and enter into a treaty which had not even been presented to many of the countries.

Sir Esme said that he would like, if possible, for me to give him some more specific message to Sir Austen as to what we would do. I replied that, while of course we will sign the present form of treaty, I was not prepared to say yet whether any acceptable modifications can be made, particularly since I have no assurance that any modifications would be acceptable to France. He talked quite awhile on this subject and emphasized the fact that Sir Austen was willing to sign the treaty in its present form.

The Ambassador then said that the New York World had made a suggestion in which he thought there was considerable merit. Suppose, he said, some country should wish to lease a naval station near the United States and Egypt should wish to lease Alexandria to Italy. I replied that if we were going to undertake to meet every possible contingency which might arise in the world, we might as well abandon the treaty; that so far as the United States is concerned, we have no fear that any country is going to lease a naval station near the United States; that if it did, we would have the right to protect ourselves on the ground of self-defense. I added that Great Britain has the same right to protect whatever Dominions or interests it has which are national in their character just the same as it would have the right to protect the British Isles. He said that he thought that was so. I said that so far as Egypt is concerned, he knew that it was as unlikely that Egypt would grant its territory to any foreign country as it was that any of the South American countries would grant their territory and, on the other hand, no country could take any South American or Central American territory without going to war since no country in this hemisphere would grant it; that time, I pointed out, has passed. I said that the chance is so remote that it is not worth while trying specifically to guard against it in a treaty because if we should, Japan would want to protect its Manchurian, Korean and Chinese interests as everyone knows and France would want to do the same, and we did not know where it would end. I added that it would certainly destroy the efficacy of any treaty. I told the Ambassador that he would understand that the position of the New York World is dictated largely by politics. I said that so far as the United States is concerned, it is willing to take its chances about other countries leasing naval stations near the Panama Canal or near the United States. I certainly gave him to understand that I was not going to enter into any treaty covered over with all sorts of reservations and understandings and exchanges of notes that would be made a part of the treaty.

I then brought up a question which the Ambassador had raised in one of our discussions recently in connection with the treaty as to whether the other countries could come to Belgium's rescue if Germany should make war on Belgium. I said that if the parties are released as to the treaty-breaking state, as they are, I did not see why Belgium could not be protected. I said that, of course, a clause could be put into the treaty to the effect that if any of the participating nations became involved in war, the others would be automatically released, but that I understood that Great Britain would not want this as it would be putting the innocent and the guilty together. He said yes or something like that.

I told Sir Esme that I would see him before he went abroad and if I had anything concrete that I could give him I would do so, but that I understood that Sir Austen would be out of the country. Sir Esme was very much surprised and I read him that part of Mr. Houghton's telegram which states that Sir Austen was leaving on the 26th of May for Geneva and would be absent until the last part of June, and that he planned to leave on his vacation the first week in September. The Ambassador was very much surprised and said that he did not know of any business which Sir Austen had in Geneva now. I am [etc.]

FRANK B. KELLOGG

711.60 c 12Anti-War/27

The Minister in Poland (Stetson) to the Secretary of State

No. 1776

WARSAW, June 11, 1928.
[Received July 3.]

SIR: In confirmation of my telegraphic Despatch No. 36 of May 30, 8 P. M.," relative to Secretary Kellogg's pact for the renunciation of war, I now have the honor to transmit herewith the original text, in French, of the Aide Memoire handed me by Count Joseph Potocki on behalf of Foreign Minister Zaleski on May 30.

A translation of the above-mentioned Aide Memoire identical to that submitted in my telegraphic despatch No. 36 of May 30, 8 P. M., and modification thereto, No. 38 of June 5, 10 P. M.," except for the first two paragraphs, which I did not deem it necessary to include, is likewise enclosed.

I regret that the Department was misled by my No. 36 of May 30, 8 P. M., as to the exact nature of the text transmitted.

I have [etc.]

JOHN B. STETSON, Jr.

"Not printed.

[Enclosure Translation]

The Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Zaleski) to the American Minister (Stetson)

The initiative undertaken by the Government of the United States, having for its object the assuring of the maintenance of pacific relations between States through the condemnation of war and its renunciation as an instrument of national policy, has been received by the Polish Government with the keenest sympathy.

This initiative fully corresponds to the efforts that the Polish Government has not ceased to follow in its foreign policy, a policy which tends to strengthen the development of the general security.

