trolled by the United States is able to make its fullest and most effective contribution toward winning the war; and, second, that it will make this contribution at fair and reasonable rates without that profiteering which has unfortunately characterized some aspects of the shipping business, both before and since the United States entered the war.

In many of its phases the bill merely perfects and clarifies powers already being exercised by the President, through the instrumentality of the Shipping Board or the War Trade Board, under the emergency shipping fund provisions of the urgent deficiencies act of June 15, 1917, and the export control sections of the espionage act of June 15, 1917. In its other phases it adds new and important powers, the lack of which has been keenly felt during the past year.

The bill is in all respects a war measure, and the extraordinary powers granted therein expire not later than six months after the declaration of peace

Section 1 of the bill contains certain definitions which clarify the meaning of subsequent sections.

Section 2 authorizes the President to exercise the powers vested in him through such agencies as he may determine.

Section 3 limits the duration of the act to the proclamation of the treaty of peace, but provides that the President may extend its operation for a further period of six months if the tonnage shortage is so severe that national interests are jeopardized. It is apparent that the dislocation of tonnage arising out of the war will persist for some time after its conclusion, and that for a long time after the cessation of hostilities a large part of the tonnage of the various nations will be engaged in transporting back to their homes the millions of troops carried overseas. The period allowed in the present act is, therefore, the minimum consistent with proper preparedness for the future.

Section 4 provides that the act shall be without prejudice to powers previously granted.

Section 5 gives the President power to require charters of American vessels to be approved by him, so that he, or the agency through which he will act, may make certain that the vessels are being used for purposes conducive to winning the war, and that the charter rates which are charged and the terms which are imposed are not extortionate. The powers conferred in this section are at present being exercised indirectly, through the control of bunkers and stores, by the chartering committee of the Shipping Board. It seems preferable, however, that there should be direct statutory authority. Section 6 confers on the President power to regulate freight rates and terms of affreightment on American ships. This is a power at present conferred on the Shipping Board only with respect to common carriers engaged in coastwise trade. The extraordinary inflation of freight rates due to the ship shortage renders it imperative that the President should have this power with respect to all vessels in all trades.

Section 7 provides for prescribing the order of priority in which goods shall be carried or other services performed by vessels, and for making regulations regarding loading, discharging, lighterage, storage, bunkering, and other matters, designed to promote the efficient use of tonnage in the conduct of the war.

Section 8 authorizes the extension of the foregoing three sections to foreign vessels under charter to American citizens.

Section 9 gives direct authority to make rules and regulations regarding safety and protective devices in the war zone, and to exclude vessels not fit for war-zone service from the submarine zone. This power also is now being exercised indirectly, both through the Bureau of War-Risk Insurance, which charges an additional premium for vessels not properly camouflaged or armed, and through the War Trade Board, which denies bunker fuel and stores to vessels not suited for use in the war zone. This indirect method, however, is not always efficacious, and direct authority seems preferable.

Section 10 forbids the chartering of foreign vessels without the consent of the President. This is a necessary and entirely legitimate measure of control over foreign tonnage to enable the President to restrain the unregulated bidding for neutral vessels which for a time threatened to unduly inflate the neutral tonnage market. Similar legislation exists in Great Britain and France, and in practice the chartering committee in New York is exercising these powers through bunker control. Here again, however, direct statutory authority is preferable and will be more efficacious.

Section 11 perfects and expands existing law authorizing the requisitioning of vessels and contains provisions which the experience of the past year in the practical administration of the Shipping Board's requisitioning program has shown to be essential.

In the first place, it authorizes requisitioning not merely the "possession" but the "services" of the vessels. Under the present law (as embodied in the emergency shipping fund section of the urgent deficiency act of June 15, 1 17) only the "possession" of a vessel may be requisitioned; in other words, the owner can only be compelled to execute a "bare-ship" charter to the Government. In practice, however, it is often necessary to require a "time charter," under the terms of which not only the ship but the services of the crew are turned over to the Government. A vessel may, for instance, be in a foreign port, with a crew employed by the owner. As the law now stands, an unpatriotic shipowner, on receipt of an order requisitioning the vessel, can fold his arms and refuse to give the necessary orders to place the vessel and crew at the service of the Government. If he is recalcitrant, the Government must send out a crew to the foreign port to take over possession of the vessel, with consequent loss of time, which may be vital in the prosecution of the war. Section 11 as now drawn authorizes requisitioning the "services" of a vessel and gives authority to order the owner to give the master instructions necessary to place the vessel at the service of the United States. It does not contemplate conscription of the crews. It preserves the principle that civilian labor must be voluntary labor. It merely provides a weapon against shipowners, fortunately few in number, who might be disposed to shirk their duties to the Government in time of need.

In the second place, the section requires the President (or the agency designated by him) to transmit to the persons concerned not only a statement of the rental or hire which he deems to be just compensation for the use of the vessel, but a charter setting forth the terms other than hire which shall govern. This will make for certainty and avoid litigation and dispute. If the hire is not

accepted, recourse may be had to the Court of Claims, as under existing law.

