The proposals of my Government are: First. To reduce the size of any battleship to be built in the future from the present limit of 35,000 tons displacement to something under 30,000 tons; Secondly. To reduce the size of guns in battleships from the present limit of 16 inches [to] 13.5 inches; and, Thirdly. To extend the accepted life of the existing capital ships from 20 to 26 years, this involving a waiver by the powers of their full rights under the replacement tables agreed upon at Washington. Such an arrangement would naturally have to provide for some little elasticity on each side of that figure. It would obviously be of advantage if such a step were agreed upon that should be taken in time to enable it to become effective before the commencement of the capital ship replacement program which is provided for by the Washington convention." GIBSON 500.A15/691: Telegram The Chief of the American Representation on the Preparatory Commission (Gibson) to the Secretary of State GENEVA, March 24, 1928-12 p. m. 24. My 20, March 24, 4 p. m. Cushendun's letter handed me during final afternoon session of Commission and came as complete surprise. Cushendun and Admiral Kelly left immediately afterwards for London, so I had no opportunity to discuss proposals or learn why they were presented here. We have declined to discuss matter with press and have taken the stand that comment must come from Department. GIBSON 500.A15/777: Telegram The Ambassador in Belgium (Gibson) to the Secretary of State BRUSSELS, September 18, 1928-2 p. m. [Received 2:55 p. m.] 60. Loudon,25 chairman of the Preparatory Commission, writes that question of next meeting is under consideration and asks my opinion as to the date. British against fixing date at present. Germans and French insistent on early meeting (this insistence is due to internal political exigencies and delegates admit privately no progress can be expected). Loudon expresses opinion that it is unwise to fix date until United States "has defined its attitude in regard to the Anglo-French "J. Loudon of the Netherlands. compromise." 26 Request Department's instruction as to reply to be made. Department might wish to consider an answer to the effect that, while we think it is desirable to meet as soon as we can embark upon a second session with reasonable hope of progress, we feel that to hold another meeting like the last three merely to recognize deadlock and adjourn would be most unfortunate and in the long run would be prejudicial to eventual achievement. He requests prompt reply. 500.A15/777 : Telegram GIBSON The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Belgium (Gibson) [Paraphrase] WASHINGTON, September 19, 1928-1 p. m. 64. In regard to your 60, September 18, 2 p. m., you had better tell Loudon that you have referred his inquiry to me. As far as I can see, it cannot be answered until I have an opportunity to confer with the President who is leaving today for Vermont and does not expect to return to Washington until Saturday. A reply to the French and British notes on the naval agreement is now being considered.27 In my opinion its acceptance is not possible. Should we, however, state our objections the other powers will lay the blame for breaking up the Conference at our door. They will probably do the same if we send no reply. No answer has been sent by Italy. Any conference called in order to put through a compromise would of course be impossible. What course would you advise under the circumstances? In my opinion there is no intention of making an agreement on limitation on the part of any of the nations. The conference is insisted upon for political reasons. KELLOGG 500.A15/810: Telegram The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] BERNE, October 30, 1928-6 p. m. 104. Eric Colban, chief of the League Secretariat Disarmament Section, is leaving tonight to confer with Loudon in Paris. The Secretariat, according to reliable information, considers that it is 26 See pp. 264 ff. "See telegram No. 329, Sept. 25, 3 p. m., to the Chargé in France, p. 282. time to attempt to break the deadlock on the question of naval disarmament, and Colban intends to suggest that Loudon call together a group of naval experts of the naval powers for informal discussions of the whole question in the hope that a solution may be found. The outcome of such a scheme does not appear to me very hopeful, particularly if no new proposal has been worked out to submit to the meeting. The failure of the naval agreement between England and France is too recent for the willing acceptance by these Governments of new technical discussions unless the broad outlines are previously agreed to by the interested governments. Have mailed copy to Brussels and Paris. WILSON 500.A15/812: Telegram The Consul at Geneva (Rand) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] GENEVA, November 6, 1928-1 p. m. [Received 3: 40 p. m.] Referring to telegram 104, October 30, 6 p. m., from Legation at Berne. Eric Colban, back from Paris where he has seen Loudon, tells me that there is no intention on the part of Loudon of approaching the naval powers in regard to conversations preliminary to the meeting of the Preparatory Commission, because Loudon prefers to wait until the British Government replies to the American note concerning the Franco-British naval agreement. Colban added that to a certain extent the date of the next session of the Preparatory Commission would depend upon whether or not there were to be