It is in this spirit that the Polish Government is ready to accept the text of the anti-war pact proposed by the United States with the interpretation given by Mr. Kellogg in his speech of April 28 last, to wit:

that the pact prejudices in no way the obligations under the covenant of the League of Nations nor the rights and obligations under which the contracting parties are bound by international agreements entered into prior to this pact;

that all signatories of this pact shall preserve full rights to freedom of action as regards any powers which might break the terms of this pact;

that such an interpretation given in an appropriate text would be in accord with the obligations assumed by Poland under her international agreements;

that under these circumstances the Polish Government hopes that the Secretary of State of the United States will invite Poland to become one of the original signers of the pact;

however, it is understood that while accepting the pact as proposed by Mr. Kellogg with the above-mentioned interpretations given in his speech of April 28, Poland could not accept changes in the pact without further previous discussions. Poland feels for that reason her cooperation during the negotiations preceding the conclusion of the pact should not fail to be recognized.

711.9412Anti-War/30

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Olds) of a Conversation With the Japanese Chargé (Sawada), June 12, 1928

Mr. Sawada made an appointment at his own suggestion yesterday. He opened by saying that after his conversation with the Secretary last Friday he had talked again with Mr. Castle,78 who T8 William R. Castle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.

had told him that if Japan desired to suggest any modifications in the text of the proposed multilateral treaty, we should be notified of such modifications as soon as possible. He had accordingly wired his Government and had a reply, the substance of which he wished to state. For the present there were two modifications which his Government would like to put forward, it being understood that further suggestions might be made later on after the whole matter had been considered by the Cabinet in Japan.

1. The word "office" appearing in the opening paragraph of the Preamble does not seem to be an appropriate term to designate the Emperor who, under the Japanese Constitution, has the full authority to make treaties. Office may mean an administrative organ or bureau. I said this did not seem to me a very serious objection. If there was any ambiguity, I had no doubt it could be straightened out by a slight change of wording, or by substituting some other word. At any rate we would take the suggestion into consideration. Mr. Sawada went on to express his own idea of what might be done. He said that the whole phrase, including the word office, might be eliminated so that this part of the Preamble should read "deeply sensible that it is our solemn duty, etc".

2. They would like to strike out the words "in the case [names] of their respective peoples" where they appear in Article I of the treaty. Here again he said the objection was on constitutional grounds. In Japan, the entire power is in the Emperor and not in the people. I said this seemed to be rather a technical point. The phrase had no constitutional or legal meaning for us and I did not see how any such signification could really be attributed to it. He replied that the Privy Council of Japan, which had been considering the treaty, comprised a good many lawyers, and that they were probably viewing the situation in a technical light. I told him that in our consideration of this treaty we would not be disposed to listen very much to jurists. This was not that kind of treaty. On the whole, I thought we should like to keep the phrase in question, and expressed the hope that on reflection Japan would agree with us that it was good material. However, I said we would also take into consideration this second suggestion.

The Chargé again reserved the right to make further suggestions in case the Cabinet of his Government desired to make them. He thought it improbable that any further suggestions would be made. Mr. Sawada concluded by referring to the arbitration and conciliation treaties.79 He said that his Government was inclined to suspend action on them until some conclusion was reached on the multilateral treaty. I expressed some surprise at this, and said that we

"See vol. III, pp. 135 ff.

23757642--14

had not thought there was any such connection between the two operations as to make one at all contingent upon the other. We were quite ready to go ahead with the arbitration and conciliation treaties and were doing so with all other Governments. We saw no reason why this should not be done. He said he would be glad to convey that view to his Government. He agreed that it would be desirable to complete the arbitration treaty before next August when the existing treaty expires. He wanted to know if I thought the multilateral treaty would be signed soon. I said I could not make any forecast on that, but that we were hopeful of an early termination of the negotiations.

R[OBERT] E. O[LDS]

711.4112Anti-War/146

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The French Ambassador in London has informed Sir Austen Chamberlain of the conversations which the French Ambassador in Washington had recently had with the United States Secretary of State in regard to the French reservations to the treaty for the renunciation of war. These reservations were:

1. Maintenance of existing treaties.

2. Freedom of action for all signatory powers against a power guilty of breaking the treaty.

It appears that the French Government would have preferred that these two reservations should be embodied in the treaty itself but that the Secretary of State had objected and had assured M. Claudel that they would be covered by the wording of the preamble.

If it were impossible to include the reservations in the body of the treaty the French Government would prefer that they should be contained in a protocol of equal value with the treaty.

Mr. Kellogg had replied that if this were done it might well happen that the Senate would accept the treaty but reject the protocol and this would cause an exceedingly embarrassing position.

The French Ambassador stated to Sir Austen Chamberlain that the French Government now fully realised this and had instructed M. Claudel to allow these reservations to be covered by the wording of the preamble, but that he should ask for the following words to be added to Article 2 for the sake of greater clarity: "in conformity with the principles enunciated in the preamble."

M. de Fleuriau had asked that His Majesty's Representative in Washington might be instructed to support this proposal. Mr. Chil