CRS-12 nothing about it. The philosophy of Humphrey's Executor, Id. at 355-356. In 1976, the Court revisited the issue in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and reaffirmed the ability of Congress to invest independent agencies with authority to perform their traditional functions and to shield their members from peremptory dismissal. All aspects of the Act are brought within the Commission's [T]he .... 424 And most recently, in Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 3188 n. 4, 3195-96, 3206-07 (1986), the Court took great pains to underscore the continued vitality of Humphrey's Executor.1 1 The litigation involving the removability of members of independent agencies focused on presidential appointees confirmed by senatorial consent. But the Court has long recognized Congress' authority to limit the Executive's power to remove inferior officers where it chooses to vest appointments in the President alone, department heads or the courts. We have no doubt that when Congress, by law, vests the Departments it may limit and restrict the power of removal regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may enact in CRS-13 The removal cases therefore establish a strong presumption for the validity of a provision which limits presidential removal authority to stated cause where the insulated official's functions are nonpolitical, i.e., are not part of the President's core constitutional responsibilities with respect to defense and foreign relations, and Congress has evidenced a clear intent to make the official independent. C.f., Kalaris v. Donovan, 697 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Members on Department of Labor's Benefits Review Board, who perform solely adjudicatory functions, may be removed in face of Congress' silence with respect to tenure.). The Director of the NPS would clearly appear to be such a nonpolitical officer and H.R. 3964 makes the intent to insulate that office from presidential control abundantly evident.2 United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886) (quoting Court of Claims). In Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), the foundation precedent for the theory of the unitary executive, the Court reaffirmed the applicability of its holding in Perkins to inferior officers not subject to Senate confirmation: "The condition upon which the power of Congress to provide for the removal of inferior officers rests is that it shall vest the appointment in someone other than the President with the consent of the Senate. Congress may not obtain the power and provide for the removal of such officer except on that condition." 272 U.S. at 162. See also Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 108 (D.D.C. 1973), holding that the Watergate Special Prosecutor, having been appointed by the Attorney General, did not "serve[] subject to ... Presidential control .... Congress therefore had the power directly to limit the circumstances under which Mr. Cox could be discharged," citing Perkins and Meyers. H.R. 3782 (Swift) utilizes the Perkins approach. That bill proposes the establishment of a "Special Environmental Counsel" within the Environmental Protection Agency who would be appointed by the EPA Administrator for a four year term but would be removable only for cause. The approach of H.R. 3964 (presidential appointment) was apparently considered but rejected because departmental appointment provided "double insulation" from presidential control and the Perkins precedent was seen as more directly supportive legally. 2 The foregoing discussion was premised on the assumption that the Director would perform no "quasi-legislative" or "quasi-adjudicatory" tasks. In fact, however, the Director will perform significant rulemaking and adjudicatory functions. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. 3 (1982) (rulemaking); 36 CFR Part 9 (Minerals Management) and Part 51 (Concession Contract and Permits). Performance of such functions, of course, places the Director well within the ambit of the Humphrey's Executor/Weiner precedents as interpreted by the CRS-14 We must note that the D.C. Circuit's recent decision in In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. granted sub nom, Morrison v. Olson, could raise some doubts as to these conclusions. The court in that case, in a 2-1 panel ruling, declared the statute establishing the Independent Counsel unconstitutional. Although the principal ground stated for the decision rested on its interpretation of the Appointments Clause, i.e., criminal prosecutors must be appointed by either the President with the advice and consent of the Senate (because they are "superior" officers) or by heads of departments but not by the courts, the court also propounded as an alternative ground of decision the notion of a unitary executive essentially as described above. Supreme Court's ultimate disposition of the case, which was argued on April 26, 1988, must be watched for its illumination on this issue. It may be said, however, that the appeals court's application of the unitary executive theory is novel and that the High Court's ultimate disposition is likely to be narrowly based and not reach the merits of this broad ranging theory. 2. Direct Reporting Requirements. The Congress' authority to impose direct reporting requirements on agency officials, while supported by the case law just reviewed, also rests independently on Congress' constitutional prerogative to inform itself in aid of its legislative functions. Both historical practice and judicial precedent support the validity of such provisions. Statutory requirements that executive branch officials report directly to the Congress trace their roots to the very first Congress. The legislation establishing the Treasury Department required the Secretary to report to Justice Department. CRS-15 Congress "and generally perform all such services relative to the finances, as he shall be directed to perform." Act of September 2, 1789, ch. 12, sec. 2, 1 Stat. 65, 66. Pursuant to this mandate, Alexander Hamilton, the first secretary of the Treasury, submitted seminal reports to the Congress at the direction of the House of Representatives. Each report begins with an acknowledgement of the order of the House which had directed him to report. See, e.g., Report of Public Credit, 2 Annals of Congress 1991 (1790); Report on a National Bank, id., 2031; Report on Manufactures, 3 Annals of Congress 971 (1791) ("The Secretary of the Treasury, in obedience to the order of the House of Representatives ..."). Prior to the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 20, which established the President's authority over the agency budget process, each agency had submitted its annual budget request directly to Congress. Finding this process inefficient and unwieldy, Congress created the Bureau of the Budget (now the Office of Management and Budget) to review the morass of agency budgetary information and to approve agency budget requests. See generally, L. Fisher, Presidential Spending Power, ch. 1 (1975). In addition to authority to review and approve agency budget requests, the Bureau was subsequently authorized to clear proposals for legislation or agency comments on proposed legislation, see Reorganization Act of 1939, ch. 36, tit. II, 53 Stat. 565 (codified at 31 U.S.C. 1108 (1982)). unequivocal. However, Congress' voluntary relinquishment of this authority has not been Either House may request an agency official to submit directly to it "an appropriation estimate or request, a request for an increase in that estimate or request, or a recommendation on meeting the financial needs of the Government." 31 U.S.C. 1108(e)(1982). Also, Congress has selectively required simultaneous or unaltered submission of budget requests and legislative CRS-16 proposals and comments. Thus, since 1973, Congress has mandated that the budget requests of the U.S. Postal Service, see Act of June 30, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-328, § 23, 88 Stat. 287 (codified at 39 U.S.C. § 2009 (1982)), and the U.S. International Trade Commission, see Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 175(a)(1), 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2232 (1976)), be submitted to Congress without revision, and that the budget requests and legislative proposals of other agencies be submitted concurrently to OMB. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5(a)(5), 88 Stat. 1896 (reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 522a app., at 318 (1976))(Privacy Protection Study Commission); Commodity Future Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93463, § 101(a)(3), 88 Stat. 1389 (1974) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 4a(h)(1)– (2)(1982)) (Commodity Future Trading Commission); Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, § 27(k), 86 Stat. 1207 (1972) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2076(k)(1982) (Consumer Product Safety Commission); Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-633, § 304(b)(7), 88 Stat. 2156 (1975) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1903(b)(7) (1982)) (National Transportation Safety Board); Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 202(a), 92 Stat. 1122 (codified at 5 U.S.c. § 1205(j)(1982) (Merit Systems Protections Board); Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 311, 90 Stat. 60 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1108(f)(1982)) (Interstate Commerce Commission); Department of Energy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 401, 91 Stat. 582 (codified at 42 U.S.c. § 717(j)(1982)) (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission); AMTRAK Improvement Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-146, § 12, 87 Stat. 553 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 601(d)(1976) (National Railroad Passenger Corporation); Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, § 2021, 87 Stat 990 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 712(f)(1982)) (U.S. Railway |