should be the better by the knowledge of them; I do not find that, without the help of authority, I can in any kind, confer so profitable an addition unto that science, as by the collecting the rules and grounds dispersed throughout the body of the same laws. For hereby, no small light will be given. In new cases, such wherein there is no direct authority, to sound into the true conceit of the law, by depth of reason. In cases wherein the authorities do square and vary, to confirm the law, and make it received one way. And in cases where the law is cleared by authority; yet, nevertheless, to see more profoundly into the reasons of such judgments and ruled cases, and thereby to make more use of them for the decision of other cases, more doubtful. So that the uncertainty of the law, which is the principle and most just challenge that is made to the laws of our nation at this time, will, by this new strength laid to the foundation, somewhat the more settle, and be corrected. Neither will the use hereof be only in the deciding of doubts, and helping soundness of judgment, but further, in gracing of argument,-in correcting unprofitable subtlety,--and in reducing the same to a more sound and substantial sense of law; in reclaiming vulgar errors, and generally, in the amendment, in some measure, of the very nature and complexion of the whole law."

DWARRIS' MAXIMS.

I. "An act of Parliament" (says Dwarris) binds all persons, but such as are specially saved by it. "As if," says Sir R. Anderson, "a person be tenant in tail, and it is enacted that he shall have his land to him and his heirs, he has the fee and the tail is determined." Such is the example given; and it is to be hoped, it illustrates the rule; but then follows another case, of a statute, "taking his land from A. and giving it to B." simpliciter; the land goes from A. et touts ses droits queux il avet devant, sount extinct, sinon que sont save especialment par les provises en le act."a

II. A statute which gives corporal punishment does not bind an infant contra of other statutes, if they do not except infants.b III. Every statute made against an injury, gives a remedy by action, expressly or impliedly.c

IV. An act of Parliament cannot alter by reason of time; but the common law may, since cessante ratione cessat lex.d

V. When statutes are made, there are some things which are exempted and fore-prized out of the provisions thereof, by the law of reason, though not expressly mentioned: thus, things for necessity's sake, or to prevent a failure of justice, are excepted out of statutes.a

VI. Whenever an act gives any thing generally and without any special intention declared, or rationally to be inferred, it gives it always subject to the general control and order of the common law"b

VII. Whenever a statute gives or provides any thing, the common law provides all necessary remedies and requisites.c

VIII. În statutes, incidents are always supplied by intendments; in other words, whenever a power is given by a statute, every thing necessary to the making of it effectual, is given by implication; for the maxim is Quando lex aliquid concedit, concedere videtur et id, per quod devenitur ad illud. d

The statute of Gloucester, C. 5. giving an action of waste against tenant for life and tenant for years, doth impliedly give authority to him in the reversion, by himself or by another, to enter, to see if any waste be done.

If an action of waste should now be given by a statute against tenant in tail after possibility extinct, treble damages would, although not mentioned, be recoverable, e for such damages are recoverable under a former statute, by which an action of waste is given; and wherever an old action is given in a new case, all that before appertained to the action is likewise given.

IX. Quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur et omne, per quod

devenitur ad illud.

X. Wherever the provision of a statute is general, every thing which is necessary to make such provision effectual, is supplied by the common law.f

XI. If an offence be made felony by a statute, such statute does by necessary consequence, subject the offender, to the like attainder and forfeiture, and does require the like constuction as to those who shall be accounted accessaries before or after the fact, and to all other intents and purposes, as a felony at the common law does. g

XII. Misprision of felony is as well incidental to a felony created by a statute, as to one at the common law.

XIII. Lex uno ore omnes alloquitur; h a maxim which does not require illustration, but which Lord Coke says is the pride of the English law; and it is pre-eminently so, of the written law; which lays down one clear and certain rule for all descriptions of per

c The Protector v. Ashfield, Hard. 62. d 2 Inst. 306; 12 Rep. 130, 131.

e Bro. Wast. pl. 68.

ƒ 2 Inst. 48.

A 2 Inst. 184.

g 1 Inst. 235; 2 Inst 222, Bac. Abridg. tit. Statute.

sons, and is both known and invariable. For, the written and statute law, being of old duly and formally promulgated to the people, could never be what Lord Bacon says of Henry VII's laws, "as a nemo scit," and of these rules of conduct, no judge, producing a manuscript decision of some former sage of the law, an unreported case, can say: "Lo! I have the law in my sidepocket!" e

XIV. Nemo punitur sine injuria, facto, seu defalto.

The statute of Gloucester provided, that in the case of a disseisor aliening lands and not being able to satisfy the damages, they, to whose hands the tenements shall come, shall be charged with the damages, &c. Now, if the tenant cometh to the land by act of law which he cannot withstand, and where there is no act or default in him, he shall not be charged. As if the disseisor alien to A. and his heirs, and A. dieth without heir, the law (that there may be a tenant to the præcipe) casts the land upon the lord. In this case, if the lord doth not take any profits of the land, in a writ brought against him for the land, the ford may plead the special matter, and so discharge himself from the damages; for albeit he be a tenant of the land, yet is he no tenant (against his will) within the meaning of this law, because there is no wrong or default in him.a

XV. Actus legis nemini est damnosus-An act for enlarging the term granted to a patentee for the enjoyment of his patent, provided that in each case the power, privilege, or authority granted by the letters patent should become vested in more than five persons or their representatives, at any one time, otherwise than by devise or succession, all liberties, privileges, &c., should cease. The patentees having become bankrupts, it was held that this clause applied only to an assignment by act of the party, and not to an assignment or transfer by operation of law.b

XVI. Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget: "this is the case," says Lord Coke, c "where the words are plain without any scruple, and absolute without any saving."