Sections 12 and 13 confer important additional powers over dry docks, wharves, loading and discharging facilities, and warehouse equipment and terminal railways. They may be requisitioned, or acquired by purchase or lease, the priority of services performed by them may be directed, and rules regarding the conduct of their business may be made. At present there is no power to control the activities of essential facilities of this character. They are free to charge what the traffic will bear, and to do whatever work is most remunerative. Since our entry in the war, rates for wharfage and the use of dry docks have soared to extortionate heights. At a time when the profits of shipowners are being rigidly limited it would be a serious reproach if owners of essential terminal facilities were permitted to profiteer without restraint. Since most shipping is now directly or indirectly for Government_account, any unreasonable profits are made at the expense of the Treasury. The two sections are designed to meet this situation.

Section 14 provides the machinery for suits for just compensation. Section 15 authorizes the operation of vessels, dry docks, and terminal facilities, and provides for the disposition of net proceeds. Any net proceeds not directly required for the purposes of the act may be employed for the construction, requisitioning, or purchase of vessels, but only within the limit of the amounts authorized.

The Shipping Board has urged upon the committee the necessity for legislation along the lines indicated, and the bill has the unanimous support of the committee.

LONGEVITY PAY CLAIMS OF ARMY OFFICERS.

MAY 15, 1918.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union and ordered to be printed.

Mr. GRAHAM of Pennsylvania, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following

REPORT.

[To accompany H. R. 11626.]

The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill (H. R. 11626) to confer jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to certify certain findings of fact, and for other purposes, having considered the same, beg leave to report it back and to recommend that it do pass with the following amendment:

Amend line 21, on page 2, by inserting, after the word "allowed," the words "if made by any person who is an assignee of such claim, nor."

This bill is intended to secure the payment of certain just debts owed by the United States to certain officers of the United States Army for what is known as "longevity" pay.

In all branches of the military service the amount of pay which an officer receives is dependent upon the length of time he has served. Each grade has a certain fixed pay, and additional pay is given for each period of five years, for four successive periods.

Originally this extra pay was made in the form of rations, but this was changed by act of June 15, 1870, and instead of rations the officer received an allowance of 10 per cent of the salary of each officer in

money.

On February 24, 1881 (21 Stat. L., 346), Congress provided "the actual time of service in the Army or Navy, or both, shall be allowed all officers in computing their pay."

In the test case of Morton v. United States (19 C. Cls., 200), the Court of Claims held that the term "actual time of service," as used in the act of 1881 covered the time spent as a cadet at the Military Academy. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court this decision was affirmed on October 27, 1884 (U. S. v. Morton, 112 U. S., 1).

About five years ago Congress by statute discontinued pay based on service at the Military Academy.

This bill is intended to cover certain claims arising prior to the last-named action of Congress. There is no question raised, nor can any be raised, as to the legality of the claims in question. They are lawful debts owing by the United States to these officers.

After the decision of the Supreme Court above quoted, many claims for this additional or longevity pay were allowed and paid by the Treasury Department of our Government.

Had it not been for a change of comptrollers in the Treasury Department all of these claims would have been allowed and paid. But in 1890 a man came to that office who, in defiance of the Supreme Court ruling, refused to count the period served at the academy in computing the pay, and from 1890 down to 1908 this was the ruling of the Treasury Department. All whose claims were presented within those dates had their claims for the period of service in the academy disallowed.

In 1908 a new comptroller returned to the original ruling and the decision of the Supreme Court, and allowed the disputed period of time spent at the academy in computing the longevity pay.

This did not help those whose claims were disallowed in the interval, 1890 to 1908, for the comptroller held he had no power to reverse the ruling of the former comptrollers.

After 1908, 1,136 officers, whose claims aggregated nearly $1,000,000, were paid.

By reason of the act of Congress passed July 6, 1914, the claims of about 140 Confederate officers for longevity pay due them prior to entering the Confederate Army, viz, prior to April, 1861, were paid, aggregating about $150,000.

The bill if passed will cover the batch of claims disallowed between 1890 and 1908.

Some of these claims were proved in the Court of Claims, but remain unpaid. These, the bill provides, shall be certified to the Treasury Department and paid. As to the remainder, the act provides that they shall be paid by the accounting officer of the Treasury Department.

The bill confines recovery to the claimant or his widow, or his blood relations.

No assignee of any claim can recover on it. The claims can not become the prey of attorneys, for the fee is limited to 20 per cent on amount recovered, which seemed to the committee to be a just allowance and one in keeping with precedents already established by Congress.

These claims can not be presented to the Court of Claims, for there the statute of limitations would bar them.

They can not be presented to the Treasury Department, for the decision of the comptroller, which will not be reversed by a succeeding comptroller, is a complete bar. Nothing but an act of Congress can relieve this situation. The debt is a just one. The Congress is conferring no favor by this legislation, but merely remedying a wrong done to these claimants.

The Confederate claims, although a third of a century old, were paid.