preliminary conversations and, therefore, upon the reply of the British Government. Apparently the initiative in this subject belongs to Great Britain rather than Loudon. A source which is usually well posted informs me confidentially that the French and British Governments are discussing the date of the next session of the Preparatory Commission. The British favor January or early February whether private conversations are held beforehand or not. Officials of the French Government are in agreement except Paul-Boncour, who favors leaving the date of the session unsettled until divergencies on naval questions have been discussed, since he is afraid that the next session may not be successful without preparation of this sort. Both Loudon and the French Government appear to prefer that the British take the initiative in approaching the American Government on the naval question. Copy to Gibson by mail. RAND 500.A15/818: Telegram The Ambassador in Belgium (Gibson) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] BRUSSELS, December 1, 1928-3 p. m. 79. Yesterday I discussed the future work of the Preparatory Commission with Loudon, the chairman of the Commission, who came from Paris in order to see me. In his opinion, to hold another meeting before some kind of agreement is reached between Great Britain and the United States would be disastrous. The French, he feels, now realize that further fruitless meetings are dangerous as allowing the Soviet Government a chance to cause trouble. No difficulty is expected by him in postponing meetings for about six months, but at the end of that time pressure for some sort of meeting is feared. In my opinion Loudon feels that by suggesting the resumption of discussions on the naval question through the Preparatory Commission he burnt his fingers, and he will now attempt to induce the governments interested to agree to postpone more or less indefinitely the meeting of the Commission on the theory that in an agreement between Great Britain and the United States lies the only hope for future progress. Loudon was informed by me that I could not give him the views of the Department on this subject, but that, in my personal opinion, I agreed that if it was obvious that no further progress was possible there was no purpose in holding a meeting. Wilson has been sent a copy. GIBSON 500.A15/822: Telegram The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] BERNE, December 6, 1928—4 p. m. [Received December 6-2: 15 p. m.] 118. Referring to Ambassador Gibson's 79, December 2[1], 3 p. m., and Consul Rand's 11, political, November 9.28 Drummond 29 seemed considerably worried in a recent conversation lest the next session of the Preparatory Commission should cause a wrangle between Great Britain and the United States. Believing that the character of the resolution adopted in the Assembly and the moral pledge to Germany Latter not printed. "Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary General of the League of Nations. necessitate an early meeting of the Preparatory Commission, Drummond is of opinion that it would be wise from a strategic point of view to call a short session in February with a limited agenda from which an attempt should be made to exclude naval questions. The date of future conference to cover all questions including naval could be placed sufficiently far in the future to allow the hope of some measure of agreement between the United States and Great Britain. For my part I concur in his fears of increased bitterness being given to the disagreement between the British and ourselves in the Preparatory Commission and believe that there is only a remote possibility that publicity and debate on naval questions can be prevented in view of the presence of the Russians. Loudon's program outlined in telegram 79 from Gibson appears much better and he should be urged to maintain it if possible. Nothing which may take place in the Preparatory Commission could be more important than our relations with Great Britain are to both of us. Gibson has been sent a copy. WILSON 500.A15/824: Telegram The Ambassador in Belgium (Gibson) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] BRUSSELS, December 10, 1928-5 p.m. [Received December 10-4:23 p. m.] 81. Referring to Minister Wilson's 118, December 6, 4 p. m. There is no purpose in seeking to convince Secretary General Drummond, although the governments of all principal members of the League, except Germany, are opposed to a meeting at an early date of the Preparatory Commission, if he feels that the calling of an early session is necessary, or if more specific instructions on this question are issued by the present meeting of the Council. Furthermore, it is highly probable that Loudon will concur in the view of the Secretary General. A meeting at the present time, in my opinion, cannot be other than harmful, and the value of the Secretary General's suggestion of a limited agenda from which naval matters are to be excluded is questionable; there has been general disregard of the agenda at former sessions, and I doubt if the stirring up of bad feeling by the Russians could be prevented, even if British and American delegates did not enter into discussion in such an eventuality; there would still be the danger that the cudgels would be taken up by the press in such a manner as to aggravate the situation. There might be, if there were any hope of general progress at the next session, some reason for running risks as to our relations with |