting, Dean and Nixon discussed the possibility of convening a new grand jury to hear Watergate evidence. Dean said:

"Henry Petersen is the only man I know bright enough and knowledgeable enough in the criminal laws and the process that really could tell us how this could be put together so that it did the maximum to carve it away with a minimum damage to individuals involved."

Dean's characterization of Petersen as a "soldier" who owed much to the Nixon administration is not significantly at odds with the picture painted by those who have worked with him in the Justice Department.

"He always had tremendous respect for the office of Attorney General and the office of the Presidency," said one former Justice official. "And I don't doubt that he had the same respect-even awe of this President. He had a very high opinion of John Mitchell.

"He was sort of awed by Nixon in the Oval Office," the former Justice official continued. "Well, it was probably the first time in his life he was in the Oval Office. What did they want him to say, 'Look . . . we're going to investigate you."

It was Mitchell, the Nixon administration's first Attorney General, who became Petersen's patron. In quick succession, the career Justice Department lawyer-Peterson had joined Justice in 1951-was promoted to positions normally occupied by political appointees-deputy assistant attorney general, acting assistant attorney general and finally assistant attorney general in charge of the criminal division.

Petersen has been frank in his praise of Mitchell, once describing him as "a man of high integrity and a tough prosecutor-he's such a refreshing breath of air after (former attorney general) Ramsey Clark." Petersen, like Mitchell publicly, shared a no-nonsense, hard-line view on "law and order," so much so that Petersen's associates throught for a time he was a Republican, which he is not.

Another popular image of Petersen, his former associates say, was also misleading that of the hard-bitten, crusty prosecutor who is frank almost to the point of bluntness. He is also, these sources say, the consummate bureaucrat, a civil servant first and foremost whose deference toward the Presidency left him incapable of resisting orders that emanated from the White House.

During the investigation of former Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, for instance, Petersen constantly argued that the President must be fully informed of details of the probe even though he conceded the danger of news leaks and expressed distrust of the White House.

Still, even as late as late summer when the Agnew investigation was under way, Petersen continued to enjoy a special relationship with the President and reported to him directly on his assessment of the Agnew case. Elliot L. Richardson, then the attorney general, recognized Petersen's unique role and at one time last August told him that his personal assessment of the Agnew case would mean more to Mr. Nixon than a similar report from Richardson.

Sources close to the prosecutors of the original Watergate burglary conspirators said yesterday that the prosecutors did not know that Petersen was talking to Dean or anyone else at the White House about the fruits of their investigation. These sources said that Petersen had frequently been briefed by the prosecutors because Petersen is in charge of the Justice Department's criminal division.

Petersen, the source said, gave the Watergate prosecutors "very little" direction during the beginning of the investigation and "never" prohibited the

prosecutors from opening up the investigation to include the possible role of the White House. One possible reason for that, the source said, is that the investigation never reached that stage at any rate.

The source, a person with intimate knowledge of the investigation in its early phases, said that the only time Petersen directed the prosecutors to pull back was when they attempted to investigate the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office. That order would have been consistent with Petersen's statements in the transcripts that the burglary was a national security matter beyond the purview of the criminal investigation.

As he did yesterday, Petersen said as early as April 17, 1973, that his actions were consistent with his duties as the chief of the Justice Department's criminal division. In an Oval Office conversation with Mr. Nixon, the President asked whether Petersen might have compromised himself by keeping the White House informed on the course of the investigation.

"No sir, I can disclose to an attorney for the government in the course of my work," Petersen told the President. "Dean was in addition to counsel for the President, obviously an attorney for the government-and there is not anything improper in that."

A short time later in the same conversation, Petersen expressed his view that only the House of Representatives could investigate the President.

"My understanding of law is-my understanding of our responsibilities, is that if it came to that I would have to come to you and say, 'We can't do that.' The only people who have jurisdiction to do that is the House of Representatives, as far as I'm concerned."