XVII. Expressio eorum quæ tacite insunt, nihil operatur: as where an advowson descending to divers coparceners, they do make composition to present by turns; being no more than the law doth appoint. St. West' mr. 2, c. 5.d

XVIII. Quæcunque intra rationem legis inveniuntur, inira ipsam legem, esse judicantur.

XIX. So, Lex beneficialis rei consimili remedium præstat; maxims too obvious in their application to need any enforcement.

a 3 Inst. 47, 49, 50; 1 Hawk. c. 41, § 4 c 2 Inst.

b Watkins on Conveyancing.

d Bloxam and another, assignees, v. Elsee, 6 B. and C. 169.

⚫ 2 Inst. 533.

ƒ 2 Inst. 365.

The qualities, and incidents of statutes, as stated in the foregoing nineteen rules by Mr. Dwarris, which give their nature, parts, and properties, with incidental rules of interpretation, may be appropriately followed by the rules of interpretation of other distinguished writers on the same subject. Grotius, Puffendorf, Vattel, Rutherford, and Domat, have each devoted a chapter to this subject of interpretation; the doctrine and manifest equity and justice of which, have obtained general approbation, and are cited by commentators and distinguished jurists, as being wise and well established; rules, containing a combination of profound reasoning, with perspicuous and logical arrangement.

By interpretation, we speak of a necessity arising from the imperfection of language as a medium of expressing the intention. Interpretation, is the life of what would otherwise be the dead letter. Necessity, therefore, demands rules or laws of interpretation. These rules are fixed principles, deduced from right reason and rational equity, and are adopted by universal consent of nations, states, and lawgivers. In all treaties, conventions, and statutes, inasmuch as language is the instrument or medium of expressing the intent; circumstances, not the time forseen, give rise to different views, and sometimes to apparent contradictions, arising from the language of the same instrument. This creates a necessity for interpretation. Sometimes the language of a treaty, statute, or compact is obscure, sometimes the words are ambiguous, sometimes they express the meaning so imperfectly as either to fall short of expressing the true intention, or as not to express the whole of it, or else exceed the intention and express more than was designed. Both the end and the means of interpretation, will distinguish it from criticism. The end which criticism aims at, is to find out what are the words of the instrument or writer; whether for instance, it is forged or genuine; whether material parts have been added, or omitted, erased or altered. The end interpretation aims at, is to find out the intent of the statute, instrument, or writer; to clear up the meaning of words if they are obscure; to ascertain their sense if they are ambiguous; and to determine the design where the words express it imperfectly. We must not confound the two. The interpretor's work does not begin till the critic's is ended.a

a Rutherford's Inst. 402.

We make the following extracts, being forty-five maxims, from Vattel, which he applies as well to treaties and statutes, as to other compacts. He says:

"It is necessary to establish rules founded on reason, and authorized by the law of nature, capable of diffusing light over what is obscure, of determining what is uncertain, and, of frustrating the attempts of a contracting power void of good faith; beginning with maxims of justice and equity."

1. "The first general maxim of interpretation is, that it is not permitted to interpret what has no need of interpretation. When an act is conceived in clear and precise terms; when the sense is manifest, and leads to nothing absurd; there can be no reason to refuse the sense which this treaty naturally presents. elsewhere in search of conjectures, in order to restrain or extinguish it, is to endeavor to elude it."1

To go

2. "If he who can, and ought to have explained himself clearly and plainly, and has not done it, it is worse for him; he cannot be allowed to introduce subsequent restrictions which he has not expressed."

3. "Neither the one or the other of the interested parties or contracting powers, has a right to interpret the act for himself."

4. "On every occasion when a person has, and ought to have shown his intention, we take it for true against him what he has sufficintly declared. In order to know the true sense of the contract, attention ought principally to be paid to the words of him who promises, for he voluntarily binds himself by his words. If the words of him who accepts the conditions, relate to the words of him who offers them, we ought to regulate ourselves by the latter."

5. "It is a question to know what the contracting powers have agreed upon, in order to determine precisely on any particular occasion, what has been promised and accepted; not only what one of the parties has had the intention to promise; but also what the other has reasonably and sincerely thought to be promised,

NOTE 1.-This maxim or rule has been adopted in this State, in the adjudications of the courts. Jackson v. Lewis, 17 John. 477; Waterford and Whitehall Turnpike Co. v. People, 9 Barb. 170; People v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co. 13 N. Y. R. 80.