[From The New York Times, Oct. 25, 1973]
PERMANENT PROSECUTOR

(By Lloyd Cutler)

Washington-A half-century ago, Owen J. Roberts was appointed Special Prosecutor to investigate the Teapot Dome scandals, which had reached President Harding's Attorney General and other top members of his Administration. His appointment restored public confidence that those who had violated the public trust, whatever their rank, would be prosecuted. Public confidence was not misplaced.

This year, Archibald Cox was appointed Special Prosecutor for a similar purpose. His appointment also restored public confidence, now abruptly shattered by his dismissal.

In between, many Administrations have had their minor Watergates and Teapot Domes, and many Attorneys General have made an effort to investigate the alleged misdeeds of high officials in their own Administration or in the one preceding. But these investigations have been notable both for the lack of public confidence they commanded and for the paucity of the felony convictions they achieved.

This lack of confidence goes up and down with the public's perception of the moral fiber and the political behavior of each incumbent Attorney General. But it is never wholly absent. It derives primarily from the people's intuition that any Attorney General, to retain his office, must to some degree be the President's man, and that he must weigh in the balance of any major prosecutorial decision its potential for embarrassing his President. Last week removed any possible doubt on this point.

Public doubt that official and campaign misconduct will be prosecuted is perhaps the gravest weakness of our political system. The Congress should therefore move speedily to recreate the office of the Watergate Special Prosecutor. But we cannot afford to address the lack of public confidence only once every fifty years, when things get so bad that the existing institutions must be set aside. We need to address it on a continuing basis.

If a Special Prosecutor like Owen J. Roberts or Archibald Cox can hold the public confidence, why not have one all the time, on an institutional basis? Why not enact a statute creating a permanent office of Special or Public Prosecutor? The post would be filled by a distinguished lawyer appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, holding office for a

fifteen-year term to span a number of Administrations. He would be supported by his own staff and Congressional appropriation. He would be authorized to make investigations solely into charges involving official misconduct and campaign law violations, to present such cases to grand juries, and to prosecute them in the courts. To curb any possibility of political ambition, a Special Prosecutor could be barred from subsequently holding any elective Federal office.

There is a close and successful precedent for such an office. The office of the Comptroller General is now filled for a fifteen-year term by a Presidential appointee confirmed by the Senate. It has its own staff and Congressional appropriation. It is charged with investigating and reporting on the expenditure of public funds. The Comptroller General has always commanded the fullest public confidence.

There may be a constitutional objection raised to the idea of a specialized independent law-enforcement agency outside the executive branch, but it can be overcome. While the Constitution charges the President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," Congress has enacted and the President has signed many laws creating independent administrative agencies either within or outside the executive branch, empowered to issue binding orders, to impose civil penalties for violation, and to bring enforcement actions in the Federal courts. The Attorney General holds a statutory office not mentioned in the Constitution, and Congress certainly can transfer some of his present statutory powers to other officials. If though constitutionally necessary or politically desirable, the statute creating the new office could preserve the Attorney General's parallel power to prosecute such cases himself; and it could also authorize the President or the Attorney General to remove the Special Prosecutor for specified types of misconduct.

By creating a continuing Special Prosecutor for these limited purposes, we would not demean the office of the Attorney General. He still would be solely responsibile for enforcing the thousands of other laws on the statute books, and for advising the President on all legal issues. to the contrary, a continuing Special Prosecutor would enhance the Attorney General's credibility by relieving him of a role he cannot convincingly perform.

We can get some lasting public benefit out of Watergate. By making a minor improvement in the system, we would achieve a major result. We would restore public confidence that those who betray the public trust will be found out and punished.

[From the Washington Star-News, Mar. 26, 1974]

ERVIN PUSHES JUSTICE SHIFT

INDEPEDENT AGENCY SOUGHT

(By Orr Kelly)

An independent Department of Justice should be established to head off the "enormous potential danger" caused by a lack of trust in government institutions, Sen. Sam J. Ervin, D-N.C. said today.

Ervin's warning was contained in a prepared statement with which he opened four days of hearings on his proposal to separate the attorney general and the Justice Department from the executive branch of the government.

The senator, who was chairman of the committee that held the televised Watergate hearings, said the committee "heard testimony from witnesses that clearly revealed that the Department of Justice had been unduly politicized

At the very least, the appearance of justice, which as we all know is as important as justice itself, fell into disarray. One consequence, of enormous potential danger, is the growing distrust among the American people generally in their political leaders and institutions," he said.

"We must try to rectify that. These hearings are a beginning toward achieving the end of restoring trust in government."

The hearings are being held by the subcommittee on separation of powers, of which Ervin is chairman. In addition to his proposal for a separate department, the committee is also considering proposed legislation from Sen. Alan

Cranston, D-Calif., which would set up a commission to study the question of whether a permanent special prosecutor should be created.

The Justice Department is expected to object to the proposed legislation on the grounds that the task of prosecuting crimes is clearly something that belongs in the executive branch of the government. But Ervin rejected that contention.

"I am aware, of course, that some commentators argue that because the Constitution says that the president has a duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, the administration of justice is inherently executive and cannot be altered by the Congress.

"I firmly reject that notion. There is not one syllable in the Constitution that says that Congress cannot make the Justice Department independent of the President," Ervin said.

The hearings, which will be broadcast live by radio station WETA-FM, will be held today, tomorrow and Thursday with a final session next Tuesday.

Witnesses tomorrow will be Arthur J. Goldberg, former Supreme Court justice; Asst. Atty. Gen. Robert G. Dixon, Jr., and Burke Marshall, former assistant attorney general and now deputy dean of the Yale Law School.

Scheduled to be heard Thursday are former Sen. Charles E. Goodell, chairman of the Committee for Public Justice; Nicholas deB. Katzenbach and Ramsey Clark, both former attorneys general, and J. Lee Rankin, former assistant attorney general and solicitor general.

Next Tuesday, witnesses will be Archibald Cox, the former special prosecutor; Whitney North Seymour Jr., former U.S. attorney; former Atty. Gen. Richard G. Kleindienst; Rep. Fred B. Rooney, D-Pa., and Lloyd Cutler, former general counsel to the President's Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence.

[Editorial from the Ledger-Star, Norfolk, Va., Dec. 17, 1973]
"INSULATING" JUSTICE

Sen. Sam Ervin has come up with what will seem to some a drastic corrective to the possibility, brought out in the Watergate hearings, that the U.S. Department of Justice may be overly exposed to political pressures from the White House. But neither North Carolina's backwoodsy senator nor his sophisticated legal thinking is to be dismissed lightly. Sam Ervin knew a lot 'about government and politics before he attained celebrity status, and it's safe to say he has learned more in the past year.

He proposes, in legislation introduced the other day, that the Justice Department be made an independent agency entirely separate from the regular 'structure of the executive branch, headed by an attorney general who would not be a Cabinet member and who would serve a fixed, six-year term. Though the Justice head would be a presidential appointee, he would name department's lower-echelon officers, including the FBI director, and they would be answerable to and removable by the attorney general rather than the President.

the

The traumatic firing of the special Watergate prosecutor, Archibald Cox, last October springs to mind in this connection. But Sen. Ervin no doubt is worried as much about the Justice Department's possible vulnerability to less spectacularly public and perhaps in the long run more dangerous-exertions of execu'tive authority calculated to influence departmental actions.

There is, of course, nothing new about accusations of national administrations using the Justice Department for political purposes. But Watergate and other recent events have brought the department's function into question as never before. The new question raised now by Sen. Ervin is how much its activities need to be, in his words, "insulated from the direct political control of the executive branch of government to preserve the independence essential to the proper administration of justice."

Independent status for the department would indeed be a far-reaching step, with implications which first would have to be most carefully thought through and assessed. Since Sen. Ervin is probably the Congress' foremost constitutional authority, one assumes there would be no legal bar to structuring the Justice Department in this manner.